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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Statement Of The Problem: 
In some countries, a single urban agglomeration absorbs most of the urban 
population. This is identified as urban primacy. Countries that exhibit this 
phenomenon generally have most of their major economic and political activities 
concentrated in the primate city. In the 1992 Revision of World Urbanization 
Prospects, the United Nations (UNDESIPA, 1993, 21) asserted that 
The urban structure of a country is shaped by a number of 
factors, among them its history, topography, natural resources 
and climate. But economic factors are probably most important 
in understanding the location, size and growth of urban places. 
In the early stages of development, when a country is 
predominantly rural and has a low level of urbanization, it is 
economically more efficient to concentrate all the investments 
in infrastructure and manufacturing facilities in one location 
(Renaud, 1981, p. 107). In such a situation, the growth of a 
single city to primate status is virtually inevitable as 
government and administrative services, industry, commercial 
and financial activities, and transportation and communication 
networks are established, and as they expand. 
Although many factors affect urban primacy, the relationship between economic 
development and urban primacy has received increased attention from both scholars 
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many previous studies, by gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. Urban primacy 
is concerned with the disproportionate size of the largest city in a country; it is 
measured by some index of relative population concentration. Countries with similar 
urbanization levels may have different degree of urban primacy. Some countries, 
usually developing countries, may have urban population concentrated in a single 
primate city. Other countries have a more balanced distribution of urban population, 
with an integrated and symmetric system of cities that fits better with both the rank-
size (Pareto) distribution and central place theory. 
Economists and other scholars generally agree that economic development 
and urbanization are positively related in both developed and developing countries. 
Mills and Becker, for example, assert that "urbanization is a natural and inevitable 
consequence of economic development." (Mills and Becker, 1986, 17). Dekle and 
Eaton stress that data on urban activity over time and across countries indicate a 
strong correlation between economic growth and urbanization. "This relationship 
suggests that the benefits of proximity increasingly outweigh the cost of congestion 
as economies develop" (Dekel and Eaton, 1994, 2). 
While there may be agreement that economic development and urbanization 
are self reinforcing, there is no such agreement regarding the association between 
economic development .and urban primacy. Berry (1961) and Mehta (1964) found no 
clear relationship between urban primacy and economic development, but Mera 
(1973) and London (1987) found a positive relationship. In his analysis of 
developing countries, Mera found that the largest cities are more productive than 
other cities in a country. Also, he found that primacy of larger cities is more 
conductive to economic development than primacy of smaller cities. Ades and 
Glaeser (1995) found a positive but insignificant association between economic 
development and size of the largest city in a country. 
On the other hand, other studies found a negative relationship between urban 
primacy and economic development (Linsky, 1965; Owen and Witton, 1973; Rosen 
and Resnick, 1980; Renaud, 1981; Vining, 1985; Mutlu, 1989). Williamson (1965) 
sug~ested that urban primacy is often associated with underdevelopment or the early 
stages of development. Moomaw and Shatter (Forthcoming) report empirical 
evidence suggesting that urban primacy decreases as economic development 
mcreases. 
3 
Another finding is a curvilinear relationship. El-Shakhs (1972), Wheaton and 
Shishido(1891), De Cola (1984), and Petrakos and Brada (1989) found a bell-shaped 
effect of economic development on urban primacy. El-Shakhs reports that urban 
primacy is rare in the very early stages of developme~t, rises during the take-off 
stage, and decreases when the economy is developed, because of the spread effect. 
El-Shakhs concludes that primacy characterizes countries at intermediate levels of 
development and that log-normalcy in the urban system is found in fully mature 
( developed) economies. Wheaton and Shihido also find that a bell-shaped 
relationship exists between economic development and urban concentration. They 
show that optimal city size population increases with economic development up to an 
intermediate level of development and declines thereafter. 
It is important to note that the mentioned scholars used different primacy 
measures, different groups of countries, and different time frames to reach their 
conclusions. 
The curvilinear (bell-shaped) relationship between urban primacy and 
economic development is consistent with spread or trickle-down effects of growth 
pole cycles. The growth pole process can be divided into three stages. The first 
stage is triggered by the introduction of new ideas and innovations and by the 
existence of agglomeration economies, increasing return to scales, urbanization 
economies and transportation cost, in addition to the effect of government and trade 
policies. All these factors lead to concentration of people and activities in a single 
growth pole, usually the primate city. Alonso (1980) suggested that agglomeration 
economies and the high cost of developing urban infrastructure cause Third World 
countries at the early stage of modernization to concentrate their investment and 
therefore population into one or few large cities. Next, through the spread effect, 
with advances of transportation and communication, and the improvement of 
infrastructure, economic development becomes geographically dispersed creating 
multiple growth centers other than the primate city. In the third stage, innovation, 
education, capital formation, and technology spreads economic development to rural 
areas surrounding growth centers (Amos, 1990). Similarly, Walters (1985) stated 
that economic innovations originate in the larger urban centers and from there are 
expected to "trickle down" to progressively smaller cities in the urban hierarchy. 
Therefore, as Renaud (1981, 22) said, "most of the countries with a high primacy 
4 
value are in the early stage of development," or as El-Shakhs (1973, 26) concluded, 
urban primacy "decreases steadily as countries drive into economic maturity." 
Several studies have suggested that urban primacy has a negative impact on 
economic development (Hoselitz, 1955; Owen and Witton, 1973; Vining, 1985, and 
Portes, 1989). This negative effect is a result of diseconomies of scale and other 
disamenities or as Findley (1993, 19) put it, "The marginal costs of production 
exceeds marginal benefits." Moomaw and Shatter (1993) found that concentration 
in the primate city has a negative effect on economic growth. 
Several scholars have studied urban primacy from different perspectives. 
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Todaro (1984) focused on the excessive size of the largest city in the country and 
argued that an urban bias exists in developing countries due to the structure of their 
economies and due to their economic policies. Frey, Dietz and Marte (1986), for 
example, study the effects of investment dependence and export dependence on 
urban primacy and found that both measures of economic dependence had positive --
albeit insignificant -- effects on urban primacy (Frey et. al., 1986, 359). Berry (1971, 
138), in his study of South and Southeast Asia suggested that urban primacy may be 
greater in the inward looking countries of Southeast Asia, as opposed to the island 
countries that participate more fully in the international metropolitan economy. 
Elizondo and Krugman (1992) stated that a closed domestic market is a key factor in 
the emergence of urban primacy. They conclude that "in a relatively closed 
economy, the forward and backward linkages are strong enough to create and support 
a single large metropolis" (Elizondo and Krugman, 1992, 26). Ades and Glaeser 
(1995) and Moomaw and Shatter (forthcoming) provide empirical support for the 
Elizondo and Krugman result that concentration in a single city is negatively related 
to international trade. Ades and Glaeser ( 1995) also studied the role of the political 
system and political instability in determining the population of the largest city in a 
country. They found a positive relationship between the size of the largest city and 
both dictatorship and political instability. 
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Many of the researchers that have studied urban primacy from different 
perspectives will be mentioned when different schools of thought are discussed in the 
literature review chapter ( chapter II), and when different measures of urban primacy 
are investigated in chapter III. Furthermore, Chapters IV, V, andVI will cover a 
variety of researches when the determinants of urban primacy are analyzed. 
Objective Of The Study: 
The main purpose of this study is to determine factors that have an important effect 
on urban primacy and particularly to study the effect of economic d~velopment. One 
main hypothesis of this study is that the relationship between urban primacy and 
economic development is curvilinear. That is, at very early stages of development 
urban primacy is rare; then, as a country starts its development path, it increases with 
economic development until the country reaches an intermediate stage of 
development. As the country becomes more advanced, urban primacy eventually 
declines. A concentration of projects, activities, and people in a single primate city 
may be a necessary requirement at early stage of development. Then, with the 
"trickle down" effects, multiple centers are created which lessens the relative 
importance of the single largest city. 
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We will accomplish our objectives and test hypotheses using pooled time-
series and cross-sectional data analysis, commonly known as panel data analysis. 
We, first, will discuss different measures of urban primacy and show that using a 
primacy index that is based on total urban population leads to inaccurate conclusions. 
We will use an index that does not depend on the various arbitrary definitions of 
urban population. Thus, we will have greater confidence in the cross-country results 
than if we use urban population. 
Second, we will test the effects of economic development and other factors 
on urban primacy using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression method. Then we 
will add groups and time effects and compare that to results of OLS without 
countries and time effect. This study will investigate the model when the three 
advanced countries·are dropped, and analyze the data when the lagged dependent 
variable is added to the model. It will also study the model when the independent 
variables are presented at earlier period of time 
Third, because some political variables do not change over a short period of 
time and due to missing data of these variables for some years, we will use a cross-
sectional analysis that tests the effect of these variables on urban primacy. 
The final empirical step is to use largest city size as dependent variable 
instead of urban primacy index and compare the results using the two dependent 
variables and Ades and Gleaser's (1995) results. 
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Our sample includes all non-socialist (non-former socialist) Asian (excluding 
Middle Eastern), Latin American, and North American countries that have 
population of 2 million or more and that have available data. The time periods of 
this study are 1960, 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, and 1990. More discussion about 
the data is presented in Chapter IV. Also, descriptive statistics are available in 
Appendix 2 
Importance Of The Study: 
Unlike most of previous empirical works, this study uses panel data techniques. 
Using panel data analysis has many advantages (to be discussed in detail in Chapter 
IV), one of which is a substantial increase in degrees of freedom. 
Different scholars use different sets of variables. Some scholars emphasize 
the economic factors that affect urban primacy; others concentrate on world system 
and uneven international relations; some try to test political effects and government 
policies; and just a few look broadly at all the different factors that may affect urban 
primacy. One of the most significant contributions of this study lies in the fact that it 
considers economic, international, political, and demographic aspects that can help 
explain the rise and decline of urban primacy. 
Another important contribution of this study is adding group and time effects 
and the comparison of the result of ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with and 
without group and time effects. This is because pure cross-sectional studies probably 
omit relevant variables, creating a strong possibility that important coefficients will 
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be biased. Using the panel data technique and testing for country and time effects 
help to avoid this bias. 
Another contribution is the use of a primacy measure t~at allows cross-
country comparisons. Thus, it seeks to reduce the alternative measures of urban 
primacy to a single measure that leads to comparable and valid conclusions. Testing 
the impact of some important factors on urban primacy will give us a broader picture 
of the mechanism that leads to the interaction of all variables in the model. 
With regard to policy implications, explaining the relationship between urban 
primacy and other factors, especially economic development, helps planners and 
policy makers distinguish. controllable and uncontrollable factors so they can predict 
urbanization trends and patterns in developing countries and plan for the future with 
the right tools and with the least cost and high efficiency. El-Shakhs (1972,30) 
stated that 
if the future trend of changes in a city size distribution could be 
predicted, several policy choices with regard to type and 
location of investments, political and administrative structure, 
and urban development and planning could be made more 
efficiently and intelligently .. 
Finally, the time period from 1960 to 1990 is sufficient to show policy 
makers how time has affected urban primacy. 
Organization Of The Study: 
After the introductory chapter which includes a survey of the relevant 
theoretical literature and empirical studies on the relationship between urban primacy 
and economic development, chapter II presents an additional literature review that 
covers a wide range of relevant economic, political, social, local, and international 
.z.-vL 
relation topics. 
Chapter III begins by operationalizing definitions of urban primacy and 
economic development. It also discusses different measures of urban primacy and 
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various indicators of economic development, and recommends which measure to use. 
Chapter IV builds a model that shows the effects of independent variables on 
urban primacy. First, we compare, empirically, several common measures of urban 
primacy with the one that fits the criteria established in chapter III. Then, we run 
OLS regressions without and with groups and time effects and compare the results. 
Different estimates, models, and samples are used to examine robustness. The final 
· part of chapter IV deals with lagged dependent variable and the independent 
variables at earlier period of time. Concluding remarks will be presented at the end 
of chapter IV. 
Chapter V investigates cross-sectional data for some of the variables that do 
not change for prolonged period of time such as some political variables, or variables 
that have missing data for some of the periods that are included in this study. 
In chapter VI we will run regression analysis with largest city size and urban 
primacy as dependent variables using this study's equations and those of Ades and 
Glaeser and compare the results. 
Finally, in chapter VII, a summary of the study and conclusion of the 
findings will be provided, and recommendations for future studies will be discussed. 
CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction: 
Although references to the literature throughout this study place our work in the 
context of previous work and show its originality, some topics are mentioned 
without in-depth discussion This chapter discusses these topics at some length. All 
topics, in one way or another, are linked to the main theme of this dissertation: urban 
primacy and economic development. They give the reader a broader picture of the 
development and primacy dilemma. 
We will, first, survey the pattern and trends of urbanization in the world. 
Then, we will summarize the major theories of economic development and urban 
primacy. We start with modernization theory, considered a classical theory of 
economic development and urbanization. It emphasizes economic factors, such as 
higher income, higher human and physical capital and international trade and foreign 
aid, as the primary elements of development. It argues, in general, that economic 
development and urban primacy are positively related. The second theory 
emphasizes ecological aspects such as population size, transportation and 
communication technology, and other environmental factors, as major forces that 
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affect economic development and urban primacy. Political aspects have been the 
main elements of the other theories: dependency and world system theories, and 
urban bias theory. Dependency theory stresses that a relationship with capitalist 
countries is harmful to development in developing countries; and it views urban 
primacy as a result of this uneven relationship. Urban bias theory shifts the conflict 
from .the international scene to within the national borders. Urban bias theory 
stresses that the poverty and underdevelopment of rural areas is caused by the 
extraction of countryside wealth by urban residents. 
The third topic to be discussed is the overurbanization phenomenon and the 
role of cities, especially large cities, in the national economy. Next, we will discuss 
the puzzling dilemma of efficiency verses equity which has to be resolved by policy 
makers. Then the focus will be on economies of scale and agglomeration economies 
that have an effect on economic development and urban primacy. Finally, a 
summary will end this chapter. 
World Urbanization Trends and Prospects: 
Bairoch (1988, xvii) states that 
two centuries ago, one person in ten lived in a city. Today, the 
ratio is one person in four; in twenty years, it will be one in two-
-a proportion already surpassed in developing countries. Two 
centuries ago, neither of the largest cities in the world, London 
and Peking, had a population as much as a million, and in the 
entire world, there were fewer than ninety cities with population 
in excess of 100,000. By 1985, there were between 32 and 36 
cities with population of more than five million and there are 
more than 2300 cities with population of more than 100,000. 
Clearly, then, the problem of the city and of its impact on 
economic life directly shapes the existence of the greater part of 
humanity. 
Todaro (1984, 7) asserts that 
one of the most significant demographic phenomena of modem 
times and one that promises to loom even larger in the future is 
the rapid growth of cities in developing countries. 
There is a wide variation in urbanization patterns around the world. While 
13 
urbanization has slowed down in developed countries, rapid urbanization continues 
in developing countries and is projected to continue in the next century. At mid 
1990, 43% (2.3 billion) of the world population lived in urban areas. The level of 
urbanization is projected to cross the 50 percent mark in 2005. By 2025, more than 
three fifth of the world population will live in urban areas. In 1950, urban population 
accounted only for 16 percent of the developing nations' total population, 285 
million people. By 1970, that percentage had risen to 25 and by 1990, to 34 percent, 
1.4 billion people. It is projected to reach 57 percent in 2025 with over 4 billion 
inhabitants. By 1990, approximately 2.3 billion people in the world lived in urban 
areas, 61 percent in developing countries. It is projected by 2025 that number will 
increase to about 5.2 billion, of whom 77 percent will live in developing world 
(UNDIESA, 1991; UNDESIPA, 1993). 
The world's urban population growth rate for 1985-1990 is estimated at 2. 7 
percent per year. It is expected to be about 2.5 percent at the tum of the century, and 
to be below 2 percent for the first time in 2020-2025. At these rates, the world's 
urban population doubles in about thirty years. In the developed world, the urban 
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population has been growing at about 1 percent per year since 1980-1985, and it is 
expected to decline to 0.6 percent in 2020-2025, doubling in about 100 years. Urban 
population growth rates are much faster in developing countries. Growth exceeded 4 
percent in 1950-1955 and 5 percent in 1955-1960. This rate was 3.8 percent during 
1985-1990. It is projected to be less than 3 percent in 2010-2015, and it will decline 
to 2.4 percent in 2020-2025 (UNDESIPA, 1993). In the last half of the twentieth 
century the urban population of the developing countries doubled every 15 to 20 
years. 
To show the different patterns of urbanization and urban growth between 
developed and less developed countries, Kasarda and Parnell (1993) compare the 
growth of Mexico City and Sao Paulo to that of New York City. In 1950, Mexico 
City and Sao Paulo had 3.1 and 2.8 million inhabitants; they are expected to reach 
25 and 22 million, respectively, by the year 2000. It took New York City (the 
world's largest metropolis in 1950) a century and a half to expand by 8 million 
residents. Clearly, Mexico City and Sao Paulo matched this growth in less than 15 
years. 
A significant proportion of the world's urban population will live in large 
cities in the 21st century. In 1990, 33 percent of the world's urban population 
resided in agglomerations of size 1 million or more inhabitants and 10 percent in 
agglomerations containing 8 million or more (UNDIESA, 1991, 20). It is projected 
that, by the year 2000, 6 of the 10 largest agglomerations of the world will be from 
Asia -- Tokyo, Shanghai, Beijing, Calcutta, Bombay and Jakarta; 2 of the 10 will be 
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from Latin America-- Mexico City and Sao Paulo; and the other 2 will be from North 
America -- New York City and Los Angeles. In 1970, there were 20 urban 
agglomerations in the world with 5 million or more inhabitants, 9 from developed 
countries. In 1990, there were 34 such agglomerations, one third of which were from 
developed world, and it is projected that in the year 2000 there will be 45 
agglomerations, only one fourth of which will be from the developed world 
(UNDIESA, 1991, 22). 
Increasingly, living in a developing country means living in a very large city. 
By the year 2000, over half of the developing countries' urban population will live in 
cities with 5 million or more inhabitants. By 2025, this could grow to 30 
percent.(Findley, 1993, 9 and 10). 
Kasarda and Parnell (1993, xiii) assert that 
the rapidly growing mega-cities (which in most cases are 
primate cities) of developing countries are among the important 
economic, social, and cultural centers of the world. Their 
importance, prosperity, and value to individual opportunity will 
likely continue to increase in the years ahead. 
The United Nations has defined mega-cities as those with 8 million or more 
inhabitants. In 1950, only two urban agglomerations were this large: New York 
with 12.3 million persons and London with 8.7 million people. According to the 
United Nations estimates, 20 agglomerations have now reached mega-city status. By 
the year 2000, it is projected that there will be 28 mega-cities (UNDIESA, 1991, 23). 
The mega-cities of many countries have a very large percentage of their 
country's total urban population. Of the 28 agglomerations that currently have 
reached mega-city status, or are projected to do so by 2000, 11 have 20 percent or 
more of their country's total urban population. Another 5 have between 15 and 20 
percent of their national urban population. Primacy of the mega-cities in the urban 
hierarchy is common in the developing world. 
In Asia, more than one half of Thailand's urban population resides in 
Bangkok and approximately one third of the urban populations of South Korea, 
Bangladesh, and the Philippines resides in Seoul, Dhaka and Metro Manila, 
respectively. Thailand, South Korea, Bangladesh, the Philippines, Indonesia, and 
Pakistan have one mega-city each, and each mega-city is generally between 3 and 4 
times the size of the next largest city in the country (UNDIESA, 1991, 26). 
Among Latin American mega-cities, 31 percent of the urban population of 
Mexico lives in Mexico City, and 41 percent of the urban population of Peru and 
Argentina currently resides in Lima and Buenos Aires, respectively. In 1990, the 
population of Mexico City was 6.4 times than that of the second largest 
(Guadalajara), and the population of Buenos Aires was 10 times than that of 
Cordoba. Brazil is the only Latin American country with two mega-cities whose 
combined populations make up 25 percent of Brazil's urban population; 15 percent 
live in Sao Paulo and 10 percent in Rio de Janeiro. The developed world has six 
agglomerations that reached a population of 8 million persons before 1990. 
Currently, the population of New York is only 9 percent and Los Angeles is only 6 
percent of the United States urban population. The urban population of Japan is 
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much more concentrated. In 1990, 19 percent of the urban population of Japan lived 
in Tokyo and another 9 percent in Osaka (UNDIESA, 1991, 28). 
During the period 1980-1990, mega-cities in developed countries grew 0. 7 
percent per annum, whereas mega-cities in Africa, Asia and Latin America grew 
annually at 3.9 percent, 3.3 percent, and 2.8 percent, respectively (UNDIESA, 1991, 
29). 
Economic Development and Urbanization Theories: 
The concepts of urbanization, economic development, political stability, 
international economic and political relations, and local social and administrative 
issues are all interrelated in the modem world. Therefore, economic and 
urbanization studies should consider all factors that affects the dependent variables of 
their studies. There are many theories of development and urbanization that can 
mainly be categorized under four major schools: Modernization, Dependency I 
World System, Ecological, and Urban Bias theories. 
We will discuss briefly each one of them and its effect on economic 
development and on urbanization -- specifically on urban primacy. 
Modernization school: 
The modernization school or as it is sometime called "developmentalist approach" 
emerged in 1950s and early 1960s. The basic hypothesis of this theory is that all 
countries go through progressive, irreversible, lengthy stages of development. This 
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theory also claims that urbanization patterns are unified and universal in all countries 
(Smith and London, 1990) 
One of the famous theories in the modernization school is Ro stow' s stages 
theory. Ro stow ( 1960) has described several stages of a nation's economic 
development. They are the (1) Traditional society, (2) Preconditions for take off, (3) 
Take off, (4) Drive to maturity, and (5) Age of high mass consumption. 
The developed countries all passed the stage of "take off into self-sustaining 
growth." To take off developing countries that are still in either the "traditional 
society" or the "pre-condition" stage have to follow a certain path of development 
(Todaro, 1985, 63). 
Traditional society is characterized by static equilibrium in a broad sense 
( economic, social, and political), fixed production techniques, unequal wealth 
distribution between the elite and peasants, and restricted social and geographical 
mobility. 
Pre-conditions for take off include a beginning of changes in attitudes, 
increased social and geographical mobility, improved transportation and 
communication infrastructure that facilitates ideas coming from the outside, an 
increased attention to education, and the emergence of entrepreneurs and 
industrialists. 
The third stage is the Take off which spans 20-30 years. During this period, 
the change is faster and the investment rate accelerates. Take off is also 
characterized by the development of one or more key sectors, and the existence of 
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political, social, and institutional frameworks that expedite the expantion of modem 
sectors. 
Drive to maturity encompasses the spread of technology from the key sector 
to other sectors of the economy, increases in per capita income, a predominantly 
urban labor force, and structural changes. At this stage, a nation has 3 options: to 
turn to international military and political power, to tum into a welfare state, or to 
reach high mass consumption, which is the fifth stage. 
The Age of mass consumption is characterized by suburbanization, 
automobile, and durable consumer goods. The United States reached this stage in 
1920 and Western European countries reached it in the 1950s. 
This theory has been criticized because the stages are overlapping and 
because it is difficult to test it scientifically. Also, there is little evidence that 
countries fall in these 5 stages. Empirical data show that increases in investment 
rates and growth do not occur in the 20-30 year span that Rostow designated for the 
take off stage. Rostow claimed that once that a nation reaches "take off', growth is 
irreversible. This claim is not valid; for example, Argentina was one of the richest 
countries at the beginning of this century, but now it is one of the poor countries. 
In addition to Rostow, members of the Chicago School claimed that free 
trade is the key to economic growth and that autonomous development is detrimental 
to it (Hein, 1992). 
The modernization school stresses that the development process requires a 
change in institutions and social attitude from traditional values to modem ones. It 
sometime argues that developing countries should adopt the economic and political 
systems developed in Western Europe and North America. 
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Modernization theorists stress that increasing domestic saving and investment 
rates is not sufficient for development; a country also needs to rely on foreign aid and 
loans, foreign investment and technology. Chenery and Eckstein (1970) found, 
based on data from Latin America, that foreign investment provides needed capital 
that the domestic.economy is unable to produce. Foreign investment can compensate 
for a low rate of domestic savings. They conclude that foreign investment is 
positively related to economic development. 
According to the modernization school, rapid urbanization occurs as a result 
of transition from traditional to modem society, and this expansion is positively 
related to economic development. The modernization school believes that cities are 
places for innovations, economic chE:lllges, and political transformation. It also 
believes that at the beginning of modernization and development, people, 
investment, and resources concentrate in one or a few large cities for efficiency and 
agglomeration economies reasons, and then, in later stage of development people and 
resources spread around the country. Developmentalists believe that cities have net 
generative effects on nations (El-Shakhs, 1972; Mera, 1973; Alonso, 1980; Wheaton 
and Shishido, 1981; Kelly and Williamson, 1984; Smith and London, 1990). 
Although the modernization school asserts that employment growth in the 
industrial sector is the main determinant of urban expansion, several studies have 
found that industry or manufacturing employment has no significant effect on 
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urbanization and primacy in the developing countries (Moir, 1976; Todaro, 1981; 
Bairoch, 1988; and Findley, 1993). Moomaw and Shatter (forthcoming) find that 
employment in industrial sector has no significant impact on urban primacy. 
Ecological Theory: 
Ecological theory is considered by many scholars as part of modernization school. 
< < 
We study it separately to stress the importance of the issues emphasized by this 
school. Ecological theory studies the relationship among population, environment, 
technology and organization (Duncan, 1959). According to Hawley (1950), change 
in a social organization is a result of the combined effects of population, technology, 
and environment. Hawley specifically emphasizes the effect of environment on 
social organization; and he defined environment as all factors external to the 
organism exerting an influence on its behavior. Meyer (1986) added changes in 
international trade and finance, along with cultural changes are important sources of 
change in social organization. 
Lenski and Nolan (1984) state that the techno-economic heritage of nations 
has an important impact on the pattern of development. Looking at the pre-industrial 
era, agrarian societies can do better with regard to development than horticultural 
societies. This happens because the former have a capacity for a variety of patterns 
such as urban system, specialization, standard currencies, administrative 
bureaucracies, and literacy .that the latter lack. These capacities help make the 
developmental changes much easier. 
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Nolan and Lenski (1985) demonstrate how the techno-economic heritage 
affects demographic patterns which in turn have an effect on the direction of a 
country's economic development. For instance, .old agrarian societies have a higher 
population density than new agrarian societies. Thus, an old agrarian society adopts 
labor-intensive methods, while a new agrarian society adopts capital-intensive 
methods as their development strategies. The different techno-economic past, also, 
results in different patterns of income inequality and international trade. Old 
agrarian countries (e.g., Asia) have a surplus oflabor, but because of high population 
density they have a relative scarcity jn land and capital due to the demand of people 
for various consumer goods ( e.g., shelter, food, etc.). This leads to less disparity in 
income distribution. On the other hand, new agrarian societies ( e.g., Latin America) 
have a surplus of land and perhaps capital but a relative scarcity in labor. Thus, a 
large amount of land and, maybe, capital will be accumulated by a few people which 
leads to a skewed distribution of income, and different pattern of urbanization than 
the rest of developing countries (Preston, 1979). 
The ecological school asserts that while there are different elite groups 
(landlords, government bureaucrats, industrialists, etc.), the common characteristic of 
all these groups is a self-serving attitude (Lenski, 1966). The ecological theory also 
asserts that a lower rate of mortality in comparison to that of fertility results in high 
population growth in rural areas which leads to agricultural labor surplus and 
increases the number of people "available for redistribution." Consequently, rural-
to-urban migration occurs, in addition to pull factors such as the perception of more 
favorable economic opportunities in cities (Spengler.and Myers, 1977; Hawley, 
1981; Bairoch, 1988). 
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Firebaugh (1979) argued that "urban pull" factors have been overemphasized 
while "rural push" factors have been underemphasized. Therefore, he tested "the 
premise that rural conditions in the Third World independently contribute to 
urbanward population movement" (Firebaugh, 1979, 201). He found "support for 
the contention that agriculture has independent positive effects on urbanization in 
underdeveloped nations in Asia and Latin America" (Firebaugh, 1979, 212). Thus, 
the ecological approach considers rural adversity to be a major determinant of urban 
growth in developing countries. 
Dependency/ World System School: 
The dependency school originated in Latin America as a response to the failure of 
traditional theories of modernization to explain economic stagnation in many Latin 
American countries. It also came as a reaction to the failure of the program of the 
United Nation Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) which had given 
hopes for increasing economic development and rising welfare of people. The 
ECLA developmental strategies of protectionism and inward looking policies such as 
import substitution failed in early 1960s. 
Frank (1966) was one of the early scholars who introduced dependency 
theory to readers in North America and West Europe. In his article, "The 
Development of Underdevelopment," Frank (1966, 202) argued that foreign 
investment causes a 
de-industrialization of the peripheral economy, as the 
productive infrastructure is reoriented to the raw material needs 
of the core country. This process of underdevelopment is 
deepened as cheap imports from the core drives the 
manufacturers of the indigenous producers out of business. 
According to Frank, a peripheral country can be developed only by 
withdrawing from the world capitalist system, which implies a large reduction in 
trade, aid, investment, and technology from the developed capitalist countries. Dos 
Santos (1970, 289-290) stated that 
Dependency is a conditioning situation in which the economics 
of one group of countries are conditioned by the development 
and expansion of others. A relationship of interdependence 
between two or more economics or between such economics 
and the world trading system becomes a dependent relationship 
when some countries can expand through self-impulsion while 
others, being in a dependentposition, can only expand as a 
reflection of the dominant countries, which may have positive 
or negative effects on their immediate development. 
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Thus, the basic argument of the dependency school is that the development of 
core countries comes through exploitation of peripheral countries and contributes to 
their underdevelopment. 
The dependency school became an ideology in Latin America during 1970s 
and resulted in official policies of import-substitution and a hostile attitude toward 
foreign investment. Import-substitution attempts to generate wealth through the 
domestic production of goods that were previously obtained from the international 
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market. It is accomplished through tariffs and other barriers that make foreign goods 
less competitive with local goods (Hein, 1992). 
According to dependency school, the relationship between core and periphery 
is based on the international division of labor, where core countries export 
manufacturing goods while periphery countries export primary and raw material 
goods. The multinational corporations take advantage of low wages in the periphery 
by establishing factories that produce goods at low cost. Thus multinational 
corporations get high profits while extracting the wealth of the periphery, which 
leads to distortion of domestic economies, slow economic growth, income inequality, 
and overurbanization (Kentor, 1981;Timberlake and Kentor, 1983; London, 1987, 
Bradshaw, 1985 and 1987; So, 1990; Hein, 1992 ). 
Dependency is not only an external, but also an internal phenomenon. It 
creates a dualistic economy (traditional and modern sectors). Modernity appears in 
the export sector, which relies on external markets and does not produce for local 
market. (Amin, 1976; De Janvry, 1981 ). The small elite, which includes state 
officials and exporters, uses the gains from exporting for luxury goods rather than 
investment. The elite is more associated with external forces in core countries than 
with their own people. Frank ( 1967) asserts that "it is capitalism, both world and 
national, which produced underdevelopment in the past and which still generates 
underdevelopment in the present". Therefore, dependency theory argues that 
development should be defined in terms of improving living standards for all people, 
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not just for a small elite at the expense of majority of people. Otherwise, that kind 
of development is not good at all (So, 1990, 165). 
While the modernization school emphasizes the reliance of the periphery on 
foreign aid and technology from core countries as a road to economic development, 
the dependency school argues that it is harmful for peripheral countries to rely upon 
foreign aid and foreign technology. They should rely upon their own resources and 
plan their own paths of development. Dependency theory also encourages trade 
between peripheral countries. Both theories, however, emphasize a tendency for 
"excess" urbanization. 
While modernization theorists view primacy as a potential development tool 
that may allow a nation to use its resources efficiently (Berry, 1971; El-Shakhs, 
1972), dependency theory views mega-cities and urban primacy as important 
mechanism of capitalist penetration that allow wealth to be transmitted from 
periphery to the core. Primate cities J.(eep peripheral nations underdeveloped due to 
disproportionate and uneven exchange with the hinterland. Peripheral countries must 
allocate additional resources for primate city services and infrastructure. These 
resources could be used for programs conductive to economic development 
(Armstrong and McGee, 1985). Castells{1977, 47-48) asserts that 
dependent urbanization causes a super-concentration in the 
urban areas (primate cities), and a considerable estrangement 
between those urban areas and the rest of the country. 
Castells suggests that dependent capitalism will also be characterized by high 
level of urban unemployment and inequality. 
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The latest modification in dependency theory is what is called a "mature 
development" where a highly developed country such Canada and Belgium can be 
dependent on foreign capital. This kind of dependency will, also, result in a negative 
long term effect on economic development (Hammer and Gartrell, 1986; See 
Bradshaw, 1988; Hein, 1992, So, 1990). 
World-system theory does not differ from dependency theory except that it is 
more global. Dependency theory is concerned with individual countries whereas 
world system theory chooses to study groups of nations that have similar conditions. 
Immanual Wallerstein (1974 and 1979) argues that capitalism created a world-
system that was globally divided into a core, a semi-periphery, and a periphery. 
These distinct divisions play different economic and political roles in the 
international system. "They are a historical product of the expansion of the world 
capitalist economy and various forms of imperialism." (Smith and London, 1990, 
576). The basic argument of world-system theory is that core countries mainly 
exploit the periphery, which results in uneven development in peripheral counties. 
The relationship among the three groups of countries is not only an economic 
relation but also a political and cultural one. The semiperiphery differs economically 
,politically, and culturally from both the core and the periphery. Its role is to protect 
the core against any threat from periphery and to become a second suppliers of raw 
materials needed by the core. This theory asserts that peripheral and semiperipheral 
nations exhibit higher levels of urban primacy than the core nations. London 
28 
(1987), Smith and London (1990), and Lyman (1992) found support for the world 
system influence on urban primacy. 
Urban Bias Theory: 
Urban bias theory has been associated mainly with the works of Michael Lipton 
(1977) and later with Robert Bates (1981 ). Lipton (1977) stated that the 
development process in developing countries is systematically biased in favor of 
urban areas relative to rural areas because of self-serving urban-based groups. 
Government favors urban areas through pricing, tax, investment policies which result 
in overtaxing and underdeveloping rural areas. This bias creates disparity between 
rural and urban areas in terms of wages, consumption and productivity levels which 
result in excess rural to urban migration that leads to overurbanization, slow 
economic growth, and inequality (Lipton, 1977, 145-59 and 270-86; 1984, 147). 
This bias occurs because rural areas are politically powerless. If the countryside 
were more powerful, it would get better prices for its products, more public 
investment, and fewer taxes (Varshney, 1993). According to Lipton (1977, 13) 
the most important class conflict in the poor countries of the 
world today is not between labor and capital. Nor is it between 
foreign and national interests. It is between rural classes and 
urban classes. The rural sector contains most of the poverty and 
most of the low-cost sources of potential advances; but the 
urban sector contains most of the articulateness, organization 
and power. So the urban classes have been able to win most of 
the rounds of struggle with the countryside but in so doing they 
have made the development process needlessly slow and unfair. 
Resource allocations, within the city and the villages as well as 
between them, reflect urban priorities rather than equity or 
efficiency. 
In contrast to modernization theory, urban bias theory asserts that fanners 
should remain in agricultural activities, instead of migrating to urban areas where 
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. they join the informal labor market. Lipton (1977) has pointed out that rural areas 
may actually subsidize urban residents, since prices for agricultural products are 
determined by urban markets, and food prices that are artificially low bring political 
benefits to urban leaders. "This urban bias eliminates the incentive for fanners to 
produce more crops; it may actually become cheaper to import food produced by 
agriculturally more efficient countries than to buy fann products grown locally" 
( UNDESIPA, 1993, 36). Urban bias may promote temporary economic growth in 
poor nations, but it will reduce efficiency and it will not produce long term equitable 
development that is possible only through aiding agriculture. (Lipton, 1977; 
Bradshaw, 1987, 226). 
According to Lipton, rural poverty is attributed to rural-urban relations within 
developing countries, and foreign involvem~nt is not important. Poverty and slow 
growth are statistically unrelated to involvement, or lack of it, in the world economy 
(Lipton, 1984, 157). Preston describes empirical findings "consistent with the view 
that spatial patterns of government expenditure bias patterns of city growth toward 
capital cities and toward the largest city in a country" (Preston, 1979, 204). Gugler 
states that urban bias and its accompanying rural exploitation are critical to 
understanding underdevelopment in many developing countries. He stated that the 
real reason "why poor people stay poor" is that urban elite funnel an inordinate share 
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of the resources of their societies into large cities, which have become "centers of 
power and privilege" (Gugler, 1982, 188). 
Bates (1981) argued that it is not enough to say that urban areas are powerful 
while rural areas are powerless. It is necessary to understand why that is the case and 
how the rural-urban relation can be changed. Vershney (1993, 14-15) identifies three 
steps in Bates works on African agriculture, 
First, to extract resources for the treasury, city and industry, 
African states set prices that hurt the countryside. Second, by 
selectively distributing state largesse (subsidies and projects), 
African states divide up the countryside into supporters that 
benefit from state action and opponents who are deprived of 
state generosity, and are frequently punished. Such policy 
induced splits pre-empt a united rural front. Third, 
independently of the divisive tactics of the state, rural collective 
action is difficult because (a) the agricultural sector is very large 
with each peasant having a small share of the product, and (b) it 
is dispersed, making communication difficult. The customary 
free-rider problem in such situation impedes collective action. 
Industry on the other hand is small and concentrated in the city, 
and the share of each producer in the market is large, making it 
worth while for each producer to organize. 
Urban bias as measured by the ratio of non-agricultural to agricultural productivity is 
positively related to urban primacy (London, 1987) and to overurbanization (London, 
1987; Bradshaw, 1985, 1987). 
Critiques: 
This section discusses some of the critiques of the theories just presented. 
With regard to .the modernization school, we summarize several critiques. First, the 
reality of developing countries contradicts basic modernization theory. There is a 
31 
pattern of urban primacy, urban poverty, and inequality that is very different from 
that of Western countries. (Smith and London, 1990). Second, although the 
modernization school asserts that employment growth in the industrial sector is the 
main determinant of urbanization, several studies have found that industry and 
manufacturing have no significant effect on urban growth and/or primacy in the 
developing countries (Moir, 1976; Todaro, 1981; Bairoch, 1988; Moomaw and 
Shatter, forthcoming). Third, Bradshaw (1987) wonders why urban growth 
continues despite the high rate of unemployment and underemployment in the 
service and informal sectors in large cities. The "bright light" theory asserts that 
migrants do not respond to the actual wage differential between rural and urban 
areas, but rather to the expected differential (Todaro, 1969, 1979; Rogers and 
Williamson, 1982). Rural-to-urban migration will continue as long as their expected 
wage exceeds their current rural wages, and as long as people in rural areas are 
attracted to the excitement of cities. Fourth, Kasarda and Crenshaw ( 1991) note that 
modernization and ecological theorists view inequality as an inherent property of 
social organization (Kasarda and Crenshaw, 1991, 485-486). 
The main criticism of the classical dependency theory relates to its claim that 
core countries in collaboration with the local elite exploit raw material and wealth of 
peripheral countries and result in underdevelopment. Some developing countries 
avoided dependency problems and moved toward economic independence and 
development. Using Brazil as an example, Evans (1979) argued that dependency and 
development can occur together. Others state that the high rate of development in 
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East Asian countries, such as Korea and Taiwan, resulted from government policies 
designed to attract foreign investment and to encourage export-led growth. Thus, 
dependency theory can not explain all nations' development experience (Smith and 
London, 1990; Hein, 1992). Thus, "dependent development" can increase economic 
development in the "modem" sector and probably increase inequality. 
In short, the dependency I world system school places a disproportionate 
emphasis on external power and gives inadequate attention to the internal causes of 
development (Portes, 1979; Chirot, 1981; London, 1987). 
Finally: The Journal of Development Studies issued a special volume on 
urban bias theory. Varshney (1993, 5-6) summarizes four critiques of the urban bias 
theory that emerged. 
First, the (urban bias) theory neglects political institutions. The 
urban bias outcome is not true across political systems (for 
example, democracy versus authoritarianism), or across 
ideological orientations of the ruling elite (pro-rural or pro-
industrial). How the polity and political institutions are 
organized, what objectives the political elites have, and how 
those objectives are expressed in the policy process may have 
varying implications not only for the power of the rural sector 
but also for its economic well-being. Second, the urban bias 
theory did not anticipate how technical change over time, 
especially of the green revolution variety, could begin to make 
the rural sector powerful. Third, the conception of how rural 
interests are expressed in politics is limited in urban bias theory 
to the strictly economic issues. That would not be such an 
omission, were it not damaging to the argument. Ethnic ( and 
religious) identities may cut across the rural and urban sectors. 
When they begin to dominate the political agenda of a country, 
they can obstruct a sectoral construction of rural interests in 
politics. The cross-cutting nature of rural identities may thus 
weaken the countryside more than the power of the city. 
Finally, ..... the urban-rural boundaries may at times be hard to 
detect. 
,.,,., 
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In his response, Lipton (1993) insists that urban bias is defined upon 
outcomes, not causes or processes, and these unfavorable economic outcomes are 
due to rural powerlessness. Lipton objects that contributions to this special volume 
concentrate more on the price-based interventions of the state and less on the 
expenditures-based interventions reducing the force of the arguments. The sum of all 
state interventions in rural areas will clinch whether an urban bias exists or not. 
Several developing nations have started to favor rural areas through price-based 
intervention, but non-price intervention may work in the other direction (Lipton, 
1993; Varshney, 1993). Bates (1993, 227-228) agrees with some of the critiques and 
states that 
Future work, they suggest, should focus more on institutions 
that structure political competition. It should develop a theory 
of public financial institutions: one that explains why they 
provide effective agencies of constraint in some countries but 
not in others. It should focus on the political significance of 
technical change and productivity growth in agriculture and of 
markets in ownership rights and claims to income that link the 
interests of town and country, thereby altering the structure of 
interests that drive policy choices in developing areas. 
Another criticism of the urban bias theory relates to the proxy used to 
measure urban bias, the ratio of non-agricultural to agricultural productivity. This 
proxy roughly represents the urban/ rural productivity differential. Kasarda and 
Crenshaw (1991, 492) state that interpreting this proxy as urban bias is problematic 
because; 
First, there is no guarantee that all modem production is located 
in urban areas for any given Third World country (e.g. 
extractive industries are highly productive and are generally 
located outside of cities). Second, this proxy variable does not 
guarantee that the productivity differential is related to an urban 
bias in public policies concerning infrastructural development, 
macroeconomic policy, or the placement of elite services. 
Finally, the variable at best measures the relative efficiency of 
urban areas over rural areas. 
Overurbaiiization and Role of Cities: 
Overurbanization is a term from the 1950s that refers to the degree to which urban 
population exceeds the general economic development or industrial labor force. A 
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nation suffers overurbanization when its urban population can not be supported by its 
level of economic development (Kentor, 1981; Tinberlake and Kentor, 1983; 
Brdshaw, 1985 and 1987; London, 1987; Smith, 1987; Kasarda and Crenshaw, 
1991 ). Bradshaw (1987) asserts that overurbanization is a sign of economic illness, 
rather than being a sign of development. 
Abu-Lughed (1965, 313) describes overurbanization as follows: 
Many students of urbanization have suggested that countries in 
the early stages of industrialization suffer an imbalance in both 
the size and distribution of their urban population, implying 
primarily that they have a higher percentage of people living in 
cities and towns than is "warranted" at their stage of economic 
development. The term used to describe this phenomenon is 
"overurbanization," which refers to the end result of excessive 
migration of un-and underemployed rural folk to cities in 
advance of adequate expansion of urban employment 
opportunities. One consequence of this premature migration is 
the high rate of unemployment in the labor forces of the great 
cities of Asia and Africa. 
Some scholars claimed that high rate of natural increase and migration from 
rural areas promoted by large urban center attractiveness led to overurbanization 
(Davis and Golden, 1954; Gibbs and Martin, 1962). 
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Sovani ( 1964) argues that the notion of overurbanization is vague and thus is 
an unsatisfactory analytical concept. Partly because of this vagueness, the analysis 
of its causes and consequences are inadequate. Furthermore, there is no reason to 
expect the developing countries to follow the same urbanization path as the presently 
"developed" countries. Sovani considers it just as reasonable to consider the core 
countries as "underurbanized" during their economic development. Kamerschen 
( 1969) confirmed Sovani' s conclusion that there is no "invariant positive correlation 
between rural pressure and overurbanization." 
Gugler (1982) defines overurbanization as: (1) rural-to-urban migration that 
results in a less than optimal allocation of labor between rural and urban sector, and 
(2) rural to urban migration that increase the cost of providing for a country's 
growing population. He thinks that the basic problem is one of misallocation. Too 
much labor and resources flowing into cities lead to underutilization and waste in 
urban areas, while rural areas are drained of potentially productive workers and fail 
to receive adequate investment. 
Graves and Sexton (1979) introduce a definition of overurbanization that 
involve net positive or negative external effects associated with city size. If the 
negative externalities dominate the positive externalities, the city may be said to be 
overurbanized. Timberlake and Kentor (1983) argued that dependence on foreign 
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capital investment leads to overurbanization. Smith (1987) argued that both 
overurbanization and economic stagnation result from dependent status in the world-
economy, and that, therefore, it is misleading to conceptualize stagnation as resulting 
from overurbanization. 
Many scholars argue that overurbanization leads to high levels of urban 
primacy, rapid rural to urban migration, saturated urban labor markets, overburdened 
public services, retarded economic development due to high costs of urban 
development, and income inequality (Lipton, 1977; Gugler, 1982, Gilbert and 
Gugler, 1982; Smith, 1987; Bairoch, 1988). Smith (1987) stresses that 
overurbanization is heavily influenced by the distortion and constraints of 
"dependent development" in the Third World. 
Overurbanization could be operationalized in several ways. Some researchers 
use an urban to industrial ratio ( Preston, 1979; Kentor, 1981 ; London, 1987) . 
.Other researchers use a residualized measure obtained by regressing the level of 
urbanization on the level of development (Timberlake and Kentor, 1983; Bradshaw, 
1985 and 1987). 
With regard to the role of cities, many authors doubt the "generative" nature 
of city growth in the developing countries. Cities, in particular large cities, are 
regarded as "parasitic" because they drain rural areas of people and resources into as 
increasingly unhealthy urban environment (London, 1980; Gugler, 1982). 
It is claimed that the primate cities retard development of other cities and 
have a parasitic effect on the economy. Hoselitz states that "a city will be designated 
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as generative if its impact on economic growth is favorable, i.e., if its formation and 
continued existence and growth is one of the factors accountable for the economic 
development of the region or country in which it is located" (Hoselitz, 1955, 279). 
According to Hoselitz, primate cities, in that they indicate an overconcentration of 
urban resources, are viewed as parasitic in relation to the rest of the economy. 
Breese (1969) indicates that primate cities consume a disproportionate amount of 
wealth of the developing countries without contributing to national economy in the 
same proportion. 
Keyfitz (1965) states that primate cities in preindustrial societies are parasitic 
because they exert force on their hinterland, but cities in industrial nations are 
generative since they are the object of force and the flow of goods between city and 
countryside is therefore no longer on balance toward the city. Theories of growth 
poles and trickle-down assume that large cities are generative in nature. An 
important exception to the "trickle down" theory is that not all large cities act as 
growth poles. Some citi~s use the surplus they extract for consumption purposes, 
and some reinvest it for purposes of enlarging productive capabilities. (Walters, 
1985) 
Mehta (1964) thinks that scholars have overstated the parasitic effect of 
primate cities. He asserts that primate cities not only become administrative, trade, 
educational, and cultural centers servicing the indigenous population, but also 
probably stimulate the growth of cities in their own hinterland. Cities in general, and 
primate cities in particular, have the advantage of a large and concentrated labor and 
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consumer market. They are centers for social, technological and cultural change 
necessary for economic development. They spread and diffuse new ideas and 
development into other town and countryside. Mera (1973), in his empirical analysis 
of developing countries, found that the largest cities are likely to be more productive 
relative to other cities in developing countries, and that primacy of large cities is 
more conductive to economic development more than that of smaller cities. 
Efficiency versus Equity 
The trade-off between efficiency and equity has been the concern of some 
studies. Alonso (1968) distinguishes between efficiency and equity. He defined 
efficiency as natural economic growth often measured in terms of national product 
per capita, and equity as a more equal distribution of income. Williamson (1965) 
finds, from cross-country data, that the degree of regional inequality increases as the 
degree of development increases until the level of development reaches middle-
income, then starts to decline. He also finds, from time-series data of several 
countries, that regional inequality occurs during the early stages of development, 
while mature development reduces the differentials. Alonso (1968) suggested that 
economic growth may lead to geographic inequalities, and, conversely, policies of 
regional equalization may slow down the growth of the total economy. Alonso 
(1980, 6) asserts that the early or take-off stages of development are associated with 
increasing inequality of income and wealth among subgroups of the population; but 
after some points this trend reverses itself and inequality decreases. 
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Mera (1973) finds that there is a positive association between the growth of 
the largest cities and economic development in developing countries. He concludes 
that the largest cities are more productive than the others in less developed countries. 
He asserts that the per capita income of different regions differs greatly because of 
the difference in the urbanization levels. He discourages any policy of 
decentralization if the goal is to maximize the growth rate of national income, but he 
asserts that decentralization policy may be effective if the goal is to achieve a more 
equitable distribution of income over different regions. 
Many scholars have argued that the urbanization process is characterized by 
uneven growth and inequality. There are imbalances between urban and rural areas, 
among cities, and within cities. These imbalances may retard economic efficiency 
and growth (Gugler, 1982). 
Most poor people in Asia and Latin America live in rural areas. There are 
imbalances in the delivery of social services to urban and rural areas. The United 
Nations' Human Development Report (1991, 21) asserts that in" 
on third of developing countries, rural people are only half as 
likely to be covered by health services as those in the urban 
areas. Even then, they are likely only to have simple clinics 
compared with the modem hospitals to be found in the towns 
and cities. A similar contrast is evident for safe water and 
sanitation, rural access is less than half that of urban areas. 
Education services too, are much less adequate for rural 
children. 
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Urban bias theory, as discussed before, stresses the unequal allocations of 
public services between urban and rural areas and transfer of incomes from the rural 
to the urban areas. 
With regard to the imbalances among cities, several scholars have noted the 
lack of important secondary cities in the developing countries (Kasarda and 
Crenshaw, 1991 ). Most of economic, political, administrative, and cultural activities 
are usually concentrated in the primate city. Renaud (1981, 138) wonders "at what 
point is it in the self-interest of those in control to encourage the development of 
alternative urban centers and invest in building their infrastructure?". 
The third level of imbalances is within the primate cities. Inequality is a 
characteristic of the internal structure of large cities. These cities are places of very 
rich people living in expensive, segregated areas and very poor, unemployed people 
living in rapidly growing shantytowns.· Within primate cities, one can find a small 
group of highly skilled workers and managers and a majority of people who are 
involved in low paying jobs, informal sectors, underemployed, or unemployed. 
Renaud (1981) defines economic efficiency for a city as a net result of the 
benefits of agglomeration economies that lowers the average cost of production for 
many activities, and losses created by congestion and environmental deterioration. 
Richardson (1993, 44) states that 
it is reasonably clear that a mega-city can not remain efficient as 
a monocentric city. If most jobs continue to be concentrated in 
the central city core, population growth and radial extension of 
the urbanized area will inevitably result in progressively more 
severe congestion costs. 
He suggests that centralizing jobs to subcenter locations will relive 
congestion without sacrificing the benefits of area-wide agglomeration economies. 
He also (1993, 45) suggests that 
many of the external diseconomies that erode mega-city 
efficiency can be avoided by changes in the metropolitan spatial 
and political structure toward a more polycentric pattern. 
The 1991 World Development Report discussed the relationship between 
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efficiency, equity, and economic growth. It concludes that there is·no evidence that 
income inequality leads to higher growth, and it seems that inequality is associated 
with slower growth. This report suggests that when markets work well greater equity 
often comes naturally. Education is the most important factor influencing income 
inequality. 
Agglomeration Economies: 
Most urban areas exist because of the advantages of scale and agglomeration 
economies. Scale economies enables cities to supply goods and services to their 
residents and to the residents of smaller town and rural areas. Mills and Hamilton 
(1989, 9) state that 
without scale economies production can take place on a very 
small scale near each consuming location, and population and 
production density-and land values- thus will be uniform. 
Agglomeration economies mean the advantages of concentration of 
population and economic activities resulting from scale economies. Mera (1973) 
finds that because of the existence of agglomeration economies in the largest cities, 
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countries with higher degree of urban concentration have a higher growth rate of 
GNP per capita. Wheaton and Shishido (1981) and Petrakos and Brada (1989) find 
that urban concentration is a bell-shaped function of the level of development and 
attributed this relationship to the existence of agglomeration economies in the largest 
cities in the early stages of development. Wheaton and Shishido (1981, 22) state that 
if the distribution of cities in a country follows the laws of 
economic efficiency, greater scale economies should result in 
more urban concentration, while a large and/or more dispersed 
market should lead to urban decentralization. 
Petrakos (1992) states that most studies consider agglomeration economies 
in the largest urban centers as the reason for the relationship of urban concentration 
and economic development. 
Agglomeration economies may arise because firms in larger cities benefit 
from the availability of a wide range of business services (banking, insurance, real 
estate, hotels, maintenance and repair services, printing, transportation, 
communication) and public services (highways, mass transit, schools, fire 
protection). Thus, large cities are both centers of production and services and nodes 
of exchange of goods and services. Larger cities also provide larger differentiated 
markets of labor. Greater division of labor in specialized firms reduces production 
cost relative to unspecialized firms (Moomaw, 1983; Walters, 1985; 0' Sullivan, 
1996). Moomaw (1988) concludes agglomeration economies induce firms to locate 
close to each other to minimize production and transportation costs. Manufacturing 
firms which locate in large cities minimize production cost more than firms in 
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smaller cities, even if input prices are higher in large cities. Moomaw ( 1981) finds 
that the productivity advantages of larger cities are much larger for the 
nonmanufacturing sector than for the manufacturing sector. 
Two kinds of agglomeration economies can be distinguished: Localization 
economies and urbanization economies. Localization economies occur if the 
production cost of firm in a particular industry decreases as the total output of the 
industry increases. Urbanization economies occur if the production cost of an 
individual firm decreases as the total output of the urban area increases (O'Sullivan, 
1996). In other words, localization economies are external to the firm but internal to 
the industry, while urbanization economies are external to the firm and to the 
industry but internal to the city (Moomaw, 1988, 150). Urbanization economies 
differ from localization economies in two ways. First, urbanization economies result 
from the scale of the entire urban economy, not just the scale of particular industry. 
Second, urbanization economies generate benefits for firms throughout the city, not 
just firms in an industry (O'Sullivan, 1996). 
In his article "Agglomeration Economies: Localization or Urbanization?," 
Moomaw (1988) estimates localization and urbanization economies and compares 
his results to those of Nakamura and Henderson. He (1988, 150) states that 
Nakamura (1985) estimates statistically and quantitatively 
significant localization and urbanization economies for Japanese 
cities. With no industry experiencing significant diseconomies 
of scale, he concludes that urbanization economies are more 
important for firms in light industries and localization 
economies are more important for firms in heavy industries. 
Using a flexible production function in a study of 2-digit 
industries in Brazil and the United States, Henderson (1986) 
concludes that external economies of scale are based on 
localization, not urbanization, economies. His estimates include 
localization economies and urbanization diseconomies. 
Moomaw's findings with regard to localization economies are similar to 
those of Nakamura and of Henderson .. With regard to urbanization diseconomies, 
Moomaw's study supports Henderson's conclusion that external economies are 
predominately localization economies and urbanization diseconomies exist in some 
industries. Henderson (1988, 97) concludes that 
e:conomies of scale in manufacturing are generally ones of 
localization, not urbanization, indicating that agglomeration 
benefits derive from local own industry employment, not 
overall urban size. Localization economies appear to be 
stronger for heavy than for light industry, although if one can 
correct for simultaneity problems in estimation, localization 
economies may be as strong for light industry. 
Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter reviewed the trends and prospects of world's urbanization. We relied 
heavily on the U.N. World Urbanization Prospects: The 1990 and 1992 Revisions. 
They are the most comperhensive references in this subject. This review predicts 
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that urban population will increase in coming decades and that the. number of mega-
cities will increase, particularly in the developing countries. This shows how 
important it is to make plans that adjust to this changes in the concentration of people 
and activities. 
This chapter also outlined the main theories of urbanization and economic 
development. It started with modernization theory, which emphasizes that a country 
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should increase its domestic savings and investment and should rely also on foreign 
investment and technology in order to develop itself. It considers rapid urbanization 
a result of transition from traditional to modem society and the primate cities a 
potential development tool that may allow nations to use their resources effeiciently. 
Ecological theory studies the effects of population, environment, and techno-
economic heritage of nations on their economic development and urbanization. It 
considers the population pressure on rural areas due to high fertility and low 
mortality rates as a reason for rural-to-urban migration and thus rapid urbanization 
and urban primacy. Dependency and world system theories stress that development 
of core countries comes through exploitation of peripheral countries and contributes 
to their underdevelopment. They view urban primacy as an important mechanism of 
capitalist penetration that allows wealth to be transmitted from periphery to core 
nations and to keep peripheral nations underdeveloped due to disproportionate and 
uneven exchange with the hinterland. Dependent urbanization also leads to a high 
rate of urban unemployment and inequaiity. While dependency theory is concerned 
with individual countries, world-system theory chooses to study group of nations that 
have similar conditions. It divides the world into a core, a semiperiphery, and a 
periphery. Urban bias theory emphasizes that the development process in developing 
countries is systematically biased in favor of urban areas, which leads to a disparity 
between urban and rural areas. This disparity results in excess rural to urban 
migration that leads to overurbanization and urban primacy. Each of these four 
theories has its strength and its shortcomings and in real life. Partial support for each 
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theory has been found. We intend to test each theory empirically to see whether we 
can confirm their hypothesis. 
Overurbanization refers to the degree to which urban population exceeds the 
number needed for economic development. It leads to misallocation of people and 
resources and to high level of urban primacy. 
With regard to efficiency versus equity, the main conclusion is that it is 
difficult at the early stages of development to have them both. In order to use the 
limited resources efficiently, they have to be concentrated in one city or region which 
leads to inequal distribution of projects and resources. This probelm may become 
less severe with the of development to other areas and other people. 
The final topic this chapter undertook is that of agglomeration economies. 
We reserve more discussion of this subject to another place in this study. 
CHAPTER III 
OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS 
Urban Primacy 
Definitions: 
In World Urbanization Prospects: The 1992 Revision, the United Nations 
. (UNDESIPA, 1993, 20) stated that 
The level of urbanization in a country refers to the percentage of 
the total population living in urban places, however urban is 
defined in the national context. But countries with similar level 
of urbanization may have quite different urban structures. Some 
countries -- often but not always in the less developed regions --
may have most urban people concentrated in a single "primate" 
city. Others may exhibit a more balanced distribution of urban 
population, with a number of large urban agglomerations as 
well as a network of smaller cities and towns .... This structure is 
more likely to be found in the more developed countries. 
Urban primacy is not a product of the modem civilization. It goes back in 
history to ancient civilizations in the Middle East, China, India, and to the ages of 
Greek and Roman Empires, when the city was the center of commercial, spiritual, 
and political activities. 
Mills and Hamilton say "the term primacy refers to the size, or allegedly 
excessive size, of the largest metropolitan area in a country. More generally, the term 
sometime refers to the claim that several of the metropolitan areas are too 
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large"(Mills and Hamilton, 1989, 411). Mehta (1964) stresses that the largest city 
must be significantly more than twice the size of the second-ranking center to be 
considered overlarge. Smith states that "urban primacy is not merely the existence of 
a city that is much larger than any other. It is a city that is too large in relation to a 
system of cities, whose sizes must be described in specific terms- whether in terms of 
population, economic infrastructure, or bureaucratic institutions" (Smith, 1985, 89). 
Thus, the primate city, by definition, is the largest city (urban agglomeration) 
in a country, often its capital, that dominates other cities within the urban system in 
that country. Urban primacy increases as the primate city has a larger percentage of 
the national population. If a country has a high primacy index, the primate city 
concentrates all major national functions --population, wealth, production and power 
-- in a single city and the other regions in the country are slighted or ignored. 
Consequently, the primate city may retard the growth of other cities and thus retard 
diversification of economic activities and convergence toward equality among 
regions within a country. Existence of high urban primacy in a country does not 
mean the existence of a high urbanization level. The level of urbanization may be 
low, moderate, or even high (UNDESIPA, 1993). 
Kasarda and Crenshaw state that the concept of urban primacy "has been 
modified to include the notion of two-city primacy (e.g., Brazil's Sao Paulo and Rio 
de Janeiro), regional multiple-city primacy (e.g., India's urban system), and 
multicentric urban systems (where cities are more nearly equal in population size 
than would be predicted by the rank-size rule). Still, the urban systems of the 
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developing world tend toward single-city primacy ... "(Kasarda and Crenshaw, 1991, 
471). 
Measures Of Urban Primacy: 
A number of measures have been devisedto measure urban population concentration 
;~ 
and urban primacy. Each measure has its own advantages and disadvantages in 
terms of representing the concepts of concentration and primacy. 
Jefferson (1939) was the first scholar to use the expression "primate city"; he 
compared the population of the largest city to that of the second and third largest 
cities. Primacy, according to Jefferson's law of the primate city, means that the size 
of the first city in a country is disproportionately large in relation to the size of the 
second and the third cities. 
Zipf (1941) used the "rank-size rule," which states that the population of a 
city within a given system of cities is an inverse function of its rank within the 
system. According to the rank-size-rule, the second largest city is one-half the size 
of the largest city, the third largest is one-third, and so on. Therefore, if the largest 
city population is greater than twice the population of the second largest, it could be 
said to exhibit excess primacy. While some scholars assume that the rank-size 
(Pareto) distribution of city sizes is the optimal urban hierarchy for purpose of 
economic development (Walters, 1985,72), others state that "the rank-size 
distribution is no more than an approximation and that other distributions fit much of 
the data somewhat better than the rank-size distribution."(Mills, 1979, 45). 
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A number of scholars have used the Herfindeihl (H) index, the squared sum 
of population shares. The H index uses the size distribution of all cities within a 
system; it gives a measure of urban concentration not of urban primacy. The inverse 
of H index can be interpreted as giving the number of equal-sized cities that could 
contain the entire population. If n equals one, then H and its inverse equal one. If n 
is a large number of equal size cities, the H is small; its inverse is large. 
Since the main concern of this study is to investigate the impact of various 
factors on urban primacy, four primacy indices will be compared. These measures 
are commonly used in the literature. The best one of these will be used to measure 
urban primacy in this study. 
Urban Primacy Indices: 
An urban primacy index should provide an objective basis for the ranking of 
countries according to the degree of primacy and therefore offer a way of assessing 
whether a primate city is disproportionately large. (Browning and Gibbs, 1961, 440). 
· Different studies have used different measurements of urban primacy. Using 
different measurements leads to different conclusions. Since there is no commonly 
accepted measure of urban primacy, we examine four common primacy measures 
used in the urbanization literature and recommend the one that we believe is the most 
appropriate. 
The first measurement of urban primacy, UPI, defines urban primacy as a ratio of 
the largest city population to the population of the second largest city. It indicates 
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how many times larger the first city is than the second city. This urban primacy 
index has been used by Browning (1958), Stewart (1959), Linsky (1965), McGee 
(1967), London (1987), Mutlu (1989), and Smith and London (1990). This measure 
can be used in cross-country comparisons, no matter how a country defines its urban 
population. It can distinguish countries that have a disproportionately large first city 
from those that do not. UPI can be interpreted in terms of the rank-size-rule. IfUPl 
equals two, the largest city is twice as big as the second largest city; if UPI exceeds 
two it means the urban primacy level is high; if UPI is less than two, there is a low 
level of urban primacy. 
The advantage of this urban primacy index is its operational simplicity and 
data availability. The disadvantage is that it fails to capture the shape of the total city 
size distribution or urban hierarchy (Walters, 1985, 75). The other disadvantage is 
that it ignores the size distribution ofcities below the two largest cities in the 
country. If the two largest cities of a country have approximately equal population, 
and if there is a wide gap between the two largest cities and the rest of the urban 
system, that may give an impression that the country has no primate city, although 
most of the urban population is concentrated in these two largest cities. But the most 
common pattern of urban primacy is one primate city many times larger than the 
other cities in a country (Frey et al., 1986). 
The second measurement of urban primacy, UP2, is the ratio of the largest city 
population to combined population of three or more next largest cities. This type of 
primacy index is the most often used in studies of urban primacy. The most popular 
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index is the "four-city" index that compares the largest city population to the 
combined populations of the next three largest cities. If the population of the largest 
city is greater than the combined populations of the next three cities, then the four-
city index is greater than one and primacy can be said to exist in the country. A 
modification of this index is in Davis or Ginsberg index, which is the ratio of the 
population of the largest city to the sum of the population of the four largest ones. 
This measures the share of the largest city of the four largest cities. If the ratio is 
above 0.5, urban primacy is said to exist. A higher number means greater primacy of 
the largest city. 
Various scholars such as Browning and Gibbs (1961), Davis (1969), Gilbert 
and Gugler (1982) and Mutlu (1989) have used this method of measuring primacy in 
their studies of the relationship between urban primacy and economic development. 
Berry (1961), Mehta (1964), and Owen and Witton (1973) have modified this 
measurement by combining the largest city population to the other large city 
populations in the denominator. Some scholars have suggested that it might be 
preferable to compare the largest city population to the next ten largest cities. 
This primacy index, like UP 1, has the advantage of avoiding the problem associated 
with the different definitions of urban population. Therefore, it can 
be used to cross-country comparisons. It has a similar disadvantage as UP 1 ; in the 
case of dual-primacy, it misrepresents the urban primacy system in a country. It, 
also, ignores variation in the size of the second, third, and fourth largest cities; 
furthermore, changes in the ratio may result from fluctuation of size in any of the 
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Table: 3.1 
Correlation Matrix of Urban 
Primacy Indices 
UPI UP2 UP3 UP4 
UPI 1.0000 
UP2 0.9835 1.0000 
UP3 0.6928 0.7040 1.0000 
UP4 0.3898 0.3458 0.6201 1.0000 
four largest cities(Walters, 1985). The other disadvantage of this measure is that it 
requires data for several cities in each country that may not be available, especially in 
the least developed countries. 
Mutlu(l 989) finds that UPl is highly correlated with the three-city index, and 
hence he concludes that either can be used with equal validity. Lyman (1992) cites 
results that found a high correlation between a three-city index and a five-city index. 
Using panel data, we have found that UPI and UP2, for our sample that includes 30 
countries from Asia, Latin America, and North America, are highly correlated (0.98) 
(Table 3.1). 
The third measurement of urban primacy, UP3, is the ratio of the largest city 
population to the total urban population of a country. It measures the percentage of a 
country's total urban population living in a single city. This measure shows the 
presence and absence of alternative urban centers large enough to balance the 
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influence of the largest city(Renaud, 1981,36). El-Shakhs (1972) used average 
measure in order to combine urban population within a country. Renaud (1981), and 
Moomaw and Shatter (forthcoming) have used this type of primacy index. The 
World Bank states that since the data on the level of urbanization are "based on 
different national definitions of what is urban, cross-country comparisons should be 
made with caution." (World Bank, 1993, 321).· The United Nations uses national 
definitions of urban population because they assume that the statistical authorities in 
each country know what constitutes an urban area better than experts from outside 
the country. The United Nations recognizes that "one of the major problems for an 
international comparative studies of urban/rural populations is definitional. The 
most common criterion for urban population is a minimum number of people, but the 
figure differs from country to country, reflecting a variety of social and geographical 
conditions." (UNDIESA, 1987, 1). The minimum number of people that constitute 
an urban area has a wide range: from 100 people in Uganda to 20,000 in Nigeria to 
30,000 in Japan, but most countries choose a minimum between 2,000 and 5,000 
people. Thus, if two countries with the same total population and same number of 
people who live in the largest city of each country, and if these two countries define 
what constitute urban population differently, the urban primacy index, UP3, will be 
different for both countries, and hence may lead to false conclusions. Therefore, 
urban primacy index, UP3, is not a reliable measure when it comes to comparing 
urban primacy in different countries. 
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The fourth measurement, UP4, is the ratio of the largest city population to the total 
population of the country. This index is not a common one in urbanization literature. 
Browning (1958) use this measurement to study urbanization trends in America. 
Vining (1985) also used it. This index does not accurately measure the concept of 
urban primacy since it does not distinguish between urban and rural areas, and it can 
not show the pattern of population distribution within a country. For example, in 
1990, 13 percent of the total population of Canada and Thailand lived in the largest 
city. However, this primacy index does not tell how the remaining 87 percent are 
distributed in each country. For instance, the largest city in Canada, Toronto, is 1.2 
times larger than the second largest, Montreal; while in Thailand, Bangkok is about 
forty times larger than the second largest city. Second, 77 percent of Canada's 
population live in urban agglomerations compared to only 22 percent for Thailand's. 
Therefore, UP4 fails to specify the patterns of population distribution within a 
country and does not indicate whether the largest city is primate or not. "It ignores 
the size distribution of cities below the largest" (Wheaton and Shishido, 1981, 19). 
Some researchers have used a primacy measure that is a ratio of the largest 
city to the total population of cities of 100,000 people or more, but the problem with 
this measure is that there are many countries in the world that have only one city of 
100,000 people or more, which result in just dividing the largest city population over 
itself. Clearly this measure does not help that much. 
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Conclusion: 
This analysis has identified the different urban primacy indices, and their advantages 
and disadvantages. Evidently each index has its own shortcomings and there is no 
perfect measure. Nevertheless, some measures are better than others. 
UP4 is less useful for this study because it ignores the distribution of cities 
below the largest one. This index does not measure primacy well. Therefore, we do 
not recommend using it to measure urban primacy. 
The UP3 is deficient in a cross-country comparison because it is based on 
various definitions of urban areas. 
UPI ignores the distribution of cities below the two largest ones. It can be 
misleading when there is a "dual-primacy" case, but dual-primacy is not a common 
phenomenon in the world. Thus, in general, UP 1 is a good indicator of urban 
primacy. 
UP2 may capture more of the concept of urban primacy than UP 1 because it 
depends on more cities in the urban system. Like UPI, it may not capture the 
concept, when there is a dual-primacy system. Nevertheless, because of high 
correlation between UP 1 and UP2, they might be used interchangeably. 
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Economic Development 
Definitions: 
Although there is a fundamental distinction between economic development and 
economic growth concepts, some researchers have used the two concepts 
interchangeably. Bairoch (1988) distinguishes between the two concepts. He states 
that "growth usually means a simple increase in production; development implies 
underlying structural changes as well; and economic development adds the idea of 
broader social and cultural transformation or change" (Bairoch, 1988, xx). In 
drawing a distinction between development and growth, Sen (1988, 13 - 15) 
distinguishes the two concepts in the :following manner: first, in so far as economic 
growth is concerned only with GNP per head, it leaves out the question of 
distribution of that GNP among the population. It is possible for a country to have an 
expansion of GNP per head, while its distribution becomes more unequal. A second 
source of difference between growth and development comes to the question of 
extemality and non-market ability. The GNP captures only those means of well-
being that happen to be transacted in the market, and this leaves out benefits and 
costs that do not have a price-tag attached to them. Third, even when markets do 
exist, the valuation of commodities in the GNP will reflect the biases that markets 
may have. There are important problems in dealing with different relative prices in 
different parts of the world. 
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Thus, while economic growth refers to a rise in a country's income per capita 
that is usually measured by gross national (domestic) product, economic 
development is a much broader concept. In addition to the increase in per capita 
income, economic development implies economic, social, political and cultural 
changes. It is a multidimensional process. It implies changes in production 
structure, a rise in urbanization, changes in pattern of consumption, and a 
reallocation of resources to more efficient use. Economic development primarily 
comes from within. It mainly depends on internal efforts with a gradual process that 
may take decades. Economic development is not homogenous. It takes different 
shapes in different countries at different times. "It is generally agreed that 
development encompasses the reduction of poverty, improvements in health and 
education of population, and an increase in productive capacity as well as rising per 
capita income" (Chenery and Srinivasan, 1988, xi). Gillis emphasize that 
"participation in the process of development implies participation in the enjoyment 
of the benefits of development as well as the production of those benefits. If growth 
only benefits a tiny, wealthy minority, whether domestic or foreign, it is not 
development" (Gillis et al., 1992, 9). It is possible for a country to experience 
economic growth without economic development, but no country experiences 
economic development without economic growth. 
59 
Economic Development Indicators: 
There are several indicators used to measure economic development, such as 
labor force shares in industry, and energy consumption. In the following we will 
discuss only the major indicators 
The first indicator of economic development is the national income per capita as 
measured by gross national (domestic) product. "Gross national product (GNP) is 
the total domestic and foreign value added claimed by residents, calculated without 
making deductions for depreciation. It comprises gross domestic product (GDP) plus 
net factor income from abroad, which is the income residents receive from abroad for 
factor services (labor and capital), less similar payments made to non-residents who 
contribute to the domestic economy. Gross domestic product "measures the total 
output of goods and services for final use produced by residents and non-residents, 
regardless of the allocation to domestic and foreign claims." (World Bank, 1992, 
288). 
GNP or GDP per capita is the most useful single indicator of economic 
development. It encompasses all of nation's economic activity in a few mutually 
consistent summary statistics, but there are problems associated with it. One of the 
' 
major problems of this indicator is that it includes only niarket activities; it does not 
consider all kinds of production. Another problem is that World Bank converts 
domestic currency to US dollars using official exchange rates that may not reflect 
purchasing power. A third problem of per capita income is the unreliable data of 
many less developed countries because of poor statistical tools and the carelessness 
60 
of the people who collect these data. A fourth problem is that GNP per capita does 
not account for income distribution. The final problem is stated by the World Bank 
is that "GNP per capita does not by itself constitute or measure welfare or success in 
development. It does not distinguish between the aims and the ultimate use of a 
given product, nor does it say whether it merely offsets some natural or other 
obstacle, or harm or contributes to welfare. For example, GNP is higher in colder 
countries, where people spend money on heating and warm clothes, than in balmy 
climates where people are comfortable wearing light clothes in the open air (World 
Bank, 1992, 287)." 
The second indicator of economic development is the Kravis Purchasing Power 
Adjustment. The International Comparative Project of the UN Statistical Office and 
the University Of Pennsylvania converts a country's GNP in local currency into 
international dollars by measuring the country's purchasing power, adjusted for the 
local cost of living, relative to all other countries rather than using the exchange rate 
(Nafziger, 1990, 24). GNP per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP$) 
reflects not just income but also what that income can buy. If goods and services are 
cheaper in one country than another, a dollar is worth more in the former country and 
purchasing power parity adjusts for this (UNDP, 1994). Even with the Kravis 
Adjustment, income per capita is not a perfect indicator of economic development, 
and efforts have been made to replace it with a more reliable measures, usually an 
index of several economic and social variables. 
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The third indicator is the physical quality of life index (PQLI) developed by Morris 
(1979). PQLI measures people's basic needs. It is an aggregation of three widely 
available indicators of social performance. The three indicators are the literacy rate, 
. . 
life expectancy at age one, and the infant mortality rate. Each indicator was assigned 
a scale value from 1 to 100, where 1 represents the "worst'' performance by any 
country and 100 the "best" performance. An unweighted average of the three 
indicators was then taken (Todaro, 1985; Nafzifer, 1990). 
Todaro (1985, 104) state that "the PQLI appears on the surface to be free of 
the major problems associated with using GNP as a measure of development." It 
measures development in terms of the quality of life. It indicates the distributional 
level of benefits of development. Furthermore, it is a simple measure with available 
data. 
Critics of the measure stress that "it is a limited measure, failing to 
incorporate many other social and psychological characteristics suggested by the 
term" quality of life" -security, justice, human rights, and so on" (Todaro, 1985, 
104). Also, the correlations among the GNP per capita, the components of the PQLI, 
and the indicators of basic needs are generally high. Another criticism is that a 
country with high per capita does not necessarily reflect a high level of social 
welfare. A third problem of this indicator is that there is no clear rationale for giving 
the three indicators equal weights. A fourth problem is related to the component of 
this indicator. Meier states that if "non income factors captured by the PQLI are 
important, so are income and consumption statistics and distribution" (Meier, 1989, 
9). Thus, to have a reliable measurement of economic development, use of 
additional economic, political, and social indicators is recommended. 
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Despite its limitations, the PQLI appears to be a useful indicator of development; it 
can serve as a useful complement to GNP statistics. (Todaro, 1985, 102-105). It has 
been noted that both Kravis index and PQLI do not alter the ranking of countries 
greatly from that utilizing per capita income. 
The fourth indicator of economic development is the human development index 
(HDI). Since GNP (GDP) per capita, the Kravis index and PQLI do not reflect the 
broad concept of economic development, there has been a new effort by the United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP) to establish a new measure. The Human 
Development Report (1990) defined human development as the process of increasing 
people's options. It stressed that the most critical choices that people should have 
include the option to live a long arid healthy life, to be knowledgeable and to find 
access to the assets, employment and income needed for a decent standard of living. 
Therefore, the 1990 report introduced a new way of measuring human development-
- by combining indicators of national income (using purchasing power parity), 
educational attainment, and life expectancy into a composite human development 
index, the HDI (UNDP, 1994, 90). Educational attainment is measured by 
combination of adult literacy and mean years of schooling. "The idea of diminishing 
returns to income is captured by a progressively lower weight to income beyond the 
poverty cut-off point." (UNDP, 1991, 15). A high level of development is 
accompanied by longer life expectancy. Life expectancy is, in fact, a measure of 
"quantity" of life rather than of its "quality." 
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Although the HDI reflects the broader meaning of human development 
beyond the GNP measure, the HDI concentrates on just three of the many and 
changing dimensions that define human development. The Human Development 
Report of 1990.acknowledged that no single index could ever completely capture 
such a complex concept of human development. Another criticism of this measure is 
that it suggests that rising per capita income from the level of middle income country 
to that of high income country makes little contribution to human development 
(Gillis et al., 1992, 81). 
Conclusion: 
All four indicators have shortcomings. Som.e represent only marketed activities, and 
these do not consider all types of output. Also, they all suffer from the lack of 
reliable data from less developed countries. The Kravis index does not alter the 
ranking of countries greatly from per capita income figures and is hard to compute. 
Fortunately, it is available for most countries from 1950 to the present. PQLI 
concentrate on three social indicators of well being and ignore economic and other 
aspects of development. 
Comparing income per capita and HDI, we find that HDI is a more realistic 
measure. The strength of the HDI measure is that it looks to development as 
multidimensional process. 
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Because HDI is a relatively new measurement, data from previous years are 
not available. For this reason we use income per capita, with its shortcomings, in our 
model as an indicator of economic development for years 1960, 1965, 1970, 1975, 
1980,1985, and 1990. 
With regard to income per capita we can use either GNP or GDP. GNP per 
capita is the most widely used. We will use GDP per capita as the measure of the 
level of economic development because it reflects the value of domestic production. 
Our main source will be The Penn World Tables (Mark 5.6a), called PWT 5.6a, 
which is a newly revised, expanded, and updated version of Penn World Table (Mark 
5) that was described in "The Penn World Table (Mark 5): An Expanded Set of 
International Comparisons, 1950-1988" by Robert Summers and Alan Heston, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, May, 1991. PWT 5.6a is distributed by the NBER 
on computer diskette and through an electronic bulletin-board file. 
CHAPTER IV 
Determinants of Urban Primacy: 
A Panel Data Approach 
I. Introduction: 
The main goal of this chapter is to find which factors that have significant impacts on 
urban primacy. Potentially, these factors include different aspects of economic 
,demographic, political, and ecological effects. Although all determinants are 
important, we have a special interest in investigating the relationship between urban 
primacy and economic development because we are interested in the extent to which 
urban primacy responds to economic forces. 
This chapter starts by sketching an economic model of urban primacy. Then, 
it empirically confirms the conclusion, reached in chapter III, that UPI is the best 
practical indicator of urban primacy. Next, the impact of various determinants on 
urban primacy will be investigated using the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. 
We compare the findings of a pooled OLS model with those of fixed-effects and 
random-effects models. Our purpose is to show the danger of ignoring fixed effects 
when they exist. Many past studies have not used country fixed effects, and thus 
may have reported biased results. Since the thirty countries that are included in this 
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countries (namely: Canada, Japan, and the United States) to determine how sensitive 
the results are to these observations. Next, we add the lagged dependent variable to 
the original equation and compare the results. Finally, we lag all independent 
variables by one period and regress them on the urban primacy index (i.e. regress the 
independent variables at periods 1960, 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980, and 1985 on the 
dependentvariableatperiods 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990),andexplainthe 
difference between this setting and the original one. This chapter will be concluded 
by emphasizing the most important results we have reached. 
II. Basic Model of Urban Primacy: 
There is no general agreement in the·urbanization literature about the determinants 
of urban primacy. This suggests the need to explore a wide range of factors that have 
a significant impact on primate city. This section will explain the importance and the 
direction of the expected relationship between several variables and urban primacy. 
The model draws on variables found important in theoretical models and in past 
empirical work. Our strategy is first to present a basic model ofu~ban primacy. 
Then, we add variables derived from the various approaches discussed in chapter II. 
Elements of an economic model: 
The main reasons for spatial concentration in urban areas, particularly in 
primate cities, are scale economies, transportation costs, and agglomeration 
economies. 
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Central Place Theory explains how many cities develop and why some cities 
are larger than others. It assumes that distance plays a significant role in the 
organization of cities, and the main function of a city is to provide goods and 
services to its population and those of its. hinterland. The theory identifies the market 
forces that generate a hierarchical system of cities in such a way there exist a small 
number of large cities and large number of small cities (O'Sullivan, 1996, Mills and· 
Hamilton, 1989). Richardson (1979, 61) indicates that "the spatial distribution of 
population and economic activity is explained as the marginal outcome of the 
influences of economies of scale and transportation costs over space." There are 
historical, religious, political, and administrative forces that determine city size 
distribution, but according to economic theory, scale economies of production and 
transport are significant determinants. 
Most urban areas exist because of the advantages of scale economies. Scale 
economies enable cities to supply good and services to their residents and to the 
residents of smaller town and rural areas. "Without scale economies, production can 
take place on a very small scale near each consuming location, and population and 
production density -and land values- thus will be uniform" (Mills and Hamilton, 
1989, 9). 
Throughout history, transportation cost is a major determinant of the pattern 
of spatial distribution and existence of cities. High transportation costs motive the 
input suppliers and producers and consumers of goods and services to locate in 
proximity (Renaud, 1981; Mills and Becker, 1986; Bairoch, 1988). Urban 
concentration is high when transportation is more expensive because people and 
activities group together to save on travel costs (Krugman, 1991 ; Elzindo and 
Krugman, 1992; Ades and Glaeser, 1995). 
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Agglomeration economies of scale induce firms to locate close to each other 
to minimize production and transportation costs. Manufacturing firms which locate 
in large cities minimize production cost more than firms in smaller cities, even if 
input prices are higher in large cities (Moomaw, 1988). Two kinds of agglomeration 
economies can be distinguished: Localization economies, which occur if the 
production cost of firm in a particular industry decreases as the total output of the 
industry increases, and urbanization economies, which occur if the production cost of 
an individual firm decreases as the total output of the urban area increase 
(O'Sullivan, 1996). In other words, localization economies are external to the firm 
but internal to the industry, while urbanization economies are external to the firm and 
to the industry but internal to the city (Moomaw, 1988, 150). 0' Sullivan ( 1996, 28) 
states that urbanization economies differ from localization economies in two ways. 
First, urbanization economies result from the scale of the entire urban economy, not 
just the scale of a particular industry. Also, urbanization economies generate 
benefits for many firms in the city, not just firms in a single industry. Because of 
agglomeration economies, economies of scale, and high transportation costs, firm 
locate closer to each other, and workers live close to their jobs to save in commuting 
cost. This leads to concentration of people and activities in a one large city, which 
results in high prices ofland and houses in the large city. Also, concentration in a 
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small area leads to congestion problems and other disamenities. People and firms 
start to compare the cost of locating in large cities to transportation cost if they move 
farther from the concentration center and, hence, many move to suburbs or other 
towns. 
Pros and Cons of A Primate City: 
Although there is an agreement that cities exist because of specialization and 
differentiation of economic activities among different cities, and between cities and 
their hinterlands, urban economists disagree on the impact of large cities, especially 
the primate ones, on national development and on the other smaller cities and towns 
in a nation. Mehta (1964) and Findley (1993) have analyzed the debate. 
To summarize, those who encourage concentration of people in the largest 
cities claim that in addition to the advantage of economies of scale and 
agglomeration economies,. a primate city serves as highly efficient center of 
specialization and technological innovation. It leads the development process of a 
nation. The primate city has the advantage of large and concentrated labor and 
consumer markets. It is more efficient to concentrate manufacturing and business 
activities in one place. It is also more efficient to build infrastructure such as roads, 
communication, port facilities in a single place. A primate city contributes 
disproportionately to national economic growth and social transformation. It offers a 
wide variety of educational, health, commercial, and personal services, and provides 
a large market for agricultural products and informal sector activities. It also 
provides an ideal environment for social mobility and accommodation between 
diverse ethnic and religious groups. 
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Those against concentration of people and economic activities in one city 
argue that "a single urban agglomeration may drain the wealth of the whole country 
and make the benefits of modernization available only to those who live in or near 
the largest city. Areas distant from the urban center have little access to advantages 
associated with modernization, such as health care, education, transportation and 
social services (UNDESIP A, 1993, 36). The negative externalities of spatial 
concentration of population and economic activities, such as crime, pollution, traffic 
congestion, and pressure on scarce services are more prevalent in a primate city than 
in smaller urban areas. The opponents of excessive primacy argue for balanced 
urban and regional development. 
Basic Model: 
Our basic model deals with several important factors that affect urban primacy. The 
size of a country--output, population, and land area--plays a major role in 
determining whether a country has a balanced urban system. When the economic 
size of a nation increases, it makes it possible to have several production sites which 
creates new spatial concentration centers, and, thus, reduces urban primacy. 
Economic development increases urbanization in a country. Furthermore, it 
is more efficient for a country in the beginning of its development process to 
concentrate infrastructure and investment in one place to take advantage of 
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agglomeration economies, to reduce transportation costs, and to have a focal point 
for manufacturing and commerce. Thus, at the early stages of development, urban 
primacy and economic development are positively related, until a point when 
benefits of development spread to other cities and rural areas which leads to a 
dispersal of population to other growing areas in the country. This is consistent with 
the theory of growth-pole cycles (Amos, 1990). 
Transportation cost and population density are negatively related. When 
population density increases, transportation cost decreases, making it easier for 
people and activities to move from one place to another. Thus, there is no need for 
people to concentrate in one city to save in travel cost. Therefore, urban primacy 
decreases. 
Nations start building their first institutions of higher education in the primate 
city. This increases the population of the largest city. Furthermore, a more educated 
population is expected to be attracted to large cities. Primate cities also attract 
educated and skilled labor for jobs and services that are not available in smaller cities 
and towns. Also, in most countries in the world, the primate city is the capital city. 
Public administration and government offices increase the employment in the 
primate city, and thus increase the total population of the largest city. In addition, 
rent seeking activities may make the capital city larger than it would otherwise be. 
In short, urban primacy depends upon gross domestic product (GDP), 
economic development as measured by GDP per capita (GDPC), GDPC squared 
72 
(GDPCSQ), population density (PO PD ENS), education (EDUC), and whether the 
largest city is the capital city (DCAP). 
Basic equation: 
We specify a multiplicative equation for urban primacy, 
(4.1) UPI= a GDPb GDPCc GDPCSQd POPDENSe EDUCf egDCAP E 
where, 
GDP : gross domestic product. 
GDPC : gross domestic product per capita 
GDPCSQ : square of GDP per capita. 
POPDENS: population density which is the ratio of a country's total population to 
arable land. 
EDUC : average years of schooling. 
DCAP : dummy variable equals I if capital city is the largest city in a country; 
and equal O otherwise. 
Taking natural logarithms gives 
(4.2) LUPI= a+ b LGDP + c LGDPC + d LGDPCSQ + e LPOPDENS + fLEDUC + 
g DCAP+LE 
a is a constant term; b, c, d, e, f, and g are the coefficients. L indicates the 
natural log. E is the error term. All variables are for country i at time t. 
To identify the effects of the fundamental variables, GDP, population, and 
land area, ( 4 .2) can be rewritten as 
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( GDP) (GDP) 2 ( POP ) (4.3) LUPI= a+ b LGDP+c L -- +d L -- +e L + fLEDUC+ 
POP POP LAND 
gDCAP+LE 
(4.4) LUPI= a+ b LGDP + c LGDP- c LPOP + d (LGDP- LPOP)2 + e LPOP-
e LLAND + f LEDUC+ g DCAP + LE 
(4.5) LUPI= a+(b+c) LGDP+(e-c) LPOP+d LGDP2 -2d LGDPLPOP +d LPOP2 + 
e LLAND + f LEDUC+ g DCAP + LE 
Before estimating equation ( 4.2), we describe the dependent and independent 
variables of the basic model and the additional variables that we plan to introduce. 
III. Dependent Variable of the Basic Model 
LUPI is the natural log of the ratio of the largest city population to the population of 
second largest city in a country. Data for all urban primacy measures are collected 
mainly from the UNDESIPA 's World Urbanization Prospects: The 1992 Revision. 
Some of the data necessary to calculate these measures are also collected from 
various issues of the UN Demographic Yearbook, The Europa World Yearbook, The 
Statesman's Yearbook, and the World Development Report and World Tables of The 
World Bank. 
IV. Independent Variables of the Basic Model 
Basic model variables 
1. The economic size of a nation is expected to be negatively related to urban 
primacy. Large countries are expected to have a more balanced urban system than 
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small countries. The economic size of a nation is measured by gross domestic 
product (GDP), adjusted for purchasing power. We expect GDP to have a negative, 
partial effect on urban primacy. Data for GDP are calculated from Summers and 
Heston's Penn World Tables (Mark 5.6). 
2. The level of economic development, as measured by GDP per capita (GDPC) is a 
significant determinant of urban primacy. As discussed in chapter I, different studies 
have found different relationships between the level of economic development and 
urban primacy. Our hypothesis of this relationship is that of a bell-shaped curve. 
Data for this variable comes from Penn World Table (Mark 5.6). We will use the 
squared GDP per capita (GDPCSQ) to test the curvilinearity of this relationship. 
3. Population Density is the number of people per square kilometer of arable land. 
Mehta (1964), Rosen and Resnick (1980), Wheaton and Shishido (1981), Mutlu 
(1989), and Moomaw and Shatter (forthcoming) have found that a country's 
population size and urban primacy are negatively related. Countries that are highly 
populated have·several large cities, each with a relatively small share of urban 
population. Ades and Glaeser (1995) found that concentration in the nation's largest 
city fall with total population. We expect that a country's total population will have 
negative effect on urban primacy. We use data of total population from World's 
Urbanization Prospect: The 1992 Revision 
With regard to land, several scholars have found a negative relationship 
between land area and urban primacy (Berry, 1961 ; Ginsburg, 1961; Wheaton and 
Shishido, 1981; De Cola, 1984; Mutlu, 1989). We expect land area to be positively 
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associated with urban primacy because a large land area leads to high transportation 
cost which result in grouping people and activities together to save on travel cost 
(Krugman, 1991; Ades and Glaeser, 1995). "The size of the country (holding 
population constant) is a decrease in population density which might mean an 
increase in the transportation costs of supplying the hinterland" (Ades and Glaeser, 
1995). Data for arable land is from FAO Production Yearbook. 
Therefore, we expect population density (POPDENS) to have a negative 
effect on urban primacy. When population density is high, transport cost might be 
low and the urban population could be more evenly distributed across several cities. 
4. When a nation starts its development, it builds schools and universities, first, in its 
primate city. Thus, educational Ql)portunities (EDUC) attract many migrants from 
other towns and rural areas. Also, the kind of jobs in large cities that are related to 
services and manufacturing are associated with more specialized and educated 
individuals. These kinds of jobs are associated with higher wages in large cities. 
Thus, educated people migrate from rural areas and small towns to large cities and 
that may enhance urban primacy. We use the average years of schooling of people 
25 years or older as a proxy for human capital effect on urban primacy. We expect 
this variable to have a positive effect on urban primacy. Data come from Barro and 
Lee (1992), andfrom different issues of UN Human Development Report. 
5. Many scholars have asserted that if the largest city and the capital of a country are 
the same this will lead to greater urban primacy (Jefferson, 1939; Ginsburg, 1961; 
Berry, 1961; De Cola, 1984; Mutlu, 1989; Moomaw and Shatter, forthcoming; Ades 
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and Glaeser, 1995). The capital is a place where government bureaucrats, army 
officers, representative of local and international corporations, and other elite groups 
are concentrated. These groups control all major activities in a country and act to 
further their own interest which often conflict with development goals. The 
concentration of resources and infrastructure in the capital attracts migrants from 
rural areas and small towns. We use a dummy variable (DCAP) that equals 1 if the 
capital city is also the largest city and equals O otherwise. Data are available in the 
UN Demographic Yearbook and World Urbanization Prospect: The 1992 Revision. 
Additional Variables 
1. The degree of openness is expected·to have a negative effect on urban primacy. 
Elizondo and Krugman (1992) assert that trade and population concentration are 
negatively related. Moomaw and Shatter (forthcoming) found that exporting has 
such an effect. Ades and Glaeser (1995) found that population concentration in the 
largest city is negatively related to international trade. In contrast, dependency and 
world system theory expect this variable to have a positive effect on primacy. We 
use exports of goods and nonfactor services as a percentage of GDP as a measure of 
openness (EXP). Data are collected from World Tables, 1994, and different issues 
of World Development Report. 
2. As we use GDP per capita (GDPC) to measure the effect of the level of economic 
,, development, we use the growth rate of GDP per capita (GDPCGR) to test the effect 
of economic growth on urban primacy. Growth pole theory suggests that a rapidly 
growing economy will generate both backwash and spread effects. Consequently, 
for a given development level a more rapid growth rate could either increase or 
decrease urban primacy. We expect a negative relationship between the two 
variables because we expect the spread effect to determine the backwash effect. 
GDPCGR is calculated from Penn World Tables (Mark 5.6). 
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3. Migration is one of the main contributors to urban primacy. Rural-to-urban 
migration, in most of the cases, is driven by economic motives. Migration is largely 
in response to real or perceived employment opportunities in industrial sector, 
government sector, or service and informal sectors (Todaro, 1969; Kelly and 
Williamson, 1984; World Bank, 1984). 
Industrialization is an important factor in attracting employment to specific 
locations. Industries prefer to locate in urban areas, especially in large cities, to take 
advantage of scale and agglomeration economies and to share infrastructure and 
transportation costs, as well as specialized needs such as financial, legal, and 
technical services. 
The service sector may attract people to the primate city to work in jobs such 
as banking industry, insurance and legal offices, and different kind of offices and 
agencies. Also labor in informal.sector shares a large percentage of employment in 
big cities. 
Thus, we want to test the effect oflabor outside agriculture (LABOR) on 
urban primacy. We calculate the share of the labor force outside agriculture as one 
minus the percentage of economically active population in agriculture that we collect 
from F AO Production Yearbook. Ades and Glaeser (1995) found that the share of 
labor outside agriculture has a positive effect on population concentration in the 
largest city in a country. We expect the same effect on urban primacy. 
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4. Population growth may contribute to urban primacy. A rapid population growth 
rate in rural areas leads people to migrate to large cities. Linsky (1965) states that a 
rapid rate of national population growth will be positively associated with high 
primacy of the leading city. Berry and Kasarda (1977) and De Cola (1984) also 
found a positive relationship between urban primacy and the population growth rate. 
The hypothesis derives from an ecological approach, which states that population 
growth rate has a positive effect on urban primacy in two ways. First, because of the 
pressure of high rate of population growth on land availability in rural areas, people 
move to urban areas seeking a better way to live. This rural-to-urban migration 
increases urban primacy. Second, Firebaugh (1971, 203-4) argued that adverse rural 
conditions contribute to high rates of urban natural increase, in part because migrants 
tend to be of child bearing age. The data for population growth rate (POPGR) are 
from World Urbanization Prospects: The 1992 Revision 
5. As discussed in chapter II, urban bias focuses on government policies that favors 
urban areas relative to rural areas which result in rural-urban income inequality and 
disparities in rural-urban standard ofliving (Bradshaw, 1987, 225; London and 
Smith, 1988). Gugler ( 1982) states that the capital city frequently receives the lion's 
share of public expenditures while rural areas face neglect. 
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Lipton (1977, 145) introduced an indicator of the disparity between rural and 
urban areas, which is the ratio of output per worker in nonagriculture (i.e., the 
percentage of nonagriculture GDP divided by percentage of labor force in 
nonagriculture) to output per worker in agriculture (i.e., the percentage contribution 
of agriculture to total GDP divided by the percentage of the labor force in 
agriculture). This urban-rural disparity measure (URDlSP) has been used by Lipton 
(1977), Bradshaw (1987) and London and Smith (1988) as a direct test of urban bias. 
This ratio increases when nonagricultural sector is more productive than agricultural 
sector. Urban bias theory predicts that this variable has a positive effect on urban 
primacy. The data for percentage contribution of agriculture to total GDP are from 
various issues of World Tables and World Development Report, and data for 
percentage of the labor force in agriculture are from FAO Production Yearbook. 
6. Dependency and world system theories assert that developing nations remain 
highly dependent because they are penetrated by foreign capital that is invested in 
raw material extraction. Petrakos and Brada (1989) asserted that foreign investment 
may promote city primacy by expanding employment opportunities in large cities. 
Moreover, many multinational corporations pay higher wages relative to host country 
standards. The location of foreign investment in large cities, also attracts domestic 
investment to these cities. All these factors expand employment opportunities and 
promotes urban primacy. This study will investigate the effect of foreign direct 
investment (FDI), which has grown dramatically, on urban primacy. Froot (1993) 
stated that between 1980 and 1990 world flows of FDI have approximately tripled. 
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Dependency and World System Theories assert that FDI will increase urban primacy. 
FDI variable is calculated as the ratio ofFDI to GDP. The data ofFDI are collected 
from various issues of IMF Balance Of Payments Yearbook and IMF International 
Financial Statistics. 
V. Econometric Approach: 
This section discusses the advantages of panel data analysis, and provides description 
of data construction. Then, it gives a brief discussion on the difference between 
fixed and random effects models. 
Data: 
This study uses panel data analysis to study urban primacy. There are several 
advantages of panel data over cross-sectional or time-series data sets: (1) They are 
very informative about the parameters to be estimated due to substantial increase in 
degrees of freedom ( ifN is the size of the cross-section, and Tis the number of time 
periods, the number of degrees of freedom increase from N to NT). (2) Panel data 
reduce multicollinearity among regressors and thus improve the efficiency of the 
estimates. (3) By permitting country and time-specific effects, panel data provide 
controls for the effects of missing or unobserved variables that are correlated with 
explanatory variables. ( 4) They allow the researcher to analyze a number of 
important economic questions that can not be addressed using cross-sectional or 
time-series data sets. (5) Using panel data does not require as strong assumptions 
about error terms as cross-sectional data requires. The disadvantage of panel data is 
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that N is usually very large and T is frequently very small. Thus, parameters that are 
identified by variation across the cross-sectional units will tend to be estimated very 
well, while parameters that are identified only by the variation across time may be 
estimated quite poorly. (Hsiao, 1986; Greene, 1993; Davidson and Mackinnon, 
1993; Judge et. al., 1988). 
This study includes countr~s from Asia (excluding Middle East), and the 
Americas. We choose to limit our sample to these areas for several reasons. One, as 
discussed earlier, rapid urbanization into large mega-cities is a phenomenon of Asia 
and the Americas. Asia and Latin America include a number of countries that have 
grown rapidly, as well as countries that have not. Moreover, the World Bank (1993) 
argues that openness to foreign influence is an important reason for southeast Asian 
development. Other Asian countries, such as India, have been more inward looking. 
Latin American countries, of course, provided the setting for the development of 
dependency theory. Thus, this group of countries is well-suited for testing 
dependency I world system theories. It is well-suited for testing ecological and elite 
theories because it contains countries that have experienced rapid and slow 
population growth. Moreover it includes countries in Southeast Asia where the 
benefits of development have been shared generally among the population and 
countries where development has generated inequality. 
Each country should meet the following conditions: (1) have a total 
population of two million or morelin 1990, (2) be a nation-state not a city-state, a 
criterion that eliminates Hong Kong and Singapore, and (3) not be a socialist or ex-
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socialist country. These criteria give 33 countries. Because of substantial data 
unavailability, we drop Haiti, Jamaica, and Nepal. Therefore, our sample includes 30 
countries; 11 countries from Asia, 17 countries from Latin America, and 2 countries 
from North America. The 30 countries, in alphabetical order, are: Argentina, 
Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, El-Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Japan, 
Korea (south), Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Sri 
Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
This sample includes a wide range of countries, from a country with very 
large population such as India with about 850 million people in 1990 to a country 
such as Panama with only about 2.5 million. It also includes mega-cities such as 
Tokyo with more than 25 million inhabitants in 1990 and smaller cities such as San 
Jose ( capital of Costa Rica) with 297 thousand inhabitants. It also has a wide range 
of income, from low-income countries such as India with GDP per capita of$1,264 
in (PPP) to high income countries such as USA with $18,054 in 1990. Some 
countries have a highly primate city, for instance Thailand (UPI = 26), others have 
low urban primacy, such as Canada (UPI equals 1.2). 
To investigate the time effect we collect data for 7 different years: 1960, 
1965, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985,and 1990. Allsourcesofdataarementionedwhen 
the corresponding variable is discussed, except for Taiwan where data are collected 
from various issues of Statistical Yearbook of Republic of China, The Europe 
Yearbook, and The Statesman's Yearbook. 
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All statistical results were computed with the econometric software LIMDEP 
version 6.0 (Greene, 1992). Most variables have complete data. If data are missing, 
the "SKIP" command is used to bypass them. 
One factor fixed and random effects models: 
Simple pooling of panel data and using OLS to estimate an equation overlooks 
country-specific and time-specific information. Both fixed and random effects 
models can use this information. We now compare these two panel data techniques 
(Hsiao, 1986; Judge, et.al., 1988; Davidson and Mackinon, 1993; and Greene 1992 
and 1993). 
Fixed-Effects Model (FEM): 
The fixed effects model (FEM) is the least squares dummy variable (LSDV) model. 
A dummy for each country is introduced and the equation is estimated by OLS; the 
fixed effects are unknown parameters to be estimated. The estimator of the 
coefficient is called the within group estimator because only the variation within (not 
between) each country is used when the estimator is formed. When FEM is used, 
inference is conditional on the observations that are in the study; inference can not be 
extended outside the sample. If differences in countries can be adequately captured 
by specifying different intercept coefficients for each country, the fixed effects model 
is appropriate. 
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Random-Effects Model (REM): 
The random effects model (REM) is a generalized least squares (GLS) regression 
model. It treats the individual specific effects as random variables. The GLS 
estimator is a weighted average of the between group and within group estimator. 
REM is appropriate if the cross-sectional units are viewed as a random 
sample from some larger population, and it is the population parameters that we wish 
to learn about. 
To summarize, FEM constrains inference to observations within the model. 
To generalize inference from the sample to a population, the effects should be 
random. It may be up to the researcher to decide whether to make inference with 
respect to the effects that are in the sample or with respect to population 
characteristics in general. Greene (1993, 479) states that 
From a purely practical stand point, the dummy variable 
approach is costly in terms of degrees of freedom lost, and in a 
wide, longitudinal data set, the random effects model has some 
intuitive appeal. On the other hand, the fixed effects approach 
has one considerable virtue. There is no justification for 
treating the individual effects as uncorrelated with the other 
regressors, as is assumed in the random effects model. The 
random effects treatment, therefore, may suffer from 
inconsistency due to omitted variables. 
We start our discussion by comparing the four urban measures to show 
empirically that UPI is the most suitable variable to the purpose of this study. 
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VI. FINDINGS 
Comparison of urban primacy measures: 
This study has compared four measures of urban primacy. These measures, as 
mentioned in chapter III, are UP 1 which is the ratio of the largest city population to 
the population of the second largest city, UP2 which is the ratio of the largest city 
population to the total population of the second, the third, and the fourth largest ones, 
UP3 which is the ratio of largest city population to the total urban population, and 
UP4 which is the ratio of the largest city population to the total population of a 
country. We conclude in chapter III that each measure has its own shortcomings, and 
that there is no perfect measure of urban primacy; but also we find that some 
measures have advantages over others. 
UP4 is available for almost all countries on a frequent basis. Moreover, it 
uses all population information; as in an example of Thailand and Canada in chapter 
III, however, it may not measure urban primacy well. The correlation matrix in 
Table 4.1 shows that the correlation between the natural log ofUP4 (LUP4) and the 
natural log of the other primacy measures ranges from 0.51 to 0.67. LUPI and LUP2 
are the most direct measures of urban primacy; LUP4's correlation with them is 0.51 
and 0.54. This implies the R2, the percentage of variation that the two variables have 
in common is only 25 to 30 percent The hope that LUP4 could proxy urban primacy 
is a vain one. LUPI and LUP2, on the other hand, have a simple correlation of 0.97. 
Almost 90 percent of their variation is variation in common. Furthermore, UP4 
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shows the percentage of the total population that lives in the largest city. It does not 
tell how primate the largest city is relative to other cities in the urban system. Thus, 
it does not accurately measure the concept of urban primacy. Since this study 
defines primate city as the largest city relative to other cities within the urban system 
in a country, UP4 is the least useful for this study. 
Table 4.1 shows that LUP3 has a relatively high correlation with LUPI (0.70) and 
LUP2 (0.77); it is not as high as the correlation between LUPI and LUP2. The 
implied R2s range from about 50 to 60 percent. LUP3, like LUP4, uses more 
information than the other measures; in this case it is total urban population and the 
population of the largest city. Again, this information is more generally available 
than information about city population for cities other than the largest city. The 
measure suffers because the definition of urban population is not constant over 
countries. The correlation of 0.7 to 0.8 suggests that it is not a good proxy for urban 
primacy. Because LUP3 is based on various definitions of urban areas, it is not a 
reliable measure when it comes to cross-country comparison. 
UP2, the "four-city" index, has the advantage of comparing the largest city to 
the next three largest cities, rather than to only the second largest. But for many 
developing countries, data for the third and fourth largest cities are difficult to get. 
UPI has the advantage of simplicity and data availability, but it fails to capture the 
size distribution of cities below the two largest in the country. Both UPI and 
UP2 have the advantage of making cross-country comparisons more accurate. Table 
4.1 shows that the natural logs ofUPl and UP2 (LUPI and LUP2) are highly 
Table 4.2a: 
Comparison of Urban Primacy Indices. OLS without group dummy variables. 
VARIABLE LUPI LUP2 LUPJ UIP4 LUPI LllPl LUPJ LUP4 LUPI LUP2 UIPJ LUP4 
LGDP 0.1548* .. O.II09 .. * -0.0775*** -0.1190* .. 0.0459 -0.0182 -0.1484* .. -0.1837*** -0.0902* -0.1072 .. -0.1717*** -0.2398*** 
(4.241) (3.264) (-3.469) (-4.650) (1.064) (-0.467) (-5.487) (-5.903) (-1.767) (-2.749) (-6.168) (-6.856) 
LGDPC 4.9115*** 4.6982*** 2.7295 ... 5.4526* .. 9.1018*** 8.1280*** 4.2958* .. 3.7429*** 14.326*** 11.963* .. 5.7703*** 5.9967*** 
(4.182) (4.296) (3.795) (6.621) (7.024) (6.935) (5.288) (4.005) (8.955) (8.829) (6.612) (5.470) 
LGDPCSQ -0.3291* .. -0.3092* .. -0.1697* .. -0.3121 *** -0.5546*** -0.4885*** -0.2504 ... -0.2182*** -0.8434 ... -0.1021••• -0.3422*** -0.3496*** 
(-4.462) (-4.503) (-3.758) (-6.037) (-7.047) (-6.861) (-5.074) (-3.843) (-8.7IO) (-8.562) (-6.479) (-5.268) 
LPOPDENS -0.4785* .. -0.4000*** -0.1782*** -0.2289 ... -0.3917*** -0.3150*** -0.1434*** -0.1902*** -0.0949 -0.1034* -0.0965*** -0.0813* 
(~8.526) (-7.652) (-5.184) (-5.818) (-6.877) (-6.114) (-4.014) (-4.630) (-1.449) (-1.865) (-2.700) (-1.812) 
l.EDllC 0.2320** 0.1421 0.0255 0.3348*** 0.5401*** 0.4976*** 0.2530*** 0.2699*** 0.6560*** 0.5794*** 0.3165* .. 0.3568*** 
( 1.970) (1.296) (0.353) (4.055) (4.078) (4.153) (3.046) (2.824) (3.924) (4.092) (3.471) (3.114) 
DCAP 1.5566*** 1.1978*** 0.5789*** 0.6429*** 1.3273••• 0.9693 ... 0.4815* .. 0.6744*** 
( 11.497) (9.502) (6.983) (6.772) (10.324) (8.334) (5.974) (7.273) 
LEXP -0.1898** -0.2278*** -0.1353** -0.2568* .. -0.2528••• -0.2727*** -0.0979 -0.2511••• 
(-2.098) (-2.782) (-2.385) (-3.934) (-2.165) (-2.757) (-1.536) (-3.137) 
GDPCGR 1 -0.0226 -0.0145 0.0023 0.0033 -0.0054*** -0.0379** -0.0017 -0.0072 
(-1.523) (-1.084) (0.251) (0.312) (-2.974) (-2.454) (-0.174) (-0.577) 
1.1.ABOR l .1.5543••• -1.4345 ... -0.7016 ... 0.8453 ... -2.9477••• -2.4647*** -0.8606*** 0.4295* 
(-5.948) (-6.069) (-4.283) (4.485) (-8.425) (-8.317) (-4.509) (1.791) 
LPOPGR i -0.4088••• -0.4007••• -0.1556 .. -0.0960 -0.5318 -0.5147* .. -0.2858••• -0.1965 
(-3.540) (-3.836) (-2.149) (-1.153) (-2.951) (-3.372) (-2.907) (-1.591) 
LllRDISP i -0.0714 0.0905 0.0067 0.2549*** -0.2626° -0.0417 0.0896 0.2324•• 
(-0.643) (0.902) (0.960) (3.183) (-1.803) (0.338) ( 1.128) (2.328) 
..-01 -2.6098 -1.3967 -0.2887 -1.1799 
(-0.695) (-0.439) (-0.141) (-0.458) 
CONSTANT -20.382••• -19.614°•• -11.044••• -24.082°•• j -37.678··· -33.543 ... -17.370*** -14.307••• -58.121 ••• .-48.632 -22.704 ... -22.709*** 
(-4.201) (-4.342) (-3.717) (-7.079) l (-6.883) (-6.774) (-5.061) (-3.624) (-8.484) (-8.382) (-6.07<,) (-4.837) 
Adj. R1 0.52 0.45 0.51 0.72 j 0.61 0.58 0.59 0.75 0.43 0.46 0.50 0.57 
The number in parentheses is the I-statistic. The number above it is the coefficient. 
... , ••, and • indicate significance at the 99 percent, 95 percent, and 90 .percent levels. 
00 
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Table 4.2b: 
Comparison of Urban Primacy Indices, (Fixed Effects Model). 
VARIABLE LUPI LUP2 LlJPl LUP4 LUPI LUP2 LlJPl LUP4 LUPI LUP2 LUP3 LUP4 
LGDP -0.4328*** -0.4005*** 0.0880 -0.0100 -0.6598*** -0.5868*** -0.0303 -0.2351 -0.6626*** -0.6029*** -0.2500••• -0.1951 
(-3.305) (-3.215) (0.670) (-0.063) (-4.204) (-3.933) (-0.271) (-1.220) (-3.893) (-3.707) (-3.227) (-0.922) 
LGDPC 1.1973* 1.129* -0.1803 1.5928** 1.9243* 1.3431 -0.5183 0.4313 1.7037* 1.1512 -0.0741 0.1190 
( 1.855) ( 1.839) (-0.389) (2.027) (2.032) (1.491) (-0.893) (0.371) (1.670) (1.181) (-0.123) (0.094) 
I.GDPCSQ -0.0349 -0.0314 0.0161 -0.080* -0.0628 -0.0320 0.0416 -0.0010 -0.0500 -0.0181 0.0275 0.0171 
(-0.939) (-0.889) (0.665) (-1.776) (-1.178) (-0.632) (1.299) (-0.015) (-0.862) (-0.327) (0.793) (0.238) 
I.POPDENS -0.1085 -0.1957* -0.0807 -0.0291 -0.0907 -0.1830* -0.0772 -0.0695 -0.1151 -0.2094* -0.0067 -0.0830 
(-0.924) (-1. 752) (-1.209) (-0.204) (•0.765) (-1.623) (-1.135) (-0.478) (-0.917) (-1.746) · (-0.096) (-0.532) 
LEDUC 0.2449** 0.1927* 0.0314 0.1864 0.2609** 0.2148* -0.0009 0.1953 0.3088** 0.2870** -0.0324 0.2082 
(2.071) (1.714) (0.445) (1.295) (2.054) (1.779) (-0.012) (1.253) (2.164) (2.105) (-0.392) (1.173) 
DCAP 0.7306°** 0.7397*-** 0.3066*** 0.7680 0.5860*** 0.6011 ••• 0.2168** 0.4875** 
(4.984) (5.306) (3.685) (4.303) (3.190) (3.441) (2.022) (2.162) 
LEXP -0.0620 -0.0497 -0.0113 0.0088 -0.0374 -0.0428 -0.0308 0.0033 
(-1.165) (-0.981) (-0.361) (0.135) (-0.624) (-0.749) (-0.853) (0.045) 
GDPCGR ; -0.0037 0.0019 0.0015 -0.0022 -0.0056 -0.0007 0.0014 -0.0053 
(-0.550) (0.294) (0.339) (-0.263) (-0.772) (-0.097) (0.272) (-0.591) 
1,1,ABOR ; 0.2613 0.3147 0.2798* 0.7697** 0.2036 0.2715 0.3164* 0.7178** 
(0.978) (1.239) ( 1.823) (2.348) (0.716) (1.000) (l.933) (2.031) 
1,POPGR ; 0.0449 0.0919 0.0914** 0.1408* 0.0457 0.1401 0.1849*** 0.2061 
(0.632) (1.360) (2.121) (1.614) (0.489) (1.568) (3.219) ( 1.772) 
UIRDISP 1 -0.1516** -0.1342** -0.0044 0.0299 -0.1245* -0.1119* -0.0065 0.0546 
(-2.334) (-2.174) (-0.119) (0.375) (-1.813) (-1.705) (-0.164) (0.640) 
m1 1.0951 1.6187 -0.1856 0.8259 
(0.876) ( 1.356) (-0.253) (0.531) 
CONSTANT -2.6203* . 0.7847 2.1549 
(-1.797) (0.330) (0.846) 
U\IT 404.915 419.988 433.5-B 275.325 j 340.559 308.602 333.246 189.757 297.878 256.661 224.639 191.775 
(p-valur) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) ({J.()000) i (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.00000 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Adj. R1 0.96 0.95 0.96 0.92 j 0.96 0.95 0.96 0.92 0.95 0.94 0.95 0 HK 
The number in parentheses is the t-statistic. The number above it is the coefficient. 
'° • • •. • •, and • indicate significance at the 99 percent, 95 percent. and 90 percent levels. 0 
Table 4.2c: 
Comparison of Urban Primacy Indices,(Random Effects Model). 
VARIABLE LUPI LUP2 LUPJ LllP4 LUPI LllP2 LllPJ UIP4 LUPI LllP2 UJPJ UIP4 
LGDP -0.1208• -0.1053• -0.1162 .. -0.1430••• -0.1192• -0.0860 -0.1530••• -0.1645••• i -0.2288••• -0.1845* .. -0.2431 ••• -0.2403••• 
(-1.880) (-1.739) (-2.023) (-2.951) (-1.809) (-1.458) (-3.295) (-3.472) ! (-3.147) (-2.980) (-5.243) (-4.764) 
LGDPC 0.7453 0.7301 0.4202 2.1176··· 1.8677** 1.4224• 0.2875 1.1985 2.0444•• 1.8333** 0.2237 1.5586 
( 1.307) ( 1.348) ( 1.207) (3.232) (2.249) (1.819) (0.583) (1.310) (2.178) (2.072) (0.392) (I .466) 
LGDPCSQ -0.0299 -0.0289 -0.0102 -0.1026•• -0.0923• -0.0675 -0.0008 -0.0522 -0.0970• -0.0848* 0.0078 -0.0669 
(-0.856) (-0.870) (-0.491) (-2.522) (-1.899) (-l.474) (-0.028) (-0.965) (-1.773) (-1.642) (0.236) (-1.071) 
t,POPDENS -0.1790•• -0.2191 ••• -0.0561 -0.1513• -0.1535* -0.1957*** -0.0508 -0.1359 -0.0587 -0.0900 -0126 -0.0245 
(-2.193) (0.0045) (-0.991) (-2.186) (0.0618) (-2.600) (-0.991) (-1.989) (-0.649) (-1.117) (-0.233) (-0.330) 
I.EDUC 0.0672 0.0029 0.0018 0.3380 ... 0.0961 -0.0495 -0.0324 0.1859* 0.1251 0.0909 -0.0626 0.2136* 
(0.755) (0.035) (0.029) (3. 748) (0.920) (0.504) (-0.489) ( 1.678) ! (1.073) (0.836) (-0.861) ( 1.700) 
DCAP 0.8289••• 0.7923 0.3346··· 0.7412*** 0.8818*** 0.8552* .. 0.3359*** 0.6266*** 
(6.171) (6.213) (4.169) (5.270) (5.685) (5.925) (3.593) (4.293) 
tEXP -0.0480 -0.0382 -0.0092 -0.0302 -0.0531 -0.0590 -0.0379 -0.0425 
(-0.933) (-0. 785) (0.301) (-0.515) (-0.912) (-1.071) (-1.078) (-0.628) 
GDPCGR i -0.0003 0.0049 0.0002 -0.0034 -0.0041 0.0003 0.0030 -0.0085 
(-0.045) (0.817) (0.037) (-0.461) (-0.584) (0.039) (0.591) (-1.012) 
I.LABOR ! -0.3465 -0.2894 0.0983 0.6613 ... -0.355 -0.3681 0.1714 0.5359* 
(-I.SOI) (-1.338) (0.713) (2.783) (-1.393) (-1.537) ( I.I 06) (1.912) 
LPOPGR ! -0.0160 0.0305 0.0878*• 0.0777 -0.0301 0.0471 0.1829••• 0.1124 
(-0.231) (0.465) (2.127) (0.974) (-0.331) (0.544) (3.267) ( 1.050) 
UIRDISP i -0.1309* • -0.1091• -0.0062 0.00452 -0.1086• -0.0968 0.0064 0.0454 
(-2.097) (-1.844) (-0.170) (0.624) (-1.627) (-1.524) (0.164) (0.570) 
mt 0.4335 0.8805 -0.3203 0.5755 
(0.354) (0.754) (-0.442) (0.383) 
CONSTANT -1.0607 -1.8344 -2.1082 -10.701 i -6 0568* -5.3387 -0.935 -5.5701 -4.6867 -5.2877 0.8995 -5.9079 
(-0.460) (-0838) ( 1.364) (-3985) 1 (-1.695) (-1.588) (-0.430) (-1.437) (-1.179) (-1.411) (0.364 J (-1.310) 
n: ,·s. RE 23.0576 18.7504 7.412 9 037 ! 36.4885 37.407 25.7785 17.738 31.278 38.319 27.619 16.676 
(p-nlut) (0.0008) (0 0046) (0.2844) (0 1715) 1 (00001) (0.0001) (0.0070) (0.0879) (00010) (0 0001) (0.0037) (0 1178) 
R2 0.33 0.30 0.38 0.69 ; 031 0.34 ()38 ()71 003 0.04 0.15 0.49 
The number in parentheses is the I-statistic. The number above it is the coefficient. 
-0 
• • •. ••, and • indicate significance at the 99 percent. 95 percent, and 90 percent levels. 
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correlated (0.97). 
To test whether these dependent variable give similar regression results, we 
report three models in tables 4.2a, 4.2b, and 4.3c, using OLS, FEM, and REM, 
respectively. Because the purpose is to compare the equations across dependent 
variables we do not discuss the coefficients at this time. Tables 4.2B and 4.2C show 
that the regression results of LUPI and LUP2 are consistent. In the first equation, 
LUPI and LUP2 favor fixed effects model over random effects model while LUP3 
and LUP4 favor the random over fixed. In the second equation all indexes favor 
fixed over random effects model, but LUPI and LUP2 have a high p-value compared 
with that ofLUP3 and LUP4. In the third equation LUPI, LUP2, LUP3 favor fixed 
while LUP4 favors the random effects model. Examining the variables' coefficients 
and t-statistics we find that the results, in general, for LUPI and LUP2 are very 
similar and close to each other in magnitude and direction. All these indicators allow 
us to conclude that LUPI and LUP2 give similar results. The coefficients and t-
statistics for the other two me.asures are quite different from those for LUPI and 
LUP2. LUPI is the urban primacy index that we use in the rest of this study. 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) without group or time dummy variables: 
The basic equation in table 4.3a ( equation 1) shows that all independent variables in 
the model are highly significant and the explained variation is over 50 percent 
(adjusted R2 is 0.52). The first independent variable coefficient in the equation 
(LGDP) is significant at 0.01 significance level. It implies that a ceteris paribus 
Table 4.3a: 
Determinants of Urban Primacy (LUPI). 
OLS without group dummy variables. 
VARIABLE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 to 
LGDP 0.1548 ... 0.1064** 0.1567••• 0.1165••• 0.1424••• 0.1473*** 0.0155 0.0404 0.0459 -0.0902* 
(4.241) (2.387) (4.238) (3.311) (3.955) (3.944) (0.337) (0.956) (1.064) (-1.767) 
LGDPC 4.9115••• 5.0125• 0 4.9737••• 6.8754••• 5.6775••• 4.6094••• 7_3755••• 8.798 ... 9.1018••• 14.326••• 
(4.182) (4.333) (4.100) (5.874) (4.819) (3.788) (4.843) (7.302) (7.024) (8.955) 
LGDPCSQ -0.3291 ••• 0.3355* .. -0.3334••• -0.4268*•• -0.3792••• -0.3097••• -0.4803••• -0.5369••• -0.5546••• -0.8434••• 
(-4.462) (-4.573) (-4.381) (-5.926) (-5.116) (-4.047) (-5.021) (-7.295) (-7.047) (-8.7!0) 
LPOPDENS -0.4785••• -0.4355* .. -0.4820••• -0.4610••• -0.4860°• -0.4794••• -0.2057 ... -0.3911 ... -0.3911••• -0.0979 
(-8.526) (-7.218) (-8.257) (-8.699) (-8.827) (-8.539) (-3.036) (-6.877) (-6.877) (-1.449) 
LEDUC 0.2320** 0.2868 .. 0.2527** 0.5413··· 0.1215 0.2681 •• 0.3830•• 0.5465••• 0.5401••• 0.6560••• 
( 1.970) (2.377) (2.086) (4.291) ( 1.004) (2.167) (2.305) (4.144) (4.078) (3.924) 
DCAP 1.5566••• 1.5425* .. 1.5680••• 1.4438••• 1.5312••• 1.5464* .. 1.3258••• 1.3273••• 
(11.497) (11.445) (11.319) (11.154) (11.516) (11.384) (10.330) (10.324) 
LEXP -0.1785* -0.1989** -0.1898•• -0.2528** 
(-1.870) (-2.228) (-2.098) (-2.165) 
GDPCGR -0.0012 -0.024* -0.0226 -0.0543••• 
(-0.077) (-1.606) (-1.523) (-2.974) 
LLABOR -1.1406··· -1.4772••• .1.5543• .. -2.9477••• 
(-5.158) (-6.371) (-5.948) (-8.425) 
LPOPGR -0.3661* .. -0.4224••• -0.4088••• -0.5318••• 
(-3.054) (-3.726) (-3.540) (-2.951) 
LURDISP 0.0962 -0.0714 -0.2626 
(0.952) (-0.643) (-1.803) 
FOi -1.0070 -2.6098 
(-0.229) (-0.695) 
CONSTANT -20.382 ... -20.oos••• -20.665° 0 • -30.119••• -22.592°•• -19.232 ... -27.245°•• -36.304°•• -37.678°•• -58.121••• 
(-4.201) (-4.145) (5.008) (-6.089) (-4.697) (-3.846) (-4.290) (-7.215) (-6.883) (-8.484) 
Adj. R 0.52 0.52 0.51 0.57 0.54 0.52 0.16 0.61 O.<, I 0.43 
The number in parentheses is the t-statistic. The number above it is the coefficient. 
• • •, • •, and • indicate significance at the 99 percent, 95 percent, and 90 percent levels. 
'° \,) 
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increase in GDP has a positive impact on urban primacy. In other words, an increase 
in GDP accompanied by the same percentage increase in population and land area, 
(to hold GDP per capita and population density constant) increases urban primacy. 
This contradicts the hypothesis that the larger the country, the less primate its urban 
system would be. 
The relationship between economic development and urban primacy, however, fits 
the curvilinear hypothesis nicely. Urban primacy increases with economic 
development until certain level or development and then starts to decline. (The 
coefficient ofLGDPC is positive and significant and that ofLGDPCSQ is negative 
and significant at 0.01 level.). Thus, OLS without group and time dummy variables 
strongly supports the hypothesis about the relationship between urban primacy and 
economic development. 
Population density has a negative coefficient significant at 0.01 level. When 
a country is highly populated relative to its area, urban population will be distributed 
among several cities. Since population density is the ratio of population to area, this 
coefficient along with the coefficient for GDPC implies that population size is 
negatively related to urban primacy. It also implies that the area has a positive 
impact on urban primacy. A country with large land area leads to a 
concentration of people in a few large cities to save in high transportation cost. 
Average years of schooling (LEDUC) has the expected positive impact on . 
urban primacy; its coefficient is significant at 0.05 level. Concentration of schools 
and universities in the largest cities leads to migration of young people from rural 
areas and smaller towns to these cities. 
95 
The last variable in the basic equation (DCAP) has a highly significant, 
positive impact on urban primacy. Primacy increases when the largest city is also the 
capital of a country. 
To summarize the findings of this phase of the analysis, except for the size of 
a country, all coefficients in the basic equation are highly significant and have the 
expected signs. The model fits our hypotheses nicely. Although we reserve detailed 
discussion of the additional variables in table 4.3a, it is pertinent that the results for 
the basic equation carry over to them. (The exceptions are equations 7 and 10 which 
omit one variable from the basic equation and omit some observations because of 
missing data for FDI.) It is also pertinent that many of the variables added to the 
basic equation have significant coefficients. 
In this classical regression model, however, the groupwise nature of the data 
set is ignored and the full set of observations is pooled. To see if this is appropriate, 
Breusch and Pagan's Lagrange multiplier statistic is computed. Table 4.3b shows, 
for equation 1 and the other equations, a large value of the LM statistic which argues 
in favor of models with group and/or time effects against the classical regression 
model (Greene, 1992, 303 and 311). If the classical regression model is 
inappropriate, studies that rely on OLS to make cross-country comparison regarding 
urban primacy are inappropriate. The coefficients of OLS model may be biased if 
relevant variables are excluded. Given the complexity of the forces affecting urban 
primacy and given the problem of assembling data for a variety of variables across 
countries, it is unlikely that existing studies have avoided omitted variable bias. 
One factor vs. two factor fixed and random effects models: 
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To choose between one factor (includes country effects) or two factors (includes 
country and time effects) fixed and random effects model, an F statistic is computed 
to test the restricted model that there is no time effect. The comparison is a 
regression with country effects versus the unrestricted regression that includes both 
country and time effects. The result of F test using 0.05 significance level results 
favors the use of one way fixed and random effects models in all equations; the time 
effects are jointly insignificant. We re-estimate the model using a 10 year span 
instead of 5 year span for the period from 1960 to 1990. The F test still favors the 
restricted model ( without time effects) for the different combinations that we used. 
This finding of insignificant time effects is an important one. The fear that 
technological or institutional changes have shifted the primacy function toward more 
urban primacy is unfounded for the 1960 to 1990 period. Overurbanization, if it 
defined as a primacy function that shifts over time, has not occurred over this period. 
Because this has been a period of rapid urbanization and growth of mega-cities, this 
result is particularly important. 
Table 4.3b shows the findings of the basic equation when the one-way fixed 
effects model is used. The coefficient of LGDP is negative and significant at 0.01 
level, confirming a central hypothesis of our model. A one percent increase in the 
Table 4.3b: 
Determinants of Urban Primacy (LUPI). (Fixed Effects Model). 
VARIABLE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
LGDP -0.4328••• -0.4373*** -0.4855*** -0.5485*** -0.4355*** -0.5580*** -0.4613*** -0.5987**• -0.6598••• -0.6626* .. 
(-3.305) (-3.334) (-3.317) (-3.803) (-3.318) (-4.107) (-3.301) (-3.818) (-4.204) (-3.893) 
LGDPC 1.1973* 1.3455** 1.4496** 0.695 1.0853• 2.0178••• 1.0174 0.8969 1.9243** 1.7037* 
(1.855) (2.018) (l.981) (1.000) (l.626) (2.898) (1.491) (1.055) (2.032) (1.670) 
LGDPCSQ -0.0349 -0.0423 -0.0457 -0.0018 -0.0269 -0.0753• -0.0234 -0.0078 -0.0628 -0.0500 
(-0.939) (-1.111) (-1.132) (-0.045) (-0.690) (-1.925) (-0.600) (-0.160) (-1.178) (-0.862) 
LPOPDENS -0.1085 -0.0978 -0.1104 -0.1320 -0.1041 -0.0907 -0.1256 -0,1193 -0.0907 -0.1151 
(-0.924) (-0.828) (-0.931) (-1.125) (-0.884) (-0.787) (-1.030) (-0.999) (-0.765) (-0.917) 
LEDUC 0.2449** 0.2523** 0.2582** 0.2049* 0.2594** 0.2433 .. 0.2997** 0.2511* 0.2609** 0.3088** 
(2.071) (2.127) (2.067) (1.716) (2.155) (2.099) (2.294) ( 1.952) (2.054) (2.164) 
DCAP 0.7306*** 0.1003••• 0.6828*** 0.5913*** 0.7187*** 0.7336*** 0.5170••• 0.5860*** 
(4.984) (4.652) (4.116) (3.610) (4.861) (5.104) (2.817) (3.190) 
LEXP -0.0472 -0.0519 -0.0620 -0.0374 
(-0.891) (-0.965) (-1.165) (-0.624) 
GDPCGR -0.0058 -0.0033 -0.0037 -0.0056 
(-0.875) (-0.487) (-0.550) (-0.772) 
LLABOR 0.4496* 0.4589* 0.2613 0.2036 
( 1.856) (1.788) (0.978) (0.719) . 
LPOPGR 0.476 0.0599 0.0449 0.0457 
(0.674) (0.835) (0.632) (0.489) 
LURDISP -0.1708*** -0.1516** -0.1245* 
(-2.823) (-2.334) (-1.813) 
FOi 1.1826 1.0951 
(0.975) (0.1176) 
CONSTANT 
LM Test 404.915 389.849 405.203 389.101 392.531 403.121! 399.491 336.948 340.559 297.878 
(p-value) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0 0000) (0.0000) 
Adj.R2 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.95 
The number in parentheses is the t-statistic. The number above it is the coefficient. 
..0 
•••, ••, and • indicate significance at the 99 percent, 95 percent, and 90 percent levels. -..J 
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size of a country (GDP) decreases urban primacy by 0.43 percent. This finding 
shows the importance of including country effects. In the classical regression model 
(without country effects) this coefficient has a positive sign. 
The results also show that urban primacy increases with economic 
development in a country. The coefficient ofLGDPC is positive and significant at 
0.10 level, while that of LGPCSQ is negative but not significant, with t-value equal 
to -0.939. Later, however, we show that the coefficients of LGDP and LGDPCSQ 
are jointly significant, although they are individually not significant. 
The population density coefficient is negative but not significant (t-value is 
just -0.924). (Note, however, that its coefficient is significant in the equations that 
use LUP2 in table 4.2b. In this case, using LUP2 as dependent variable made a 
difference.) 
The coefficients for average years of schooling and the dummy variable of 
capital city are both significant and have the expected signs. 
Table 43c shows the findings of random effects model when GLS with 
group dummy variables is used. All variables have the expected signs, but only three 
variables have significant coefficients, namely LGDP, LPOPDENS, and DCAP. 
So far we have investigated the classical OLS, the fixed-effects model, an:d the 
random-effect model. FEM and REM are preferred.over the classical regression 
model. 
To choose between fixed and random effects model (between LSDV and 
GLS), one can use the Hausman test. It is basically a test to see whether the GLS 
Table 4.3c: 
Determinants of Urban Primacy (LUPl). (Random Effects Model). 
VARIABLE I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 JO 
LGDP -0.1208• -0.1327° -0.1210• -0.1026· -0.1194* -0.1396° -0.2390••• -0.1088* -0.1192• -0.2288••• 
(-1.880) (-2.016) (-1.813) (-1.622) (-1.867) (-2.140) (-3.097) (-1.679) (-1.809) (-3.147) 
LGDPC 0.7453 0.9143 0.6788 0.9727 0.7296 . 1.0608* 0.7615 1.178 1.8677** 2.0444** 
(1.307) ( 1.506) (1.115) (l.548) (1.230) (l.782) (1.244) (1.553) (2.249) (2.178) 
LGDPCSQ -0.0299 -0.0377 . -0.0259 -0.0430 -0.0289 -0.0474 -0.0246 -0.0537 -0.0923* -0.0970* 
(-0.856) (-1.042) (-0. 702) (-1.138) (-0.787) (-1 :309) (-0.665) (-1.201) (-1.899) (-1.773) 
LPOPDENS -0.1790•• -0.1630* -0.1745** -0.1802°• -0.1788••• -0.1742 .. -0.1049 -0.1648° -0.1535* -0.0587 
(-2.193) (-1.941) (-2.104) (-2.270) (-2.189) (-2.137) (-1.135) (-2.017) (-1.867) (-0.649) 
LEDUC 0.0672 0.07539 0.0633 0.1031 0.0682 0.0387 0.1307 0.1043 0.0961 0.1251 
(0.755) (0.841) (0.675) ( 1.025) (0.750) (0.428) (1.285) (0.992) (0.920) ( 1.073) 
DCAP 0.8289••• 0.804* .. 0.8133••• 0.8799••• 0.8296··· 0.8168••• 0.8577••• 0.8818••• 
(6.171) (5.856) (5.460) (6.204) (6.141) (6.166) (5.556) (5.685) 
LEXP -0.0439 -0.0394 -0.0480 -0.053 I 
(-0.854) (-0.760) (-0.933) (-0.912) 
GDPCGR 0.0009 -0.0010 -0.0003 -0.0041 
(0.151) (-0.150) (-0.045) (-0.584) 
LLABOR -0.1602 -0.1902 -0.3465 -0.3551 
(-0.806) (-0.883) (-I.SOI) (-1.393) 
LPOPGR 0.0069 -0.0082 -0.0160 -0.0301 
(0.100) (-0.118) (-0.231) (-0.33 I) 
LURDISP -0.0898 -0.1309 .. -0.1086* 
(-1.591) (-2.097) (-1.627) 
FDI 0.7953 0.4335 
(0.664) (0.354) 
CONSTANT -1.0607 -I.SOSO -0.7795 -2.5401 -1.0307 -1.9791 1.0327 -3.2815 -6.0568* -4.6867 
(-0.460) (-0.636) (-0322) (-0.892) (-0.436) (-0.842) (0.423) (-1.001) (-1.695) (-1.179) 
FE vs. RE 23.058 23.585 23.389 31.185 25.086 28.226 13.830 36.2861 36.489 31.279 
(p-value) (0.0008) (0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0001) (0.0007) (0.0002) (0.0316) (0.0001) ((HJOO I) (0.0010) 
R2 0.33 0.33 0.32 037 0.30 .(1.()5 0.37 0 37 ().(J.J 
The number in parentheses is the t-statistic. The number above it is the coefficient. 
'Ci 
•• •, ••, and • indicate significance at the 99 percent, 95 percent, and 90 percent levels. ·..o 
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estimator is an appropriate alternative to the LSDV estimator. It is a test for 
orthogonality of the random effects and the regressors. The Hausman test is based 
on the idea that under the hypothesis of no correlation between the individual effects 
and the other regressors in the model, both OLS in the LSDV model and GLS are 
consistent, but OLS is inefficient, while under the alternative OLS is consistent, but 
GLS is not. Therefore, under the null hypothesis, the two estimates should not differ 
systematically, and a test can be based on the difference (Greene, 1993, 479). Large 
values of the Hausman statistic argue in favor of the fixed effects model over the 
random effect model (Greene, 1992). Table 4.3c shows that the Hausman statistics 
for all equations are large and significant; it favors fixed effects model. Thus, we 
will concentrate the remainder of our analysis on table 4.3b. 
Other Independent Variables: 
Now, we discuss the new variables that were added to the basic equation. Because 
the FEM is preferred, we discuss the results in table 4.3b. 
Export of goods and nonfactor services (LEXP) was added but it does not 
make a significant difference. Equation 2 in table 4.3b has no significant changes in 
the coefficients of the basic variables, and adjusted R2 stays the same. The export 
coefficient is negative as expected, but it is not significant (t-value is -0.891). 
When economic growth measured by growth rate of GDP per capita 
(GDPCGR) is added to the model (equation 3), adjusted R2 declines to 0.95 but the 
basic variables did not change their direction nor their significance. The coefficient 
of GDPCGR is not significant (t-value is -0.875). 
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The share of labor outside agriculture (LLABOR) has a significant 
coefficient at 0.10 level and has a positive sign (equation 4). It has a positive impact 
on urban primacy. Its inclusion also affects other coefficients in the model. The 
coefficient of LGDPC is no longer significant. Similarly, the significance of 
LEDUC's coefficient is reduced, although it is still significant. These changes occur 
because LGDPC, LGDPCSQ, and LEDUC are highly correlated with LLABOR 
(0.84, 0.83, 0.80 respectively). The simultaneous inclusion of these intercorrelated 
variables as regressors leads to inefficient estimation. 
Equation 5 in table 4.3 B shows the effect of adding the population growth 
rate (LPOPGR) to the basic equation. Although LPOPGR coefficient has the 
expected positive sign, it is not significant (t-value is only 0.674). This means that 
population growth rate does not have a significant impact on urban primacy. This 
weakens support for the ecological idea that population growth, particularly rural 
population growth increase primacy. 
To test the urban bias theory, urban-rural disparity measure (LURDISP) is 
added to the basic model ( equation 6). The bell-shaped hypothesis with respect to 
development is clearly supported in this equation. LGDPC is positive and significant 
and LGDPCSQ is negative and significant. The significant coefficient of the urban 
disparity measure strongly contradicts the hypothesis that the ratio of productivity of 
workers outside agriculture to that of workers in agriculture enhances urban primacy. 
It is negative and significant at 0.01 level. This result implies that the greater the 
difference between nonagricultural and agricultural productivity, the lower the 
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primacy of the urban system. We suspect that this productivity difference increases 
urban population in general, although it does not increase urban primacy. This 
indicates that the population of smaller cities in urban system might increase more 
rapidly than that of the primate city, as nonagricultural productivity improves. This 
result is also consistent with the proposition that the city-size distribution responds to 
economic and market forces. 
To test the dependency I world system theories hypothesis that dependency 
on foreign investment and multinational corporations' penetration enhances urban 
primacy, the foreign direct investment (FDI) variable is added (equation 7). FDI's 
coefficientis positive but not significant (t-value is 0.975). Thus, there is little 
support for the idea that foreign direct investment, or foreign dependency, causes 
resources to concentrate in the largest city. (DCAP in equation 7 is dropped because 
there are only 195 observations available for FDI variable so the "SKIP" command is 
used and it omits observations with missing values. This cause regressors to be 
collinear when DCAP is included (thus, DCAP is dropped). LGDPC and LGDPCSQ 
lose their significance, while LGDP and LEDUC remain significant. 
In equation 8-10 of table 4.3b we add the groups of the additional variables 
to the basic equation to see if the results change. In equation 8 adjusted R2 does not 
change; the coefficients ofLGDP, LEDUC, DCAP, LLABOR are significant and 
have the same signs as before. The economic development coefficients (LGDPC and 
LGDPCSQ) became insignificant and the coefficients ofLPOPDENS, LEXP, 
GDPCGR and LPOPGR remain insignificant. 
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Equation 9 adds LURDISP to equation 8 and LGDPC and LLABOR became 
insignificant. The LURDISP coefficient has the same sign and is significant as it 
was the case in equation 6. 
In the final equation of table 4.3b (equation 10) we add FDI to (and drop 
DCAP from) equation 9. Results are the same as of that of equation 9 except 
adjusted R2 is reduced to 0.95. 
In summary, analysis of table 4.3b shows that a one way OLS with group 
dummy variables (fixed effects model) provides a useful explanation of urban 
primacy. Some of the variable coefficients are significant and have the expected 
impact on urban primacy throughout the 10 equations, such as LGDP, LEDUC, 
DCAP and to some extent LGDPC. The other variables, except LURDISP, have the 
expected signs but they are not significant. LURDISP's coefficient is significant, 
and has a negative sign which is inconsistent with urban bias theory. 
Marginal effects ofLGDP and LPOP on LUPl: 
Although we have developed the model in term of GDP per capita and population 
density, it is of interest to determine the effects of GDP, population, and land area on 
primacy. To do so, we take partial derivatives of equation (4.5) with respect to each 
of these variables. Because the independent variables are not orthogonal, these 
partial derivatives must be interpreted with caution. The partial derivative of ( 4.5) 
with respect to LGDP is 
(4.6) BLUPI = (b + c) + 2d LGDP - 2d LPOP 
BLGDP 
= (b + c )+ 2d(LGDP) 
LPOP 
= (b + c) + 2d LGDPC 
This gives the partial elasticity of urban primacy with respect to GDP, 
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allowing GDP to have its size effect through economic development. The quadratic 
development effect results in the marginal effect of GDP on urban primacy being a 
linear function of economic development (GDPC). In the typical estimate in table 
4.3b, the function has a positive intercept and a negative slope. The marginal impact 
of GDP is positive at low levels of development, and it becomes smaller and 
eventually negative with economic development. 
For instance, for equation 1 in table 4.3b the effect ofLGDP on LUPI is 
= (b + c) + 2d LGDPC 
To get t-statistics for (b + c) and d, we estimate equations with LGDP, LPOP, 
and LLANO rather than GDP per capita and population density. Results for 
equations 1, 6, and 9 from table 4.3b are reported as equations 2-4 in table 4.3d. The 
t-statistics for (b + c) and d are in parentheses below the coefficients. For equation 1, 
we get 
BLUPI = - 0.4328 + 1.1973 - 2 (0.0349) LGDPC 
aLGDP · 
= 0.7645 - 0.0698 LGDPC, 
(1.271) (-0.94) 
and for equation 6, 
= - 0.558 + 2.0178 - 2 (0.0753) LGDPC 
= 1.4598 - 0.1506 LGDPC, 
(2.28) (-1.93) 
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Table 4.3d: 
Determinants of Urban Primacy (LUPl). 
Net effects ofLGDP and LPOP 
(Fixed Effects Model). 
VARIABLE 1 2 3 4 
LGDP 0.2022*** 0.7651 1.4609** 1.2661 
(3.331) (1.271) (2.284) (1.395) 
LPOP -0.7447*** -1.3065** :-2.1097*** -2.0166** 
(-4.322) (-2.100) (-3.135) (-2.191) 
LL AND 0.1349 0.1084 0.0906 0.0906 
(0.2380) (0.924) (0.786) (0.764) 
LEDUC 0.2615** 0.2449** 0.2433** 0.2609** 
(2.238) (2.071) (2.099) (2.054) 
DCAP 0.7226*** 0.7306*** 0.7336*** 0.5861 *** 
(4.940) (4.984) (5.104) (3.190) 
LGDPCSQ -0.0349 -0.0754* -0.0629 
(-0.940) (-1.926) (-1.180) 
LURDISP -0.1708*** -0.1517** 
(-2.824) (-2.335) 
LEXP -0.0621 
(-1.166) 
GDPCGR -0.0037 
(-0.551) 
LLABOR 0.2611 
(0.978) 
LPOPGR 0.0449 
(0.632) 
CONSTANT 
LMTEST 464.223 404.915 403.129 340.560 
(p-value) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
FE vs. RE 15.924 23.057 28.230 36.500 
(p-value) (0.0071) (0.0008) (0.0002) (0.0001) 
Adj. R2 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 
The number in parentheses is the t-statistic. 
The number above it is the coefficient. 
***,**,and* indicate significance at the 99 percent, 95 percent, and 90 percent levels. 
and for equation 9, 
= - 0.6598 + 1.9243 -2 (0.0628) LGDPC 
= 1.2645 - 0.1256 LGDPC 
(1.40) (-1.18) 
Different levels of LGDPC of different countries around 1990 (7 .142 of 
India, 8.375 of Chile, and 9.801 of United States) show that the marginal effect of 
LGDP on LUPI is positive for India and Chile and negative for the United States 
(using the coefficients for equation 6 of table 4.3b). 
The partial derivatives of equation ( 4.5) with respect to LPOP is 
8LUP1 
- c - 2d LGDP + 2d LPOP + e 
8LPOP 
=(e-c)-2dLGDPC 
For equation 1, 
oLUPI = - 0.1085 - 1.1973 - 2 (-0.0349) LGDPC 
8LPOP 
= - 1.3058 + 0.0698 LGDPC, 
(-2.10) (-0.94) 
and for equation 6, 
= - 0.0907 - 2.0178 - 2 (-0.0753) LGDPC 
= - 2.1085 + 0.1506 LGDPC, 
(-3.135) (-1.93) 
and for equation 9, 
= - 0.0907 - 1.9243 - 2 (-0.0628) LGDPC 
= - 2.015 + 0.1256 LGDPC 
(-2.191) (-1.18) 
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At all reasonable levels ofLGDPC, the marginal impact ofLPOP on LUPI is 
negative. Countries with large population have less primacy in their urban system, 
regardless of the level of development. 
Given that LGDP and LGDPCSQ are significant in only one of the equations 
in table 4.3d, we test the joint hypothesis that the coefficients (b + c) and d equal 
zero. To do so, the variables LGDP and LGDPCSQ are removed from the equations. 
The rest of the variables are regressed on LUPI to get the restricted model. An F test 
is conducted for the equations to test the restricted model versus the unrestricted one. 
All results of the F-test are significant and reject the null hypothesis that LGDP and 
LGDPCSQ can be removed from the model (F statistic equals 5.72, 8.29, and 7.24 
for equations 2, 3, and 4, respectively). These results allow us to refine our 
discussion of the effects of GDP and population on urban primacy. 
Equation 4.6 has a graph like that in Figure 4.1, which shows that the 
marginal effect of GDP on primacy depends upon the level of development. At low 
level of development, an increase in GDP increases urban primacy. Using the 
parameters for equation 6 in table 4.3b and setting equation 4.6 equals to zero, shows 
that the partial effect equals zero when GDP per capita is about $16,000. 
The partial effect of population on urban primacy increases with GDPC. An 
increase in population reduces primacy by a smaller amount at higher levels of 
development. 
If GDP per capita is a function of primacy, the results in tables 4.3b and 4.3d 
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Figure 4.1 
8LUP1 
8LGDP 
LGDPC 
may be subject to simultaneous equation bias. To test this possibility, we 
instrument LGDP and LGDPCSQ. The first stage equation includes all other 
variables in equation 9, as well as investment as a percentage of GDP (LINV), and 
per capita energy consumption (LENERGY). 
Results are reported in table 4.3e. A comparison of the equations in tables 4.3d and 
4.3e show that instrumenting makes little difference. LGDP is significant in most of 
the table 4.3e equations. LGDPCSQ is not significant in any equation. The 
coefficient of other 
variable coefficients are similar in the two tables 
VII. Without Developed Countries: 
The sample in this study contains 30 countries from Asia, Latin America, and North 
America. Only 3 countries are considered advanced or developed countries. These 
countries are Canada, Japan, and the United States. The other 27 countries vary from 
Table 4.3e: 
Determinants of Urban Primacy (LUPl).OLS with group dummy variables 
Instrumental Variables for LGDP and LGDPCSQ 
VARIABLE I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 IO II 
LGDPF 0.2878*** 0.6232* 0.6536* 0.6756* 0.5272 0.5511 0.7946** 0.5629* 0.550 0.7198* 0.6557* 
(3.807) (l .774) (1.849) (1.897) (1.488) (1.526) (2.257) (1.722) (I .493) (1.934) (1.892) 
LGDPCSQF -0.0245 -0.0239 -0.0252 -0.0253 -0.0179 -0.0322 -0.225 -0.0180 -0.0232 -0.0212 
(-1.076) (-1.049) (-1.106) (-1.118) (-0.747) (-1.423) (-1.056) (-0.751) (-0.972) (-0.929) 
LPOP -0.8895*** -1.1879*** -1.2220*** -1.3010.*** -1.1995*** -1.1273*** -1.4568*** -1.1826*** -1.2773*** -1.4978*** -1.496*** 
(-4.707) (-3.126) (-3.196) (-3.270) (-3.175) (-2.914) (-3.756) (-3.255) (-3.183) (-3.666) (-3.791) 
LLANO 0.1396 0.1203 0.1164 0.1277 0.1190 0.1129 0.1241 0.1269 0.1133 0.1138 0.1309 
(1.218) (1.030) (0.993) (1.088) (1.025) (0.962) (1.079) (1.055) (0.967) (0.978) (1.078) 
LEDUC 0.2387** 0.2460** 0.2580** 0.2563** 0.2136* 0.2641 ** 0.2501** 0.3209** 0.2627.** 0.2809** 0.3481** 
(2.021) (1.978) (2.060) (2.049) (l.705) (2.091) (2.042) (2.309) (2.016) (2.169) (2.359) 
DCAP 0.7599*** 0.6907*** 0.6640 0.6931*** 0.5766*** 0.6838*** 0.7027*** 0.5590*** 0.6023*** 
(5.121) (4.150) (3.930) (4.155) (3.199) (4.093) (4.286) (3.031) (3.275) 
LEXP -0.054 -0.0646 -0.0701 -0.0493 
(-0.991) (-1.181) (-1.290) (-0.779) 
GDPCGR -0.0064 -0.0059 -0.0048 -0.0061 
(-0.981) (-0.876) (-0.710) (-0.825) 
LLABOR 0.4025 0.3334 0.2037 0.1993 
(1.593) (1.265) (0.763) (0.749) 
LPOPGR 0.0663 0.0723 0.0890 0.0783 
(0.902) (0.956) (1.180) (0.832) 
LURDISP -0.1533*** -0.1461** -0.1274** 
(-2.634) (-2.416) (-1.981) 
FOi 0.7309 0.5418 
(0.590) (0.423) 
CONSTANT 
Adj. R2 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.95 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.95 
The number in parentheses is the t-statistic. 
The number above it is the coefficient. 
***, **,and* indicate significance at the 99 percent, 95 percent, and 90 percent levels. 
0 
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newly industrialized countries to some poor countries in Asia and Latin America, but 
all are considered developing, less developed, or Third World Countries. Developed 
and developing countries differ in many aspects such as level of income, health, 
education, political and administration systems. To investigate the effect of these 
three developed countries, they will be dropped from the model and findings will be 
compared to that of full model. 
Table 4.4 shows findings with and without the 3 developed countries. LGDP 
is negative and significant in all equations, but t-values when all countries are 
included is larger than that of only developing countries in the model. When 
developed countries are dropped from the model, the level of economic development 
is not significant. LGDPCSQ has negative sign in all equations, butt-values of 30 
country equations is larger than that of 27 country equations. LPOPDENS 
coefficient has negative sign but is insignificant in all equations. Coefficients of 
LEDUC and DCAP are positive and significant in all equations. LURDISP is 
negative and significant in both equations. All other variables have the expected sign 
but are not significant; t-values of the 30 country equation are larger than those of the 
27 country equation. 
To summarize the findings of this section, it appears that exclusion of the 
three advanced countries does not change the regression results significantly. 
Results that include all thirty countries are more appropriate if we assume that the 
primacy relationship is a function of the independent variables. Thus, the data set 
that contains all thirty countries will be used in the rest of this study. 
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Table 4.4: 
Determinants of LUPI (Fixed Effects Model). 
(With and Without Canada,Japan, and United States) 
VARIABLE LUPI LUPI LUPI LUPI 
30 27 30 27 
LGDP -0.4328*** -0.4016*** -0.6598*** -0.5956*** 
(-3.305) (-2.921) (-4.204) (-3.476) 
LGDPC 1.1973* 0.8046 · 1.9243** 1.4007 
(1.855) (0.851) (2.032) (1.157) 
LGDPCSQ -0.0349 -0.0123 -0.0628 -0.0348 
(-0.939) (-0.211) (-1.178) (-0.487) 
LPOPDENS -0.1085 -0.1389 -0.0907 -0.1195 
(-0.924) (-1.121) (-0.765) (-0.944) 
LEDUC 0.2449** 0.2565** 0.2609** 0.2659** 
(2.071) (2.042) (2.054) (1.967) 
DCAP 0.7306*** o.1240*** 0.5860*** 0.6012*** 
(4.984) (4.757) (3.190) (3.121) 
LEXP -0.0620 -0.0430 
(-1.165) (-0.744) 
GDPCGR -0.0037 -0.0010 
(-0.550) (-0.141) 
LLABOR 0.2613 0.2143 
(0.978) (0.757) 
LPOPGR 0.0449 0.0401 
(0.632) (0.508) 
LURDISP -0.1516** -0.1503** 
(-2.334) (-2.177) 
LMTest 404.915 388.862 340.559 334.250 
(p-value) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
FE vs.RE 23.058 15.191 36.489 24.265 
(p-value) (0.0008) (0.0188) (0.0001) (0.0117) 
Adj.R2 0.96 0.95 0.96 0.95 
The number in parentheses is the t-statistic. 
The number above it is the coefficient. 
* * *, * *, and * indicate significance at the 99 percent, 
95 percent, and 90 percent levels respectively. 
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VIII: Model with lagged Dependent Variable 
To make our model a more dynamic one, we take into account the lagged value of 
the dependent variable. Using the partial (stock) adjustment model, the lagged value 
of the dependent variable is added to the original equations and they are reestimated. 
Following Mills (1972, 52-53), let us call all independent variables in the urban 
* primacy equation X, and coefficients p . Thus, we have 
* * (l)LUPI it= p LX. + LE. 
' l,t 1,t 
* In this equation, LUPI is equilibrium value of LUPI in country i at time t, 
and is unobserved, except when the system is in equilibrium. It is assumed that the 
adjustment of LUPI to equilibrium can be approximated by a distributed-lag process, 
which assumes that between successive observations the variable adjusts by a 
constant fraction of its deviation from equilibrium in the earlier period. This process 
can be represented as 
(2)(LUPI. t - LUPI. t-l) = 'A.(LUPI *. t -LUPI. t _ 1), l, l, l, l, 
where A is the adjustment coefficient. Thus, 
* (LUPI. t - LUPI. 1) = 'A.(p LX. t - LUPI. 1) l, l,t- l, 1,t-
* 
='AP LX. t -'A.LUPI. t-l l, l, 
Therefore, the estimating equation, with all variables observed is 
(3)LUPI. t =bLX. +/LUPI. t I +LE. t l, l,t l, - l, 
* where, b = 11.p * b => p = - and l = 1 - A and A = 1 - / . 
A 
All variables in (3) are observable. 
In this model, the dependent variable (LUPI) and its lagged value 
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(LAGLUPI) are highly correlated (0.99). If the city-size distribution adjusts slowly, 
most of the explanatory power will come from LAGLUPl and with little left for the 
equilibrium determinants of urban primacy to explain. Inclusion of the lagged 
dependent variable produces a very conservative test of the effects of other 
independent variables on changes in the dependent variable, since the lagged value of 
dependent variable explains most of the variation in the dependent variable. This 
may result in ignoring theoretically important determinants because very little of the 
variance remains to be explained in the empirical analysis. Furthermore, the positive 
autocorrelation between the dependent variable and its lagged value upwardly biases 
the effect of the lagged dependent variable and, therefore, reduces the effect of other 
independent variables (Timberlake and Kentor, 1983; Bradshaw, 1987; London, 
1988). 
The F-test favors the model without time effects, and LM test favors FEM 
and REM over OLS. Table 4.5 shows that in all equations LAGUPI 's coefficient is 
highly significant with large t-values and has the expected positive impact on urban 
primacy. In equation 1, a one percent increase in the lagged value of urban primacy 
will increase urban primacy by 0.80 percent. When the lagged dependent variable is 
added to the model, it dominates other variables and explains most of the variation in 
Table 4.5: Determinants ofLUPl When Lagged Dependent Variable is included (Fixed Effects Model). 
VARIABLE l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
LAG LUPI 0.8039*** 0.9642*** 0.8021 *** 0.8086*** 0.9624*** 0.8074*** 0.8212*** 0.9489*** 0.9500*** 0.8395*** 
(13.132) (40.697) (13.088) (13.101) (40.691) (12.957) (13.003) (35.703) (36.088) (12.908) 
LGDP -0.1362 0.0085 -0.1846 -0.0873 0.0171 -0.1223 -0.1835* 0.0051 0.0054 -0.0836 
(-1.281) (0.578) (-1.545) (-0.679) (1.341) (-1.066) (-1.618) (0.329) (0.350) (-0.557) 
LGDPC 0.0700 0.1278 0.3136 0.1289 0.1301 -0.0228 -0.0387 0.3890 0.3883 0.4619 
(0.138) (0.357) (0.543) (0.249) (0.366) (-0.039) (-0.074) (0.923) (0.868) (0.638) 
LGDPCSQ 0.0077 -0.0069 -0.0032 0.0025 -0.0084 0.0123 0.0166 -0.0220 -0.0221 -0.0175 
(0.267) (-0.310) (-0.100) (0.083) (-0.376) (0.382) (0.556) (-0.863) (-0.817) (-0.424) 
LPOPDENS -0.0412 0.0057 -0.0377 -0.0401 -0.0067 -0.0437 -0.0876 -0.0009 -0.0006 -0.0782 
(-0.458) (0.251) (-0.418) (-0.444) (-0.309) (-0.481) (-0.940) (-0.036) (-0.025) (-0.824) 
LEDUC 0.0189 -0.0627 0.0268 0.0278 -0.0915** 0.0171 0.107 -0.0498 -0.0503 0.0848 
(0.196) (-1.593) (0.277) (0.285) (-2.348) (0.177) (0.995) (-0.972) (-0.988) (0.754) 
DCAP 0.1565 0.0655 0.1614 0.1937 0.0747 0.1527 0.0810 0.0797 
(1.374) (1.138) (1.414) (1.531) (1.308) (1.330) (1.348) (1.340) 
LEXP -0.0370 -0.0395 -0.0391 -0.0280 
(-1.308) (-1.345) (-1.327) (-0.647) 
GDPCGR -0.0041 -0.005 -0.0004 -0.0052 
(-0.892) (-0.145) (-0.118) (-0.982) 
LLABOR -0.1496 -0.091 -0.0875 -0.3403 
(-0.681) (-0.963) (-0.880) (-1.325) 
LPOPGR -0.0481 -0.0498 -0.0493 -0.0965 
(-1.348) (-1.341) (-1.332) (-1.314) 
UIRDISP 0.0154 -0.0005 0.0333 
(0.331) (-0.014) (0.693) 
FDI -0.5012 
-0.3407 
(-0.572) (-0.375) 
CONSTANT -0.5452 -0.6391 -1.605 -1.6029 
(-0.375) (-0.439) (-0.917) (-0.856) 
LM Test 12.342 13.258 11. 780 12.1305 11.667 10.134 10.299 12.091 10.432 7.816 
FE vs. RE 12.992 11.974 14.310 13.1312 12.342 14.532 18.085 13.254 15.112 21.671 
(p-value) (0.0723) (0.1524) (0.0740) (0.1074) (0.1366) (0.0689) (0.0116) (0.2771) (0.2354) (0.4138) 
Adj.R2 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 
The number in parentheses is the t-statistic. The number above it is the coefficient. 
* * *, * *, and * indicate significance at the 99 percent, 95 percent, and 90 percent levels. 
.s::. 
the dependent variable. This happens because the lagged variable has already been 
explained by independent variables in previous periods; therefore it represents all 
explanatory power of those independent variables. 
IX: Determinants of LUPl when they are observed in earlier periods in time 
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To reduce the possibility ofreciprocal causation, we regress LUPI from the current 
period on the independent variables lagged one period. All independent variables are 
lagged by one period, so that this procedure estimates the effects of independent 
variables (from 1960 to 1985) on the dependent variable (from 1965 to 1990). 
Regression results in table 4.6 show that GDP has a negative effect on urban 
primacy. A one percent increase in GDP, holding all other variables constants, 
reduces urban primacy, on average, by 0.6 percent. Although it is positive, the 
relationship between economic development and urban primacy is significant only 
in equation 6. Also, the equations do not support the curvilinear hypothesis. 
LGDPCSQ is negative but insignificant. LPOPDENS coefficient has the expected 
negative sign, but it is not significant. LEDUC and DCAP coefficients have the 
expected positive signs, and they are significant. The coefficient of the export 
variable is negative and significant in three out of four equations. This result 
supports Krugman's hypothesis that openness to international market reduces 
primacy of a nation's largest city. GDPCGR, LLABOR, and LPOPGR coefficients 
are not significant. LURDISP coefficient is negative, as before, but it has significant 
results only in equation 6. 
Table 4.6: Determinants of Urban Primacy (LUPI). (Fixed Effects Model). 
Independent variables are observed in earlier periods in time. 
VARIABLE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
LGDP -0.5204*** -0.5666*** -0.5359*** -0.6168*** -0.5214*** -0.6297*** -0.5818*** -0.6746*** -0.7148*** -0.7418*** 
(-3.353) (-3.629) (-3.133) (-3.715) (-3.344) (-3.888) (-3.680) (-3.707) (-3.904) (-3.893) 
LGDPC 0.9025 1.2381 0.7885 0.3849 0.8794 1.5927* 0.6334 0.6113 1.5055 1.2448 
(1.188) (1.595) (0.930) (0.467) (1.125) (1.944) (0.831) (0.615) (1.306) (1.022) 
LGDPCSQ -0.0106 -0.0247 -0.0025 0.0226 -0.0089 -0.0445 0.0097 0.0161 -0.0324 -0.0163 
(-0.237) (-0.548) (-0.052) (0.460) (-0.192) (-0.946) (0.218) (0.284) (-0.499) (-0.238) 
LPOPDENS -0.0899 -0.0729 -0.1097 -0.1160 -0.0886 -0.0654 -0.149 -0.1176 -0.0831 -0.1414 
(-0.710) (-0.578) (-0.871) (-0.913) (-0.696) (-0.520) (-1.193) (-0.930) (-0.649) (-1.075) 
LEDUC 0.2756* 0.3123** 0.3008** 0.2315* 0.2788* 0.2752** 0.3811*** 0.3120** 0.3280** 0.3793** 
(1.962) (2.218) (2.039) (1.625) (1.950) (1.983) (2.582) (2.038) (2.148) (2.273) 
DCAP 0.5812*** 0.5185*** 0.3984** 0.4600*** 0.5985*** 0.5791 *** 0.2412 0.3090* 
(3.820) (3.347) (2.381) (2.711) (3.756) (3.851) (1.298) (1.623) 
LEXP -0.0996* -0.1011* -0.1031 * -0.0589 
(-1.807) (-1.801) (-1.844) (-0.941) 
GDPCGR -0.0008 0.0004 -0.0003 -0.00298 
(-0.121) (0.052) (-0.039) (-0.396) 
LLABOR 0.4141 0.3949 0.1730 0.1847 
(J.581) (1.435) (0.557) (0.582) 
LPOPGR 0.0097 0.0060 -0.0024 -0.0299 
(0.134) (0.083) (-0.033) (-0.307) 
LURDISP -0.1389** -0.1132 -0.0694 
(-2.105) (-1.514) (-0.887) 
FDI 3.3475*** 3.1538** 
(2.794) (2.523) 
LM Test 294.021 279.427 288.021 288.397 287.093 294.268 294.245 245.557 249.520 221.613 
FE vs. RE 24.640 27.325 27.194 30.706 25.786 27.641 16.0116 38.969 36.936 29.712 
(p-value) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0137) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0018) 
Adj.R2 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 
The number in parentheses is the t-statistic. The number above it is the coefficient. 
***,**,and* indicate significance at the 99 percent, 95 percent, and 90 percent levels. 
°' 
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The most significant difference between table 4.6 and the previous ones is the 
finding that relates to foreign direct investment. The FDI coefficient is significant 
and has a positive sign in both equations 7 and I 0, supporting the dependence I world 
system hypothesis. Perhaps FDI take time to have its impact on the largest city of a 
country. 
In summary, except for foreign direct investment, the findings of table 4.7 
when independent variables are observed in earlier periods in time do not differ 
substantially from results of table 4.3b. 
Summary and Conclusions: 
With regard to urban primacy indices, we conclude that in studies that contain 
different nations it is important to have a comparable index of urban primacy to 
validate the result. LUPI and LUP2 are comparable measures, and we find that both 
LUPI and LUP2 can be used interchangeably with equal validity. We use LUPI 
because of data availability and simplicity. 
This study uses panel-data analysis that combines cross-section and time 
series data. The findings of the classical regression model (OLS without group 
effects) strongly support the hypothesis that urban primacy increases with economic 
development until a certain level of development, then starts to decline. Table 4.3b, 
with group effects, supports the hypotheses to some extent. LGDPC is positive and 
significant in most of the equations, while LGDPCSQ is negative in all equation but 
provides a significant coefficient only in equation 6. because the preferred model is 
the fixed effects model, we conclude that there is a strong support for a positive 
relationship between urban primacy and economic development, but one modest 
support for the bell-shaped hypothesis. 
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The classical regression model without group effects (table 4.3a) shows a 
significant positive relationship between LGDP and urban primacy, while both fixed 
and random effects models show a significant negative relationship between these 
two variables. The negative relationship between the economic size and urban 
primacy is the expected one. 
The marginal effect of population on urban primacy is significantly negative. 
The more populated the country, the more balanced urban system it has. Population 
density in the OLS model without group effects shows a strong significant 
relationship between population density and urban primacy. This implies that 
population and urban primacy are negatively related while land and urban primacy 
are positively related. The fixed effects model, however, does not display significant 
effects of population density on urban primacy. The other variables that show 
statistically significant expected signs such as capital city dummy variable, education 
variable, and the share of labor outside agriculture should be considered by planners 
and policy makers if they want to consider the right policy to urbanization and 
development. 
The final conclusion is that when lagged dependent variable is included in the 
model it dominates other independent variables since it represent all explanatory 
power of the independent variables. And when the lagged dependent variable is 
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dropped from the model and independent variables are observed at earlier points in 
time, results do not differ from those of table 4.3b except for foreign direct 
investment coefficient (FDI) which shows a significantpositive impact on urban 
pnmacy. 
CHAPTER V 
Determinants of Urban Primacy: 
A cross:-sectional Approach 
Introduction: 
In Chapter IV the determinants of urban primacy were investigated using panel data 
analysis. The independent variables change over time. They are not fixed for a long 
period. Thus, seven periods from 1960 to 1990 have been used to capture the impact 
of independent variables on urban primacy. There are relevant variables, however, 
that do not change for long periods of time and other variables that suffer from data 
unavailability. Some variables have both symptoms. The panel-data analysis 
controls for these variables with country-specific dummy variables. The coefficients 
of these dummy variables are jointly significant in the models of Chapter IV. Their 
values reflect the fixed effect associated with each country and are a composite of 
various factors. For example, political regimes and a nation's position in the world 
system do not change over short. Data about corruption and bureaucracy, for 
example, may be hard to find for many countries for many years. Furthermore, their 
effects may be subjective reflecting the opinion and belief of the person or the 
institution that presents these data. They change slowly. 
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This chapter investigates the impact of political and dependency I world 
system factors on the fixed effects of urban primacy. It will start by regressing the 
fixed effects of urban primacy for 30 countries on several variables using ordinary 
least squares (OLS). Next, some new independent variables will be introduced to the 
model. Data of these variables are available only for 24 countries. 
Replication of the 30 countries' different sets of equations will be investigated to see 
whether there are any significant changes. Regression results of the 24 country 
model with new variables will be discussed. Finally, concluding remarks will be 
presented. 
Dependent Variable: 
In chapter IV, the dummy variable estimator is used to derive a separate intercept for 
each country. The fixed effects of urban primacy (FE)·for the basic equation in 
chapter IV ( equation 1, table 4.3b) are used as the dependent variable in this analysis. 
Independent Variables: 
1. There are many economic factors that affect urban primacy. Although this 
chapter is oriented toward political factors, we use an international trade variable, 
which represents political and economic factors, as one determinant of fixed effects. 
The effect of openness to trade may be based on the perception of the "normal" trade 
regime. Increased openness, as indicated by a greater importance of exports in a 
particular year, may not induce relocation in response to the availability of foreign 
customers or suppliers because the openness may not continue. Thus, Krugman's 
122 
hypothesis that greater openness to foreign trade reduces the dependency on location 
in the largest cities only works if the openness is expected is expected to be 
permanent. How do people determine their perception of openness? In Chapter IV 
we found that the lagged value of export has a significant negative effect on primacy 
even though the current value's coefficient was insignificant. Here, we take the 
value of the ratio of exports to GDP, averaged over a number of years, as a 
determinant of the fixed effects. The ratio of export of goods and nonfactor services 
to GDP from 1960 to 1990 (EXPORT) is averaged and used as a measure of 
international trade. 
2. Dictators concentrate power in the administrative center and serve the 
interests of military, political, and economic elite that usually reside in the capital or 
the largest city. They may ignore the wishes of the politically weak hinterland (Ades 
and Glaeser, 1995), and favor elite groups in the largest city by offering subsidies, 
gifts, such as land, houses, cars, and money, and travel to foreign countries. These 
subsidies are paid from public money and resources, since dictators consider the 
nations' resources as their own. Dictators may also concentrate government 
programs and projects in the administrative centers, which increases employment 
and, hence, the population of the capital and/or largest city. Thus, residents of the 
largest city enjoy higher incomes and higher standard of life, which encourages 
people from smaller town and rural areas to migrate to the primate city and increases 
its size. It should be clear that pure dictatorships are not the only governments that 
prohibit freedom of speech and a multiparty system; there are also regimes that have 
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"democracy of speech" but not "democracy of change". In many Third World 
Countries in 1980s and 1990s, freedom of speech and a multiparty system might be 
allowed artificially, but the governments of these countries do not allow political or 
economic reform. 
To measure the ability of a government to concentrate resources in the 
primate city, we use the Gastil index of political rights ranks countries in seven 
categories according to a checklist of political rights, annually. Countries that score 
one are the most democratic countries, while countries that score seven have the 
most dictatorial regimes. The Gastil index, also, categorize countries as free, 
partially free, and not free. We measure dictatorship variable in two ways. One way 
is assign one to "free" countries, two to "partially free" countries, and three to "not 
free" countries for the years 1975, 1980, 1985, and 1990, and then average this over 
the years for each country. The other way is to average the scores that the Gastil 
index assigns to each country for these years. We expect a positive relationship 
between DICT and the fixed effects of urban primacy (FE). Regression results of 
both methods do not differ significantly, but the former one shows more robustness 
and produces higher t-values than the latter one. Thus, the first measure of 
dictatorship (DICT) is used as one of the independent variables 
3. The degree of political instability in a country influences the size of 
primate city in that country. Ades and Glaeser (1995) state that political instability 
increases largest city size, especially if weak governments are unable or unwilling to 
protect life and property of people outside the capital. They found that one extra 
revolution or coup per year increases the average size of the largest city by 2.4 
percent. 
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Unlike Ades and Glaeser, we believe that this instability variable can work in 
two directions. If the political unrest or the warfare is based in rural areas, people of 
affected areas will move to a safer areas such as the capital that are not affected by 
this unrest. Primacy would decrease if political instability such as assassinations, 
coups, or bombings of public targets is based in the capital or primate city because 
this might discourage people from migrating to cities and encourage residents of the 
primate city to move to other towns or to countryside. Sometimes when government 
is weak and the whole country is politically unstable, people migrate to other 
countries and probably reduce the population of urban areas more than rural areas. 
Thus, the relationship between political instability and urban primacy is complex and 
depends on where in the country this instability occurs and the degree to which it 
affects people's daily life. Consequently, we do not predict the sign of the 
coefficient of this variable. 
As with the dictatorship variable, we have tried two measures of political 
instability. The first is the number ofrevolutions and coups from 1965 to 1985 or 
subsample, averaged for each country. The other is calculated as (0.5 * assassination 
+ 0.5 * revolution) for the same period and then averaged for each country. Both 
variables produce similar results; we choose the latter one. Data for political 
instability variable (POLINS) are from the Barro and Lee data set that is available 
through National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). 
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4. Ades and Glaeser (1995) create a variable to investigate the interaction 
between dictatorship and political instability. This variable is defined as UNREST= 
DICT * POLINS. We also will use this variable to test its effect in addition to the 
other two variables that measure the type and status of internal politics of each 
country. 
The dependency and world system school was discussed in detail in chapter 
II. Here, we explain briefly the variables used to measure it in this regression 
analysis. 
5. A measure for dependency theory is foreign direct investment (FDI) which 
can be normalized in many ways. One way that has been used in chapter IV is to 
take the ratio ofFDI to GDP. Another method is to take the ratio ofFDI to total 
population. Data are averaged from 1960 to 1990 or a subperiod for each country. 
Both methods yield similar results. A positive relationship between (FDI) and (FE) is 
expected, if the dependency approach provides an important explanation of primacy. 
6. To measure the position in world system, dummy variables are used for 
periphery (PER) and semiperiphery (SEMPER), with the core as the reference 
category (Smith and London, 1990; Lyman, 1992). We use the world system 
classification by Nemeth and Smith (1985) published in Lyman (1992). Three 
countries in our sample are not included in this classification. We arbitrarily classify 
Bangladesh and the Dominican Republic in the periphery, and Taiwan in the 
semiperiphery (see Appendix 4). Both world system theory and modernization 
theory are consistent with a positive effect of the noncore variables on urban 
pnmacy. Our reading of world-system theory, however, suggests that primacy 
should be greater in the semiperiphery than in the core and greater in the periphery 
than in the semiperiphery. 
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7. In his article, "Corruption and Growth", Paolo Mauro ( 1995) used indices 
on corruption, red tape, and the efficiency of the judicial system for the period 1980-
1983 drawn from Business International (BI), a part of the Economist Intelligence 
Unite. The BI indices reflect the subjective opinion of BI' s correspondents stationed 
in 68 countries. Each index has values from O to 1 O; a high value of the index means 
the country in question has "good" institutions. Data are averaged for each country 
over the 4 year period from 1980 to 1983 (Mauro, 1995, 684). Because the judiciary 
system, red tape and corruption indices represent closely related variables, Mauro 
averaged them and labeled the result bureaucratic efficiency (BE). He considered 
"the bureaucratic efficiency index to be a more precise measure of corruption than 
the corruption index on its own" (Mauro, 1995, 686). Mauro also used the BI 
political stability index. This index reflects subject opinions. Political stability 
index is not highly correlated with the political instability measure. We intend to use 
the bureaucratic efficiency (BE), and political stability (POLSTAB) as independent 
variables in explaining the fixed effects. 
Table 5.1 shows the correlation matrix of variables in the model. 
Intercorrelations among the variables are not particularly high, except for the 
correlation between UNREST and POLINS. Because UNREST equals POLINS * 
DICT, it is not surprising that the correlation as high. UNREST's correlation with 
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political instability is 0.97 while its correlation with dictatorship variables just 0.27. 
Another exception is that between bureaucratic efficiency (BE) and corruption 
(COR). 
Findings: 
A 30 country model: 
Using cross-sectional data for 30 countries, this section investigates the effects of 
several political variables on the fixed effects of the log of urban primacy. 
The effect of openness or the average export ratio on the fixed effects of urban 
primacy is tested first. Table 5.1 shows that the correlation between FE and 
EXPORT is relatively high (-0.58), and equation 1 of table 5.2 shows that the 
coefficient of EXPORT is statistically significant at 0.01 level with t-value of -3.764. 
It is negative, which supports the hypothesis that international trade decreases urban 
primacy. The coefficient of EXPORT is negative and statistically significant at 0.01 
level in all seven equations in table 5.2. It has a strong and robust impact on fixed 
effects of urban primacy (FE). Equation 2 in table 5.2 adds two political variables to 
equation 1, DICT and POLINS. The coefficient of dictatorship variable (DICT) is 
significant at 0.05 level with t-value of 2.114 and has the expected positive sign. 
Dictatorial regimes with their attitudes and policies lead to concentration of people in 
the primate city. The political instability coefficient (POLINS) has a negative effect 
but it is not significant. When the UNREST variable is added to the political 
variables, the dictatorship coefficient is still significant and positive, political 
FE EXPORT DICT 
FE 1.0000 
EXPORT -0.5781 1.0000 
DICT 0.1999 0.2647 1.0000 
PO LINS 0.2418 -0.1251 0.1089 
UNREST 0.3130 -0.1923 0.2681 
FDI -0.1729 0.0688 -0.3754 
PER -0.1420 0.2087 0.1263 
SEMPER 0.2865 -0.0730 0.2583 
POLSTA -0.5154 0.1789 -0.2384 
BE -0.5205 0.1088 -0.3843 
CORUPT -0.4469 0.0063 -0.3873 
Table 5.1: 
Correlation Matrix of Determinants of 
Fixed effects of Urban Primacy 
PO LINS UREST FDI PER 
1.0000 
0.9725 1.0000 
-0.1223 -0.1344 1.0000 
0.0406 0.0259 -0.1986 1.0000 
0.2197 0.2263 -0.1737 -0.7687 
-0.3401 -0.3467 0.4099 -0.0686 
-0.3106 -0.3167 0.4682 -0.1792 
-0.1891 -0.2082 0.4276 -0.1193 
SEMPER POLSTA 
1.0000 
-0.3508 1.0000 
-0.2856 0.6626 
-0.2873 0.6285 
BE 
1.0000 
0.9601 
CORUPT 
1.0000 
IJ 
00 
Table 5.2: 
Determinants of Fixed Effects of Urban Primacy 
Ordinary Least Squares (30 countries) 
VARIABLE 1 2 3 4 5 
CONSTANT 1.9028*** 0.8984 0.7031 0.47305 1.2169** 
(6.517) (1.550) (0.958) (0.529) (2.737) 
EXPORT -0.0451 *** -0.0509*** -0.0518*** -0.0531 *** -0.0455*** 
(-3.764) (-4.308) (-4.258) (-4.190) (-3.928) 
DICT 0.7527** 0.8768* 1.0020* 
(2.114) (1.920) (1.870) 
PO LINS -0.7881 2.4449 3.6123 
(-0.754) (0.333) (0.460) 
UNREST -1.8039 -2.4335 
(-0.445) (-0.562) 
PER 0.5328 
(1.136) 
SEMPER 1.0268** 
(2.222) 
FDI 0.0035 
(0.467) 
Adj R 0.31 0.37 0.35 0.33 0.41 
The number in parentheses is the t-statistic. The number above it is the coefficient. 
* * *, * *, and * indicate significance at the 99 percent, 95 percent, and 90 percent levels. 
6 
1.0933* 
(2.001) 
-0.0466*** 
(-3.857) 
0.6577 
(1.157) 
1.1441 ** 
(2.070) 
0.0030 
(0.403) 
0.39 
7 
0.6756 
(0.767) 
-0.0501 *** 
(-3.885) 
0.3786 
(0.601) 
-4.5730 
(-0.512) 
2.1171 
(0.432) 
0.6267 
(0.918) 
1.0849 
(1.550) 
0.0050 
(0.650) 
0.37 
1-J 
'° 
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instability variable remains insignificant, and the new variable is insignificant. 
To investigate the effect of world-system variables, dummy variables for 
periphery (PER) and semiperiphery (SEMPER) are added to equation 1 ( equation 5 
in table 5 .2). Both coefficients are positive as expected, but the one for PER is not 
significant (t =l.136) while the other is significant at 0.05 level (t =2.222). The fact 
that FDI is not significant in combination with political variables or with the world-
system variables weaken dependency theory. Equation 7 combines all economic, 
political, and dependency I world system variables. This combination results in only 
one significant variable (EXPORT) and at-value that is equal to 1.55 for SEMPER 
variable. This equation combines two types of political influence and has a total of 7 
independent variables with only 30 observations. We are not surprised that there is 
not enough information to provide significant results. 
The main conclusion from the 30 country model is that a nation's openness to 
the world has a significant negative impact on the fixed effects of urban primacy 
(FE), and that the fixed effects of urban primacy are influenced by political 
considerations and level of development. The variables that influence the later 
conclusion are dictatorship and semiperiphery position. 
A 24 Country Model: 
Data for the variables of bureaucratic efficiency (BE) and political stabiJity 
(POLSTAB) are available in (Mauro, 1995, 708-710), but only for 24 of the 30 
countries included in this study. Because we are using these new variables with a 
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smaller sample, we first replicate the equations of 5.2 for this sample. The purpose 
is to see if the results are sensitive to the excluded observations. A comparison of 
Tables 5.2 and 5.2a shows that the results do not change much when the 6 
observations are dropped. The dictatorship variable, however, is not as strong in 
Table 5.2a. 
Thus, Mauro's variables can be used in combination with some of other 
variables, and we can conclude that any changes in results are not strongly influenced 
by the different sample. 
Bureaucratic efficiency (BE) is used.as a proxy for corruption. There is a 
very strong correlation between BE and corruption for the 24 countries (0.96) (table 
5 .1 ). This is expected since BE is the average of corruption, red tape, and judiciary 
system. Mauro suggests that BE is the best measure of corruption. We expect that 
high bureaucratic efficiency will reduce urban primacy and lead to a more systematic 
distribution of urban population. 
Regarding the political stability variable (POLST AB), we find that it has a 
relatively high correlation with BE (0.66) and with corruption (0.63) respectively 
(table 5.1). As mentioned before, it is a subjective measure. We expect a negative 
relationship between political stability and urban primacy. Net of other factors, there 
are no reasons for people in a politically stable nation to gather in small area of land 
and leave the rest of the country unoccupied. 
Table 5.3 contains the regression results of the 24 country model when bureaucratic 
efficiency (BE) and political stability (POLSTAB) are added. We investigate the 
Table 5.2a: 
Determinants of Fixed Effects of Urban Primacy (FE). 
Ordinary Least Squares (24 countries) 
VARIABLE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
CONSTANT 1.9375*** 0.6648 0.9805 l.0157 l.1875** l.0611 * 1.6788 
(6.580) (1.105) (l.176) (0.977) (2.661) (1.891) (l.580) 
EXPORT -0.0402*** -0.0457*** -0.0434*** -0.0431 *** -0.0434*** -0.0445*** -0.0402*** 
(-3.323) (-3.895) (-3.415) (-3.149) (-3.697) (-3.613) (-2.995) 
DICT 0.7894** 0.5586 0.5375 -0.6681 
(2.140) (0.999) (0.797) (-0.720) 
POLINS 1.1484 -4.1368 -4.3784 -21.297 
(0.732) (-0.430) (-0.410) (-1.530) 
UNREST 3.2367 3.3807 12.610 
(0.557) (0.525) (l.568) 
PER 0.8032 0.9360 l.4193 
(l.609) (l.523) (l .606) 
SEMPER l.0155** l.1347* l.5918* 
(2.193) (2.009) {l.835) 
FDI -0.0005 0.0030 0.0034 
(-0.060) (0.378) (0.437) 
Adj Rz 0.30 0.40 0.38 0.34 0.38 0.36 0.40 
The number in parentheses is the t-statistic. The number above it is the coefficient. 
* * *, * *, and * indicate significance at the 99 percent, 95 percent, and 90 percent levels. 
-l,J 
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effect of BE, the effect of POLS TAB, and the effects of both variables in different 
equations. 
The statistical significance and the expected negative sign of EXPORT is 
maintained throughout table 5.3. In equation 2, when BE is added to EXPORT, the 
bureaucratic efficiency (BE) coefficient is significant at 0.01 level and has the 
expected negative sign. Countries that have high bureaucratic efficiency tend to have 
low urban primacy. 
In equation 3, when POLSTAB is added to exports, the political stability 
coefficient (POLSTAB) is significant at 0.05 level with at-value equal to -2.740. It 
has the expected negative sign. A nation with a politically stable regime might have 
its urban population dispersed in different cities and towns, and no single large city 
dominates the urban system. 
When bureaucratic efficiency and political stability variables are combined in 
equation 4, we find that the significance level of BE is decreased; its t-value falls 
from -3.131 in equation 1 to -1.674 in equation 3. Thus, BE is significant at 0.10 
level. The political stability variable lost its significance in equation 4, although it 
still maintains its expected negative sign. The reason for this result may be because 
of the correlation between BE and POLSTAB variables. When the dictatorship 
variable (DICT) is added to the model (equation 5), BE lost its significance, 
POLSTAB stays almost the same, and DICT does not show a significant result (t-
value is 1.257), but has the expected positive sign. Adjusted R2 is 0.52. In equation 
6, when POLSTAB is dropped from the model, adjusted R2 is still 0.52 and there is 
Table 5.3: 
Determinants of Fixed Effects of Urban Primacy (FE) When BE and POLSTAB are Included. 
Ordinary Least Squares (24 countries) 
VARIABLE I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
CONSTANT 1.9375*** 3.2421*** 4.2734*** 4.0016*** 3.0742** 2.3188** 3.0139** 4.2076*** 3.1678*** 4.245** 
(6.580) (6.679) (4.796) (4.597) (2.716) (2.683) (2.625) (4.581) (3.025) (2.572) 
EXPORT ,0.0402*** -0.0367*** -0.0349*** -0.0351*** -0.0396*** -0.0412*** -0.0419*** -0.0351 *** -0.0354*** -0.0335** 
(-3.323) (-3.567) (-3.231) (-3.389) (-3.660) (-3.842) (-3.804) (-3.354) (-3.062) (-2.692) 
BE -0.2246*** -0.1590* -0.187 -0.1813** -0.1814* -0.2212* -0.1899 
(-3.131) (-1.674) (-1.199) (-2.315) (-1.810) (-2.058) (-1.632) 
POLSTAB -0.3324** -0.1623 -0.1573 -0.3063** -0.1806 -0.1738 
(-2.740) (-1.050) (-1.032) (-2.368) (-1.144) (-0.973) 
DICT 0.4567 0.4665 0.7053* 
(1.257) (1.282) (1.906) 
POLINS 
UNREST 
PER -0.1195 -0.1910 
(-0.185) (-0.253) 
SEMPER 0.1262 0.0070 
(0.207) (0.010) 
FDI 0.0057 0.0050 0.0044 
(0.881) (0.776) (0.606) 
Adj R.---- 0.30 0.50 0.46 0.51 .52 0.52 0.50 0.50 0.47 0.45 
The number in parentheses is the t-statistic. The number above it is the coefficient. 
***, ••,and• indicate significance at the 99 percent, 95 percent, and 90 percent levels. 
II 
3.4374** 
(2.586) 
-0.0335** 
(-2.609) 
-0.2082* 
(-1.957) 
-0.6103 
(-0.714) 
-19.645 
(-1.527) 
11.623 
(1.564) 
0.5657 
(0.612) 
0.7660 
(0.848) 
0.0046 
(0.641) 
0.49 
v, 
+-
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almost no change in both DICT coefficient and its t-value. BE regained its 
significance at 0.05 level. From equations 4, 5, and 6, we conclude that addition or 
elimination of either the political stability variable or dictatorship variable does not 
effect the coefficient of other variable. On the other hand BE and POLSTAB have 
strong effects on each other. The correlation between BE and POLSTAB is 0.67, 
while that between DICT and BE, and DICT and POLSTAB is 0.11 and 0.18 
respectively. Equation 7 tests the effects ofEXPORT, POLSTAB, DICT, and FDI 
on the fixed effects of urban primacy. Political stability is significant at 0.05 level 
and has the expected negative sign. The dictatorship coefficient is positive and 
significant at 0.10 level. Foreign direct investment coefficient (FDI) is positive but 
insignificant (t-value is 0.881). BE is added to, and DICT is dropped from, equation 
7, POLSTAB lost its significance and BE is significant at 0.1 level. FDI is not 
significant (t-value is 0.776). The findings of equations 7 and 8 confirm our 
conclusion about the association between BE, POLSTAB, and DICT. 
In the 24 country sample, the world system position as well as dependency 
school provide weak and insignificant coefficients. Equation 9 show the expected 
signs and significance of EXPORT and BE coefficients. PER has unexpected 
negative sign with an insignificant coefficient, and SEMPER's coefficient is positive 
but insignificant. Adjusted R2 has dropped to 0.47 and to 0.45 in equation 10 when 
FDI is added. These results suggest bureaucratic efficiency and political stability 
explain rather than dependency I world system theories the earlier results for 
periphery and semiperiphery dummy variables. In a 30 country model (table 5.2) 
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and in 24 country model without BE and POLSTAB, both PER and SEMPER are 
positive and SEMPER has significant effect on fixed effect of urban primacy. In 
equation 11, POLSTAB is dropped and the other three political variables (DICT, 
POLINS, and UNREST) are added. No surprising result occurs in this equation, and 
the main findings of table 5 .3 prevail here. 
Concluding Remarks: 
The main noticeable remark is the small sample size of the cross-section analysis. 
When panel data are used, we have the advantage of the large sample size. But even 
with this sample size limitation, this chapter has produced results that support some 
well-established theories and provide·some new ideas for urbanization and 
development planners and policy makers. 
Krugman's theory of the degree of openness and its negative relationship has 
been supported throughout this chapter. Thus, one important step towards 
deconcentration of people from the primate city is to increase the interaction with the 
world economy. International trade is a key factor to a more systematic urban 
hierarchy. This, of course, contradicts of the implication of dependency I world-
system theories. 
While political instability did not show statistically significant results in the 
cross-sectional analysis, the dictatorship variable provides support to the theory that 
nations with democratic regimes have more balanced urban systems than dictatorial 
regimes with their greater ability to follow policies that lead to concentration of 
people in the largest city. 
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Although dependency theory is not strong in this study, the world-system 
position supports the hypothesis that urban primacy occurs in periphery, comes 
strong in semiperiphery, and decline in core nations. This result, however, is also 
consistent with modernization theory. Thus, urban primacy may be a natural phase 
in the transfer of nations from one zone to another. 
Other significant methods for planners and policy makers to fix unbalanced 
urban system is to increase the efficiency of government bureaucrats since 
bureaucratic efficiency is negatively related to urban primacy, and to eliminate 
political instability. Looking at the two variables of political instability (POLINS) 
and political stability (POLSTAB) we may conclude that political stability leads to a 
more balanced urban system. 
Finally, to my knowledge, this is the first study to investigate the 
determinants of urban primacy from different perspectives: economic, political, 
demographic, international relations, and combine all those variables to give a 
broader picture of the mechanism that leads to concentration of people in one primate 
city. 
CHAPTER VI 
Urban primacy and size of a nation's largest city 
Introduction 
In the previous. chapters of this study, the determinants of urban primacy were 
investigated. While we use the urban primacy index (L UP 1) as the dependent 
variable, Ades and Glaeser (1995) used the log of average population in the largest 
city. They tested the effects of several variables on the size of a nation's largest city. 
Some of their variables are similar to those which we use in our analysis, such as a 
dummy for capital city, land area, real GDP per capita, share oflabor outside 
agriculture, share of trade in GDP, a dictatorship dummy, and transportation. Ades 
and Glaeser emphasized the role of trade, governments, and politics in determining 
the size of a country's largest city. They find stronger results with the political 
variables. In this chapter we compare results of equations explaining the size of the 
largest city to equations explaining urban primacy. 
In addition to the differences in the dependent variables, there are other 
differences between this and Ades and Glaeser (1995)'s study. (1) They used more 
countries in their sample than; (2) they used cross-sectional analysis with data 
averaged over time, while we use both panel data techniques and cross-sectional 
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analysis averaged over time; and (3) they used variables for non-urbanized 
population and urbanized population outside the main city. We so we use total 
population to proxy the effect of these two measures. 
Dependent and Independent Variables 
The dependent variables for panel data analysis are urban primacy (LUPI from 
chapter IV) and the population size of the largest city in a nation (LMCITY). With 
regard to the cross-sectional analysis both variables are averaged for each country 
over the period 1970 to 1990. 
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The independent variables are the same as in Chapters IV and V, except for 
the dictatorship and transportation variables The dictatorship variable for panel data 
is calculated from Gastil Index for the period from 1972 to 1990. We used data of 
1972 rather than those of 1970, which are not available. As Barro (1995) did, we 
used related data from Bollen (1990), who suggested that his measures are 
comparable to Gastil's. We categorize Bollen's measure as free, partially free, and 
not free for use in this study. The transportation variable for the panel data is 
measured as the ratio of the number of passenger cars to total population in a 
country. When cross-sectional data is used, the transportation variable is calculated 
as the 1970, 1980, and 1990 average of government expenditure in transportation and 
communication for each country. The other variables are as defined in Chapter IV 
andV 
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Findings: 
This section presents the panel data results and then the cross-sectional results. 
Panel Data Analysis: 
Table 6.1 follows the Ades and Glaeser (1995) model. Most of Ades and Glaeser's 
variables are in this study. Thus, we use the variables that are common in both 
studies to compare the two dependent variables .. Considering tables IV and V 
(specially equations 3 and 10) in Ades and Glaeser study, we estimated three sets of 
equations. The classical regression model is rejected for all equations. The 
Hausman test favors fixed-effects models (FEM) for all urban primacy equations and 
the largest city size equation that includes the dictatorship variable; random-effects 
models (REM) are favored for the other largest city size equations. The F-test favors 
the restricted model in both LUPI and LMCITY equations, suggesting that time 
effects are jointly insignificant. 
Comparing coefficients of the variables, we find that the DCAP coefficient is 
significant and positive in all equations. The impact of capital city is strong and 
positive in the largest city size and in the urban primacy equations. The population 
size coefficient is negative and significant in all urban primacy equations. Urban 
primacy falls as a nation's total population increases because the second largest city 
grows faster than the first. Conversely, as Ades and Glaser found, the population 
coefficient is highly significant and has a positive impact in all equations for 
LMCITY. A one percent increase in a country's population leads to an 0.8 percent 
VARIABLE LUPI 
DCAP 0.5659*** 
(3.429) 
LPOP -0.5140*** 
(-4.057) 
LLANO 0.0645 
(0.597) 
LGDPC 0.1311* 
(l.726) 
LLABOR 0.5693*** 
(2.635) 
LEXP -0.0443 
(-0.853) 
DICT 
LTRANS 
CONSTANT 
LM Test 463.859 
(p-value) (0.0000) 
FE vs. RE 19.2001 
(p-value) (0.0038) 
R2 I Adj.R2 0.96 
Table 6.1 
Comparison of LUPl and LMCITY 
Fixed I Random Effects Models 
LMCITY LUPI LMCITY 
0.6045*** 0.3854* 0.4823*** 
(6.283) (1.809) (3.424) 
0.7628*** -0.5797*** 0.8589*** 
(14.075) (-4.455) (9.983) 
0. 1098** 0.1093 0.0902 
(2.079) (1.001) (1.249) 
0.1693*** 0.1302* 0.1760*** 
(3.527) (1.722) (3.520) 
0.7939*** 0.6470*** 0.6511*** 
(7.524) (2.910) (4.429) 
0.0104 -0.0340 0.2374 
(0.318) (-0.652) (0.688) 
0.0607** -0.0083 
(2.151) (-0.447) 
-2.0995*** 
(-3.244) 
463.031 445.186 394.164 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
7.271 21.654 15.0524 
(0.2965) (0.0029) (0.0353) 
0.90 0.96 0.99 
The number in parentheses is the t-statist1c. 
The number above it is the coefficient. 
LUPI 
0.5470*** 
(3.080) 
-0.5247*** 
(-3.973) 
0.0633 
(0.582) 
0.1036 
(0.982) 
0.5685** 
(2.578) 
-0.0462 
(-0.873) 
0.0161 
(0.387) 
449.790 
(0.0000) 
20.0475 
(0.0055) 
0.95 
***, **,and* indicate significance at the 99 percent, 95 percent, and 90 percent levels respectively. 
LMCJTY 
0.5982*** 
(5.836) 
0.7617*** 
(13.943) 
0.1093** 
(2.058) 
0.1600** 
(2.453) 
0.7887*** 
(7.293) 
0.0097 
(0.291) 
0.0057 
(0.22 l) 
-1.9846** 
(-2.385) 
446.717 
(0.0000) 
8.2385 
(0.3120) 
0.90 
+> 
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increase in the largest city size 
The land area coefficient is insignificant in the three equations for urban 
primacy, but it is significant and has a positive impact on the largest city size when 
the random-effects model is favored. This is evidence for the proposition that larger 
land area-- greater transportation cost for a given amount of decentralization-- favors 
concentration in the largest cities, but not to the exclusion of concentration in the 
second largest city. 
The level of economic development is positive and significant in two of the 
urban primacy equations; it is positive and highly significant in the largest city 
equations. Similarly, the share of labor outside agriculture is positive and 
significant in all equations of table 6.1. The measure of a nation's openness (LEXP) 
has insignificant effects in all equations. This result contradict Ades and Glaeser 
findings that share of trade in GDP is negative and significant. 
When a dummy variable for dictatorship is added, it shows a significant 
positive effect in the urban primacy equation, but it shows an insignificant impact on 
the largest city's population. The transportation coefficient is positive, but 
insignificant, in both LUPl and LMCITY equations. Thus, the panel data results are 
different from Ades and Glaeser' s cross-section results. 
Table 6.2 use a more complicated model than that of 6.1. The economic size 
of a country is added to the equations and population density (LPOPDENS) replaces 
population (LPOP) and land area (LLAND). The dummy 
for capital city is always positive and significant. LPOPDENS is significant and 
Table 6.2 
Comparison of LUPI and LMCITY 
Fixed I Random Effects Models 
VARIABLE LUPI LMCITY 
DCAP 0.5659*** 0.6045*** 
(3.429) (6.283) 
LPOPDENS -0.0645 -0.1098** 
(-0.597) (-2.079) 
LGDP -0.4494*** 0.8725*** 
(-3.412) (19.804) 
LGDPC 0.5805*** -0.7032*** 
(3.898) (-10.665) 
LLABOR 0.5693*** 0.7939*** 
(2.635) (7.524) 
LEXP -0.0443 0.0104 
(-0.853) (0.318) 
DICT 
LTRANS 
CONSTANT -2.0995*** 
(-3.244) 
LM Test 463.859 463.031 
(p-value) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
FE vs. RE 19.198 7.270 
(p-value) (0.0038) (0.2966) 
R2 I Adj.R2 0.96 0.90 
The number in parentheses is the t-statist1c. 
The number above it is the coefficient. 
LU Pl LMCITY 
0.3854* 0.4823*** 
(1.809) (3.424) 
-0.1094 -0.0901 
(-1.001) (-1.248) 
-0.4702*** 0.9490*** 
(-3.540) (10.805) 
0.6004*** -0.7730*** 
(4.005) (-7.798) 
0.6469*** 0.6512*** 
(2.910) (4.430) 
-0.0340 0.0237 
(-0.652) (0.688) 
0.06067** -0.0083 
(2.151) (-0.447) 
445.186 394.164 
(0.0000) (0.0000) 
21.651 15.052 
(0.0029) (0.0353) 
0.96 0.99 
LUPI 
0.5470*** 
(3.080) 
-0.0633 
(-0.582) 
-0.4613*** 
(-3.339) 
0.35650*** 
(3.666) 
0.5684*** 
(2.577) 
-0.0462 
(-0.873) 
0.0161 
(0.387) 
449.790 
(0.0000) 
20.045 
(0.0055) 
0.95 
***,**,and* indicate significance at the 99 percent, 95 percent, and 90 percent levels respectively. 
LMCITY 
0.5982*** 
(5.836) 
-0.1093** 
(-2.058) 
0.8710*** 
(19.541) 
-0.7110*** 
(-9.296) 
0.7887*** 
(7.293) 
0.00972 
(0.291) 
0.0057 
(0.221) 
-1.985** 
(-2.385) 
446.717 
(0.0000) 
8.238 
(0.3121) 
0.90 
.i-
v> 
144 
negative in the largest city equations that favors random-effects model. 
LGDP is significant and negative in all urban primacy equations, and 
significant and positive in the largest city equations. This indicates that urban 
primacy falls when the size of a country--GDP, population, land area-- increases. 
This does not mean necessarily that the largest city size decreases; it could mean that 
the second largest city increases more rapidly than the first largest. 
Given the coefficient of GDP in city size equation, the latter interpretation is 
the correct one. In table 6.1 we report LGDPC's coefficient holding LPOP and 
LLAND constant. In table 6.2 we test LGDPC holding LGDP constant, which 
implies a reduction in LPOP and LLAND. The coefficient ofLGDPC is significant 
and positive for the urban primacy equations and is significant and negative in the 
largest city equations (table 6.2). In smaller countries with higher levels of 
development primacy is greater but the largest city is smaller. This implies that in 
smaller countries, the second largest city is proportionately smaller than the largest 
city. This may indicate that people with higher income prefer the largest city 
because it has services and other amenities that are not available in other cities in 
smaller countries. The share of labor outside agriculture is significant and has a 
positive effect in all equations. The export coefficient is not significant in any 
equation. The coefficient of dictatorship, as in table 6.1, is positive and significant in 
the urban primacy equation and insignificant in the largest city equation. The 
coefficient of transportation is not significant in any equation. 
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Cross-sectional Analysis: 
Table 6.3 shows the cross-sectional results of the LUPI and the LMCITY equations 
using averaged data. The coefficient of the capital dummy variable (DCAP) is 
positive and significant in all equations. The population coefficient is significant in 
all equations; it has a negative sign in the LUPI equations and a positive sign in the 
LMCITY equations. The results for these two variables confirm the panel data 
results. 
The coefficient of land area is significant or approaches significance in the 
urban primacy equations, It is insignificant inthe city size equations, which is the 
opposite pattern to that of the panel data equations. Similarly, unlike the panel data 
results, LGDPC is insignificant in all equations. LLABOR is negative and 
insignificant in all primacy equations, but it is positive and significant in all main 
city equations. If we accept these coefficients, we may infer that the share of labor 
force outside agriculture would increase largest city population but may not increase 
urban primacy. This may happen because in addition to increasing largest city 
population, this variable also inc,:reases the population of the second largest city and 
other cities in a nation's urban system. 
The export coefficient is negative and significant in all main city equations while it is 
negative and significant in only two of the urban primacy equations. As we have 
previously suggested, an average over time of the export variable tends to be 
significant, although annual measures do not have significant effects. 
The dictatorship coefficient is significant when it is combined with political 
Table 6.3 
Comparison of LUPI and LMCITY 
Cross-sectional Model 
VARIABLE LUPI LMCITY LUPI LMCITY LUPI LMCITY LUPI LMCITY 
CONSTANT -0.9268 -0.0524 -2.2746 -0.9888 -2.5313 -2.4569 -0.6363 -0.0845 
(-0.333) (-0.029) (-0.781) (-0.531) (-0.778) (-1.321) (-0.228) (-0.046) 
DCAP I 1.5961*** 0.6943** 1.4279*** 0.5774** 1.4478*** 0.529** 1.6490*** 0.6884** 
(3.987) (2.693) (3.456) (2.185) (3.345) (2.115) (4.087) (2.591) 
LPOP I -0.4039** 0.6677*** -0.3990** 0.6711*** -0.4389** 0.6651*** -0.4142** 0.6688*** 
(-2.357) (6.049) (-2.367) (6.224) (-2.393) (6.349) (-2.414) (5.919) 
LLAND I 0.3034* 0.0945 0.2804 0.0785 0.2923 0.0554 0.3198* 0.0927 
(1.723) (0.833) (1.612) (0.706) (1.594) (.529) (1.810) (0.797) 
LGDPC I 0.3011 0.1117 0.4154 0.1907 0.4484 0.3219 0.3099 0.1108 
(0.3798) (0.515) (1.215) (0.872) (1.222) (L536) (0.920) (0.500) 
LLABOR I -0.9266 1.0358** -0.9739 1.0029** -1.0825 0.8004* -0.9888 1.0427** 
(-1.321) (2.293) (-1.411) (2.271) (-1.496) (1.937) (-1.405) (2.251) 
EXPORT I -0.00228 -0.0205** -0.0255* -0.0224** -0.0293* -.0264*** -0.0212 -0.0207** 
(-1.604) (-2.247) (-1.808) (-2.486) (-1.947) (-3.65) (-1.484) (-2.204) 
DICT I 0.4593 0.3191 0.683 0.7228** (1.338) (1.453) (1.501) (2.780) 
PO LINS I 3.9138 9.5306** (0.572) (2.439) 
UNREST I i -2.5402 -5.3115** (-0.678) (-2.481) 
LTRANS I j -0.0772 0.0085 (-1.012) (.170) 
Adj.R2 I 0.41 0.88 l 0.43 0.89 i 0.40 0.91 i 0.41 0.88 
The number in parentheses is the t-statistic. 
The number above it is the coefficient. 
***,**,and* indicate significance at the 99 percent, 95 percent, and 90 percent levels respectively. +o 
°' 
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VARIABLE LUPI LMCITY 
CONSTANT -l.4377 -0.7044 
(-0.522) (-0.381) 
DCAP l.5528*** 0.7153*** 
(4.096) (2.815) 
LPOPDENS -0.3537* -0.1251 
(-l.956) (-1.032) 
LGDP -0.0784 0.7776*** 
(-0.567) (8.394) 
LGDPC 0.4192 -0.6100** 
( l.037) (-2.250) 
LLABOR -0.9245 0.9325* 
(-1.331) (2.003) 
EXPORT -0.0188 -0.0190* 
(-1.299) (-1.963) 
DICT 
POLINS 
UNREST 
LTRANS 
Adj.R' 0.43 0.88 
Table 6.4 
Comparison of LUPI and LMCITY 
Cross-sectional Model 
LUPI LMCITY LUPI 
-2.526 -1.678 -2.5417 
(-0.870) (-0.883) (-0.784) 
l.3995*** 0.5781 ** l.4100*** 
(3.495) (2.204) (3.326) 
-0.3146* -0.0901 -0.3150 
(-1.719) (-0.752) (-1.593) 
-0.0978 0.7601 *** -0.1252 
. (-0.706) (8.383) (-0.843) 
0.5324 -0.5087* 0.5784 
(1 .285) .; · (-1.875) (l.293) 
-0.9606 0.9002* -1.0378 
(-1.390) {l.989 (-1.421) 
-0.0216 -0.0216** -0.0250 
(-1.483) (-2.259) (-1.577) 
0.3886 0.3477 0.5312 
(1.130) (l.544) (1.137) 
l.9818 
(0.284) 
-1.452 
(-0.380) 
0.44 0.89 0.40 
The number in parentheses is the t-statisttc. 
The number above it is the coefficient. 
LMCITY 
-3.2152* 
(-l.726) 
0.4812* 
(l.977) 
-0.0198 
(-0.175) 
0.7174*** 
(8.408) 
-0.3205 
(-1.248) 
0.6872 
{l.638) 
-0.0271 *** 
(-2.974) 
0.7931*** 
(2.956) 
10.235** 
(2.551) 
-5.6826** 
(-2.587) 
0.91 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 99 percent, 95 percent, and 90 percent levels respectively. 
LUPI 
-l.2101 
(-0.438) 
1.5849*** 
(4.166) 
-0.3575* 
(-1.977) 
-0.0816 
(-0.591) 
0.4477 
{l.105) 
-LOI 14 
(-1.445) 
-0.0178 
(-1 .228) 
-0.0749 
(-1.002) 
0.43 
LMCITY 
-0.7827 
(-0.415) 
0.7043** 
(2.717) 
-0.1238 
(-1 .005) 
0.7787*** 
(8.266) 
-0.6198** 
(-2.244) 
0.9624* 
(2.018) 
-0.0193* 
(-l.961) 
0.0258 
(0.506) 
0.87 
""" -.J 
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instability and unrest variables in the main city equation. The political instability 
coefficient is positive and significant. The interaction variable of dictatorship and 
political instability (UNREST) is also significant with a negative sign. The 
transportation coefficient is never significant. These are the same results that Ades 
and Glaeser report. 
When LGDP is added and LPOPDENS replaces LPOP and LLANO in the 
cross-sectional model (table 6.4), LGDPC and LPOP results change but results for 
the rest of the variables do not change much. The findings for DCAP, LLABOR, 
and EXPORT are similar to the table 6.3 results. The coefficient ofLPOPDENS is 
significant and has a negative sign in three urban primacy equations, but it is not 
significant in any of the largest city size equations. LGDP's coefficient is positive 
and significant in all largest city equations, but it is insignificant in the urban 
primacy equations. LGDPC is positive and insignificant in the urban primacy 
equations, but it is significant and negative in three of the largest city equations. The 
three political variables are significant in the largest city equation. 
Conclusions: 
When variables that are similar to Ades and Glaeser's variables are used in 
panel data and cross-sectional analyses, we find that when the capital city is the 
largest city, it has a positive effect on both the size of the largest city population and 
urban primacy. While the population size of a country is positively associated with 
the population of the largest city, it is negatively associated with urban primacy. 
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This indicates that the population of the second largest city, and perhaps other cities, 
in the urban system increases more rapidly than the population of the largest city. 
The level of economic development has a significant positive impact on LUPI and 
LMCITY in the panel data analysis, but it does not show that effect for the cross-
sectional analysis. 
We believe when LGDP variable is introduced to the model along with 
LGDPC, that weaken the cross-section approach and other results obtained in the 
cross-section equations. LGDPC's coefficient becomes negative in the city size 
equations. This may occur because we assume the size of a country's population and 
land area falls in order to hold LGDP constant. 
The share of labor outside agriculture increases the main city size (in all 
tables) for obvious reasons. This confirms Ades and Glaeser's results. The same 
variable is not as robust when LUPI is used. It shows a positive impact when panel 
data are used (table 6.1 and 6.2), but it is insignificant when cross-sectional data are 
used. The measure of openness and dictatorship variables agree with Ades and 
Glaeser findings only when cross-sectional analysis is used. 
The final thought that should be emphasized in this chapter is the operational 
differences between urban primacy and population size of the largest city of a nation. 
While LUPI take into consideration the ratio of the largest city to the second largest 
city, LMCITY does not contain any information other than that oflargest city 
population. Therefore, findings when LMCITY is the dependent variable do not 
reflect what is happening in the rest of the urban system, while findings when LUPI 
is used take into account the largest city population and the second largest city 
population. 
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CHAPTER VII 
Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Summacy: 
Several scholars have studied the effect of economic development and other 
economic factors on urban primacy. Other scholars have tested the effect of 
international factors according to the dependency and world system theories. Some 
have investigated the demographic effects, while others have studied the political 
effects on urban primacy. Different findings have been reached because different 
specifications of urban primacy index, different sample sizes, and different statistical 
techniques have been used. No agreement exists on the direction of the relationship 
between economic development and urban primacy, international trade and 
concentration of people in the primate city, or between demographic or political 
factors and urban primacy. 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of different factors on 
urban primacy. It combines economic, demographic, political and international 
factors in to test the effect on urban primacy of each factor separately and when 
different factors are combined. One main hypothesis of this study that has been 
tested is the curvilinear relationship between economic development and urban 
ISi 
pnmacy. This study also tested the hypothesis of dependency and world system 
school, urban bias theory, and several other economic, demographic and political 
hypotheses. We used panel-data and cross-sectional analysis to test these 
hypotheses. 
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We use the log of the ratio of the largest city population to the population of 
the second largest (LUPI) as the urban primacy index. This. can be used in a 
comparative study of different nations. Chapter IV used regression methods that 
produce results for the classical regression model, fixed-effects model, and random-
effects model. Chapter V used ordinary least squares (OLS) regression method to 
analyze political factors in cross-sectional models. Urban primacy index and the 
largest city size as dependent variables are compared in chapter VI. The full sample 
of this study includes 30 countries from Asia, Latin America, and North America, 
and 7 time periods from 1960 to 1990. 
Findings and Conclusions: 
Comparative studies need to use comparable measures. This study concludes that 
LUPI and LUP2 are comparable measures of urban primacy. We use LUPI for its 
simplicity and data availability. 
With regard to panel-data analysis, we find that both fixed and random effects 
models are favored over the classical regression model, and the fixed-effects model 
(FEM) is favored over the random one. Thus, the findings from the FEM are 
preferred. The basic economic determinants show significant effects on urban 
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pnmacy. An increase in a size of a country (GDP, population) reduces urban 
primacy. Furthermore, GDP has a positive effect on urban primacy at early stages of 
development, but it has a negative effect when a nation is more developed. The bell-
shaped hypothesis has modest support. LGDPC is positive and significant in most of 
the equations, while LGDPCSQ is negative in all equations. 
The education variable shows a significant positive impact on urban primacy. 
Educated people prefer to live in the largest city. The same impact occurs when the 
largest city is also the capital city. The fixed-effects model does not show a 
significant effect of population density on urban primacy, but the net effect of a 
nation's total population is negative. The share of labor outside agriculture shows a 
positive significant impact on urban primacy in some of the equations. The urban-
rural disparity has a significant negative impact on urban primacy. 
When the lagged dependent variable is included, it provides much 
explanatory power. It has a highly significant positive effect on urban primacy. 
When the independent variables are lagged one period, we find that the coefficient of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) has a significant positive effect on urban primacy. 
This result supports the hypothesis of dependency school that FDI leads to the 
concentration of people in the primate city. 
Cross-sectional analysis deals mainly with political variables that take 
prolonged time to change. The degree of openness to international markets has a 
significant negative impact on the concentration of people in the primate city. This 
finding supports Krugman's theory. Ades and Glaeser's (1995) hypothesis about the 
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positive relationship between dictatorship and concentration of people in the main 
city is also supported in this study. The dictatorship coefficient is significant and has 
a positive sign in most of the equations in the cross-sectional model. This study also 
finds results that support world system theory. The semiperiphery coefficient has a 
significant positive effect on urban primacy. Nations that are in the semiperiphery 
zone have higher urban primacy than other core and periphery nations. Finally, 
bureaucratic efficiency{BE) and political stability (POLSTAB) lead to a reduction in 
urban primacy and a more balanced urban system. BE and POL ST AB coefficients 
are negative and significant in most of the equations of table 5.3. 
When the largest city size is used as dependent variables in chapter VI, we 
find that, with panel-data analysis, LGDP, LGDPC, and DCAP coefficients have the 
expected significant effects on main city size and on urban primacy. Unlike urban 
primacy model, the main city model shows a significant positive impact of a nation's 
total population. Labor outside agriculture and population growth also have a 
significant positive impact on population of the largest city. 
When the cross-sectional model is used in chapter VI, the same effect of 
DCAP, LPOP, LLABOR occurs in all equations. The export coefficient has a 
significant negative effect on the main city size. The political variables (DICT, 
POLINS, and UNREST) are all significant. 
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Recommendations: 
Unlike many others, this study uses panel-data technique to capture the county and 
the time specific effects and tests a variety of hypothesis that have not tested together 
before. However, several questions can be raised for discussion and for future 
research. We present here some problems, suggestions, and recommendation for 
future studies. 
1. Urban primacy measures discussed in this study do not capture primacy in 
the best way possible. Further research to find a better measure of urban primacy is 
an important task. Because, for many countries, data of cities smaller than the first 
and the second largest are not available for different periods, scholars may be 
discouraged about finding a new improved measure. One solution may be for the 
United Nations to adopt a universal definition of urban area and motivate its 
members to use this measure. Another interesting point is the size difference of 
primate cities. Some primate cities have a population of less than half million 
people, while others have more than 1 o million residents. Do they have the same 
effects on their national economies? Do we have to give them equal weight when 
policies are made? 
2. Regarding research methodology, this study shows that, when panel-data 
technique is used, fixed and random effects models are favored over the classical 
regression model. Thus, the coefficients of the OLS may be biased because of the 
exclusion of relevant variables. This bias may exist in most of the cross-country 
studies that use OLS model. Allowing dummy variables for the fixed effects 
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eliminates this bias because of the correlation between fixed effects and the omitted 
variables 
3. Because some variables are hard to quantify, researchers use proxies to 
measure them. But these proxies do not exactly represent the real variables. For 
example, is life expectancy a good measure of human health? Is GDP per capita a 
representative measure of human development? The level of economic development, 
for example, is more than GDP per capita. It is also more comprehensive than 
education and health measures. It is an economic, social, cultural, and political 
phenomena. It encompasses equality and fair distribution of wealth and sources 
among all people in a country. Economic development does not mean much if 10 
percent of a nation's population have more than 40 percent of the nation's wealth or 
when development is concentrated in small portion of a country, while the rest of the 
country is very backward. Therefore, these measures should be taken with caution 
until more sophisticated ones are available. Kasarda and Crenshaw (1991, 492) give 
an example of how interpreting a proxy may be problematic. They refer to the ratio 
of non-agricultural to agricultural productivity as a proxy of urban bias and show that 
the validity of this proxy is questionable. They state that 
First, there is no guarantee that all modem production is located 
in urban area for any given Third World country. Second, this 
proxy variable does not guarantee that the productivity 
differential is related to an urban bias in public policies 
concerning infrastructural development, macroeconomic policy, 
or the placement of elite services. Finally, the variable at best 
measures the relative efficiency of urban areas over rural areas. 
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4. More comprehensive studies are required to cover new areas or expand 
research in existing ones. Many questions about urban primacy need to be answered. 
Some of these questions are: What is the effect of urban primacy on economic 
growth and what are the simultaneous effects of these variables on each other? 
Several studies have dealt with the effect of industrial sector on primacy, but how 
about the effects of the growing services and informal sectors on shaping the 
population of the largest city? How about the effect of information industry and high 
technology on urban primacy? How do social mobility and the existence of religious 
and ethnic minorities influence the concentration of people in a nation's main city? 
Is income inequality between rural and urban areas the main reason for migration to 
large cities? If several socio-economic and spatial inequalities occur within the 
largest cities why do people continue to move to them? Does the growth of new 
industries, such as tourism, help in reducing urban primacy? Is it possible to study 
international nodes without reference to national boundaries? Some of these 
questions have been investigated, but more comprehensive studies are required. 
5. This study uses data from thirty countries. Future research can use 
regional groupings to capture the effect of each region. Another grouping of 
countries can be explored. For example, dividing countries according to their size 
(GDP, population, and land), or grouping countries by their levels of GDP per capita, 
or their human development index. This may lead to further understanding of the 
factors that affect urban primacy. 
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6. Some scholars think that urban primacy is a natural phenomenon of 
modernization and suggest letting market forces decide the optimal size of cities; 
others consider urban primacy harmful and call for total intervention of governments 
to solve this problem. As in many things in life, the best solution is in the middle. 
A more balanced urban system may be achieved if the right policies are 
taken. Simmons (1979) recommends strategies aimed at discouraging rural 
migration to urban areas by improving rural conditions, by resettling potential 
migrants in frontier lands, and by redirecting rural migrants to new industrial 
"growth poles" located in non-metropolitan cities. Simmons asserts that this 
combination of policies may only slow, not stop, the growth of primate cities. 
Renaud (1981, 130) states that 
Direct national spatial policies have two roles. First, the 
provision of transport and communication infrastructure is 
crucial to releasing the growth potential of every region of the 
country. Second, by improving the comparative advantage of 
other areas, direct spatial policies help direct migration and 
resource flows away from the primate city. 
Mutlu (1989) suggests that urban primacy can be reduced by decreasing 
income inequality and decentralizing administration. He also suggests that if the 
capital is the economic, political, and administrative center, then the capital should 
be relocated. Of course, this last suggestion is hard to implement in most countries. 
The United Nations (1993, 36) asserts that 
as the primate city becomes larger and wealthier and more 
dominant, regional inequality increases. At what point is it in 
the self-interest of those in control to encourage the 
development of alternative urban centers and invest in building 
their infrastructure? Without such publicly funded investment, 
the urban hierarchy may remain unbalanced in favor of the 
primate city .... Urbanization policies often have little effect on 
the movement of people to the cities especially displaced 
workers who can no longer make a living in rural areas. 
Evidence has accumulated that shows that migrants will come 
to cities where there are jobs, in spite of living conditions in 
urban areas. 
Therefore, policies not only needed to discourage people from moving to 
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primate city; more importantly, policies are needed to improve the quality of life for 
the majority of the primate city population as well as for the population in other areas 
in a country. 
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APPENDIX A: 
List of Countries 
included in different Samples 
No. Full Sample Not in the 24 
Country 
Sample 
1 Argentina 
2 Bangladesh 
3 Bolivia 
* 
4 Brazil 
5 Canada 
6 Chile 
7 Colombia 
8 Costa Rica 
* 
9 Dominican Rep. 
10 Ecuador 
11 El Salvador 
* 
12 Guatemala 
* 
13 Honduras 
* 
14 India 
15 Indonesia 
16 Japan 
17 Korea (South) 
18 Malaysia 
19 Mexico 
20 Pakistan 
21 Panama 
22 Paraguay 
* 
23 Peru 
24 Philippines 
25 Sri Lanka 
26 Taiwan 
27 Thailand 
28 United States 
29 Uruguay 
30 Venezuela 
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APPENDIXB: 
Descriptive Statistics of Regression Variables, 1990 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
UPI 30 5.1778 5.5609 1.138 25.49 
UP2 30 2.1917 1.9998 0.5050 9.399 
UP3 30 0.28613 0.13388 0.05700 0.5830 
UP4 30 0.16326 0.10327 0.01440 0.4160 
GDP* 30 368570 867790 6983 4520000 
GDPC 30 4612.0 4426.7 1264. 18050 
GDPCSQ* 30 40213 82746 1598 325900 
POP* 30 75700 158300 2418. 849500 
LAND* 30 20127 44544. 285.0 187900 
PO PD ENS 30 8.2797 7.3156 0.5782 29.98 
EDUC 30 6.0290 2.6825 1.900 12.30 
DCAP 30 0.80000 0.40684 0.0000 1.000 
EXP 30 27.600 18.301 7.000 91.00 
GDPCGR 30 1.7543 3.0307 -3.838 9.179 
LABOR 30 0.67073 0.19089 0.3150 0.9720 
POPGR 30 1.9552 0.74016 0.4400 3.200 
URDISP 30 3.1794 2.2842 0.7768 13.21 
FDI 28 0.0095368 0.014016 -0.02604 0.05884 
MCITY* 30 6203.5 6266.0 297.0 25010 
DICT 30 1.5000 0.50855 1.000 2.000 
* add (000). 
APPENDIXC: 
List of Countries According to their 
positions in the World-System* 
No. Core Semi periphery Periphery 
1 Canada Argentina Bangladesh** 
2 Japan Brazil Bolivia 
3 United States Chile Costa Rica 
4 Colombia Dominican Rep.** 
f 
5 India Ecuador 
6 Korea (South) El Salvador 
7 Malaysia Guatemala 
8 Mexico Honduras 
9 Pakistan Indonesia 
10 Philippines Panama 
11 Taiwan** Paraguay 
12 Thailand Peru 
13 Venezuela Sri Lanka 
14 Uruguay 
* Countries are classified according to Nemeth and Smith 
(1985) classification published in Lyman, Brad (1992), 
"Urban Primacy and World- System Position," Urban Affairs 
Quarterly, 28 (1): 22-37. 
** countries that are not included in Lyman's list. 
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